Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following an altercation concerning auto repairs, plaintiff, an African American, found damage to his car and was threatened by a garage employee; he called 911. Garage employees also called 911. When officers responded, plaintiff and defendant, a white officer, had a verbal altercation about whether defendant was responding as he would respond to a white victim. Defendant handcuffed plaintiff, placed him in the patrol car, and spoke to the garage employees without questioning plaintiff. He arrested plaintiff and one of the garage employees. Plaintiff was acquitted. The garage employee apparently entered a plea of no contest. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, a jury awarded plaintiff $80,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. The district court overturned the verdict and entered judgment for defendant. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show unlawful seizure, equal protection violations, and that the defendant lacked probable cause for the vehicle search that followed towing of plaintiff's car.

The state notified a concert promoter that use of two names might violate New Jersey trademark laws. The promoter provided evidence of common law trademarks, but the state notified the hotel venue to advertise the shows as a "tribute" or "salute" to named groups. The promoter filed suit, claiming that the state's enforcement violated the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125 and its civil rights. The district court entered a temporary restraining order, but the state changed its position. The court did not issue an injunction and denied attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the "catalyst" theory and holding that the promoter was not a "prevailing party." Even the judge did not consider the TRO an enforceable judgment on the merits and the state's change of position mooted the constitutional issues.

The plaintiffs were subjected to raids as part of "Operation Return to Sender," implemented to apprehend fugitive aliens. The complaint included "Bivens" claims: unreasonable home entries, unreasonable searches; unreasonable seizures, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force by four individuals; a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim involving three individuals; and a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim by one individual. The district court denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants, high-level federal Immigration enforcement supervisors, participated in the raids, adopted an unconstitutional policy, or had legally sufficient notice of the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates. They did not identify what defendants should have done differently with respect to training or other matters, that would have prevented the unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs may pursue official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any further intimidation or unlawful entry. The court did not address individual capacity claims for damages against the lower-ranking agents

The student was suspended for using a home computer to create an internet profile of her middle school principal, including sexual content and vulgar language. The site did not include the principal's name, but did include his picture from the school website. Other students were not able to view the site from school computers and the student made an effort to limit viewers to a few of her friends. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school on First Amendment claims (42. U.S.C. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed in part. The school violated the student's rights in suspending her for for off-campus speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school. There was no disruption beyond "general rumblings" and a few minutes of talk in class; the profile was outrageous and there was no evidence that anyone took it seriously. The court rejected the parent's Fourteenth Amendment claim of interference with their "liberty" interest in raising their child. The court affirmed that the school handbook and computer use policy were not overbroad and vague.

A student reported to her aunt, a member of the school board (plaintiff), that she had seen a teacher hugging another student. The investigation ended because the teacher and minor student denied the incident and the plaintiff raised concerns about the reporting student's credibility. More than a year later, a police officer saw the teacher and the minor student in a sexual encounter and the teacher was arrested. A copy of the report on an investigation that followed, containing plaintiff's assertions about her niece's credibility, was leaked to the press during a school board election. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy with respect to the information at issue. Plaintiff may not have intended wide-dissemination of her opinion but she volunteered it to others and it did not concern autonomy and independence in personal decision-making.

The petitioner, convicted in 1982 of murdering a police officer and sentenced to death, exhausted state appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and subsequently remanded the Third Circuit's grant of relief on the sentence. On remand, the Third Circuit held that the death sentence must be vacated because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent (Mills v. Maryland). The verdict form and jury instructions, particularly a statement that â[w]e, the jury, have found unanimously . . . one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,â created a substantial probability the jury believed it was precluded from finding a mitigating circumstance that had not been unanimously agreed upon. The court noted that the form has been amended since the petitioner's conviction.

An officer issued a misconduct report against the plaintiff (an inmate) following an attack on another inmate. Although the officer had stated that the incident was recorded, a hearing officer accepted a statement that it was not recorded and accepted the victim's refusal to testify, found the plaintiff guilty, and imposed sanctions. Sanctions included loss of a prison job, disciplinary confinement, and assessment of the plaintiff's prison account; the Third Circuit later determined the plaintiff had a protected property interest in the account. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but on remand found a due process violation in the hearing officer's failure to independently evaluate the credibility of a confidential informant. The Third Circuit affirmed that due process was not violated by the decision to allow the victim not to testify, but reversed in part, holding that due process was violated by the hearing officer not seeking to view documentary evidence (the recording) requested by the inmate, absent legitimate institutional concerns. The court affirmed that damages are precluded by qualified immunity and ordered the misconduct expunged, but denied other relief. A reasonable official in the position of the hearing officer would not have known that her actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.

A police officer was suspended for his handling of another officer's complaint against superior officers in violation of policies governing use of the computer system. A union grievance resulted in an award of back pay and benefits to the date of the award. The Office of the Inspector General issued a report several months after the incident and scheduled a hearing, which resulted in termination. After filing another union grievance, the officer was reinstated without back pay. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, first holding that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Under Pennsylvania law, the officer had a protected property interest in his job and, absent extraordinary circumstances, was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing, but that right was not clearly established. Prior case law could have been interpreted as indicating that the post-suspension union grievance hearing was adequate. The notice of the termination hearing was adequate, despite not identifying the specific rules allegedly violated.

An Erie County resident had spoken during the public part of 14-15 council meetings before he attempted to object to a motion on an ordinance after the close of public comments. After being told that he was out of order, the resident continued to assert violation of the Sunshine Act and was escorted out. The chair sent a letter stating that the resident could be banned from future meetings if he was disruptive. The district court dismissed civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983), except against the chair. A jury awarded $5,000, but the court entered judgment in favor of the chair. The Third Circuit affirmed. The meeting was a limited public forum, so the council had the right to impose narrowly-tailored, reasonable content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions. The resident had adequate alternatives for raising objections to procedures used in adopting ordinances; the evidence did not establish that the chair intended to suppress his message because of content or personal hostility. The only difference between the resident and other speakers at the meeting was the timing of his comments. Because the resident had waived the claim, the court declined to consider whether the council satisfied the state Sunshine Act by reserving time for public comment, but held that the Act does not change the scope of First Amendment rights.