Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was detained for 1,072 days pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which requires that any person who is removable from this country because he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled substance be taken into custody and does not provide for release on bond. Petitioner, a citizen of Senegal, apparently had a state conviction for possessing a controlled substance. The district court concluded that the detention was lawful. The Third Circuit construed the pro se petition as seeking habeas corpus and reversed. The statute authorizes only detention for a reasonable period of time, after which the Due Process Clause requires that the government establish that continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the detention statute. Detention of petitioner for nearly three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable.

A Caucasian former police officer claimed that disciplinary action against him and his 1999 termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, because it was retaliation for his opposition to the city's racially discriminatory treatment of minority officers. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The Third Circuit affirmed, using the analysis from the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Once plaintiff established a prima facie case that his termination was motivated by his supervisor's retaliatory animus, it was the city's burden to come forward with evidence that it terminated plaintiff for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original biased action in preferring charges against plaintiff. The jury was properly instructed that it was plaintiff's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated after engaging in protected activity and that there was a causal connection between the termination and the protected activity.

Unlike many states, Pennsylvania allows felons to vote immediately upon release from prison. To correct widespread misunderstanding, public-interest organizations planned an advertisement encouraging ex-prisoners to vote. The Port Authority denied a request to place the ad on buses, based on a written policy, prohibiting noncommercial ads. Evidence indicated that, despite the policy, the Authority had accepted many noncommercial ads in recent years. The district court found viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the rejection was based on hostility to the ad's message and that the Authority is not now required to accept all noncommercial messages.

After an injury trial, plaintiff's attorney called jurors to ask about the award of damages and assignment of fault between the parties, apparently believing that there had been a clerical error on the verdict form. After a juror informed the magistrate judge, the judge concluded that the attorney had violated ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 by initiating post-verdict contact with a juror. The Third Circuit vacated, first holding that the attorney had standing to appeal. The judge abused his discretion and denied the attorney's due process rights by not following the disciplinary procedures outlined in Local Rule 83.2(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and by failing to give sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to finding misconduct and imposing sanctions.

The school board has a policy of praying at its regular meetings, routinely attended by students. The district court upheld the policy, based on a Supreme Court holding that Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that a school board may not claim the exception established for legislative bodies and that traditional Establishment Clause principles governing prayer in public schools apply.

The Township filed disciplinary charges against an officer, which were suspended pending state investigation, and placed him on paid leave. The state and county declined to investigate. The Township reinstituted charges. Before his hearing, the officer filed suit claiming violation of due process rights by publicizing charges and failing to provide a hearing before suspension; violation of the First Amendment by retaliating for requesting a hearing. The court granted summary judgment to the Township on due process claims, but denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claim. After a hearing, the board fired the officer. Because the officer waited until just before trial, the district court denied a motion to amend. He filed a new complaint, alleging retaliatory termination. The jury found for defendants on the First Amendment claims. The court dismissed the second suit, citing res judicata. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Res judicata does not bar claims predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint. The court properly instructed jurors that the township should prevail if it showed that it would have reached the same decision absent protected conduct. The officer's interest in a hearing before suspension with pay was outweighed by the township's interest in maintaining the integrity of its police force.

The school district and chief of police sent an e-mail to officials and citizens instructing them "if you see this person in or around the district schools, please contact the police." Plaintiff claimed that the email used his real name and stated that he had been known to hang around schools, had not approached any kids, and that his mental status was unknown. It contained his picture, home address, the make, model, and license plate number of his vehicle, and his driver's license number. His suit, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged deprivation of freedom of movement, illegal seizure of personal records, violation of right to privacy, conspiracy, and failure to train, supervise and discipline agents. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously and, after a deadline for filing in his own name passed, dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court provided two independently sufficient reasons for dismissal: refusal to prosecute in compliance with court orders and consideration of factors concluding that plaintiff would not suffer substantial harm that might sufficiently outweigh the public interest in an open trial.

An essential witness in a rape, robbery, murder prosecution refused to testify because of threats to her family and went as far as pulling a knife on a police officer. She evaded capture during two trials and, after a second conviction was overturned, was jailed as a material witness. A February 2 trial date was continued until May 25; the witness was incarcerated for 54 days before being released. The prosecution did not notify the judge who had ordered the incarceration of the continuance and, when the witness's father died, allowed her only a short visit to the funeral home, in handcuffs. Following a remand, the district court denied the prosecutor qualified immunity with respect to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. The incarceration was a seizure, for Fourth Amendment purposes, and a reasonable jury could find the duration unreasonable. As the sole government official in possession of the relevant information, the prosecutor had a duty of disclosure that was neither discretionary nor advocative, but was a purely administrative act, not entitled to the shield of immunity,

Defendant was indicted on one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). Following indictment, arrest, and detention, the government sought to collect a DNA sample, relying on 42 U.S.C. 14135a(a)(1)(A), which permits the collection of DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted. The district court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and prohibited the government from taking the sample prior to conviction. After determining that the matter concerned a collateral order, subject to interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement interests; such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioner, convicted of armed assault and murder in 1977, is detained in a federal facility in West Virginia. While in prison he was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He is serving an aggregate sentence comprised of sentences that were imposed under the D.C. Code and the U.S. Code. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition, reasoning that the U.S. Parole Commission had a rational basis for denying parole (the unusual circumstances of his offenses) and that petitioner was not entitled to benefit from the release-date guarantee under the earlier version of the Sentencing Reform Act because the Commission applied D.C. Code regulations, not the current SRA, in declining to set a parole date. The District Court also denied a certificate of appealability explaining that petitioner, in custody by virtue of a District of Columbia judgment, is considered a state prisoner and had not made the threshold showing for issuance of such a certificate. The First Circuit agreed, stating that petitioner had not made the necessary showing of constitutional violations that would justify issuance of a COA.