Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Special Management Unit housing unit within the Lewisburg U.S. Penitentiary houses inmates identified as having violent tendencies or having a history of gang involvement while incarcerated. Inmates assigned to the SMU are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day, but can spend the remaining hour in a recreation cage. When first assigned to the SMU, inmates are interviewed by prison officials to ensure that inmates who may be hostile to each other are not housed in the same cell. Shelton, a USP inmate, filed a purported class action, alleging that the defendants have engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of improperly placing inmates who are known to be hostile to each other in the same cell. He also claims that the defendants fail to intervene when the predictable inmate-on-inmate violence erupts, and that defendants improperly restrain inmates who refuse cell assignments with inmates who are known to be hostile to them. The district court denied Shelton’s motion for class certification and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act claim, but vacated the denial of class certification and summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment claim. View "Shelton v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

Thousands of retired professional football players sued the National Football League and other defendants alleging primarily that the defendants failed to take reasonable actions to protect players from the risks associated with concussive and sub-concussive head injuries. The cases were consolidated and the district court “preliminarily approved” a proposed class-action settlement agreement and “conditionally certified for settlement purposes only” the settlement class and subclasses. Seven retired professional football players who object to the proposed settlement agreement and class certification, filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) petition for permission to appeal. The Third Circuit dismissed finding that the order was not an “order granting or denying class-action certification” under the plain text of the rule permitting interlocutory review. View "In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation" on Justia Law

Judon was injured while riding in a commercial passenger vehicle that was insured by Travelers. Judon sought first-party medical benefits of $7,636.40. Travelers paid $5,000, up to the policy’s first-party medical benefits limit. Judon filed a class-action complaint in state court, alleging that Pennsylvania law required that the policy offer up to $25,000 in first-party medical benefits. Judon alleged that “there are hundreds of members of the class” who were wrongfully denied payment of first-party benefits. Travelers removed to federal court, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, arguing that the parties were minimally diverse; the proposed class consisted of at least 100 putative members; and the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The district court remanded, finding that CAFA’s numerosity and amount-in- controversy requirements were disputed and placing the burden of proof on Travelers to establish jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Judon’s complaint unambiguously pleaded that the numerosity requirement was satisfied, so the court should have placed the burden of proof on Judon to show, to a legal certainty, that the numerosity requirement was not satisfied. The court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the amount-in-controversy requirement. View "Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

A.S., who suffers from a congenital birth defect, and his mother, Miller, who ingested Paxil while pregnant, sued GSK in the Philadelphia County Court, alleging that all parties were citizens of Pennsylvania. GSK removed the case based upon diversity. On plaintiffs’ motion, the case was consolidated with other Paxil cases before a district court judge who had previously held that GSK was a citizen of Pennsylvania and who remanded A.S.’s case and the other consolidated cases to state court. The case returned to state court on January 4, 2012. On June 7, 2013, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Johnson, which held that GSK was a citizen of Delaware. Less than 30 days after the Johnson decision, GSK filed a second notice of removal in A.S.’s case and in eight other cases with the same procedural posture. The district court denied the motion and certified its order for interlocutory review. The Third Circuit directed remand to state court, holding that the second removal request was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) because there had been a final order. View "A.S. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp" on Justia Law

Facing asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits filed in the 1980s, a group of producers of asbestos and asbestos-containing products formed the Center for Claims Resolution to administer such claims on behalf of its Members. About 20 Members negotiated and signed the Producer Agreement, which established and set forth the mechanics of the Center and the obligations of the Members. After G-I failed to pay its contractually-calculated share of personal injury settlements and Center expenses, U.S. Gypsum and Quigley were obligated to pay additional sums to cover G-I’s payment obligations. G-I filed for bankruptcy and the Center, U.S. Gypsum, and Quigley each filed a proof of claim, seeking to recover for G-I’s nonpayment under the Producer Agreement. The Center settled its claim with G-I. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in G-I’s favor. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the Producer Agreement permits the Former Members to pursue a breach of contract action against G-I for its failure to pay contractually-obligated sums due to the Center, in light of their payment of G-I’s share. View "In re: G-I Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Quest provides diagnostic and clinical testing. In general, it tests a patient’s specimens upon the request of a referring physician. Once Quest bills a patient’s insurance provider, the provider reviews the claim and sends Quest an Explanation of Benefits (EOB) or an Electronic Remittance Advice (ERA), which informs Quest of the amount, if any, that the patient is responsible for paying. Quest then sends the patient a bill, and, if no response is received, it may turn the bill over to a collection agency. Plaintiffs in a putative class action claimed that Quest billed patients in excess of the amount stated on the EOB or ERA. The district court denied certification as to all four proposed classes and granted summary judgment against an individual plaintiff, as to her state law claims of consumer fraud and unjust enrichment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court properly found that individual inquiries would be required to determine whether an alleged overbilling constituted unjust enrichment for each class member. View "Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc." on Justia Law

The cases on appeal are among several similar actions brought by a single law firm alleging systemic underpayment in the healthcare industry in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, Pennsylvania law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001,and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. Nurses and other patient-care professionals, on behalf of a putative class, claimed that their employers maintained unlawful timekeeping and pay policies: under the “Meal Break Deduction Policy,” the timekeeping system automatically deducted 30 minutes of pay daily for meal breaks without ensuring that the employees actually received a break; under the “Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule Work Policy,” the employees were prohibited from recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts; under the “Unpaid Training Policy,” employees were not paid for time spent at “compensable” training sessions. The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The overtime claim was factually inadequate: the plaintiffs “failed to allege a single specific instance in which a named Plaintiff worked overtime and was not compensated for this time.” View "Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

Former employees of RHI filed suit on behalf of themselves and others, alleging that RHI failed to pay overtime and improperly classified them as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201. Both had signed employment agreements that contained arbitration provisions: “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment, termination of employment or any provision of this Agreement” shall be submitted to arbitration. Neither agreement mentions classwide arbitration. RHI moved to compel arbitration on an individual basis. The district court granted the motion in part, compelling arbitration but holding that the propriety of individual versus classwide arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide. The court entered an order terminating the case. Rather than immediately appealing, RHI proceeded with arbitration until the arbitrator ruled that the employment agreements permitted classwide arbitration. The district court denied a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s partial award. The Third Circuit reversed. Because of the fundamental differences between classwide and individual arbitration, and the consequences of proceeding with one rather than the other, the availability of classwide arbitration is a substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court absent clear agreement otherwise.View "Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are among 24,000 New Jersey merchants who entered into contracts for credit or debit point of sales terminals with Defendants and filed a class action, alleging that Defendants charged small business owners unconscionable and exorbitant fees for leasing terminals and added extra costs not included in the contracts. On July 31, 2013, the district court denied class certification. On August 19, 2013, Plaintiffs sought permission to appeal the denial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), conceding that the Rule 23(f) petition was filed beyond the 14 day deadline. The Third Circuit dismissed, stating that the time to file a Rule 23(f) petition runs from entry of the order, not service of a document. Counsel’s mistake or ignorance of the rules does not constitute excusable neglect; Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(1) states that a court cannot extend the time for filing a petition for permission to appeal. The court also noted that no motion for reconsideration was filed in the district court. View "Eastman v. First Data Corp." on Justia Law

Rahman filed a securities class action against KB, an importer of infant furniture and products, and individuals, alleging violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 and (2) and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The complaint alleged that defendants misled investors by artificially inflating KB’s stock price by issuing deceptive public financial reports and press releases dealing with compliance with customs laws and overall financial performance. A second amended complaint specified failure to disclose product recalls, safety violations, and illegal staffing practices. The district court dismissed for failure to satisfy the heightened scienter pleading standard required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc." on Justia Law