Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Long filed an suit against city and state police and forensic chemists, claiming conspiracy to obtain a murder conviction against him by presenting false evidence and preventing him from obtaining DNA testing that would prove his innocence (42 U.S.C. 1983). After screening (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2); 1915A), the district court found that the claims were barred unless he could demonstrate that his conviction was invalid. Dismissal was entered on the docket August 21, 2006, so that he had until September 4 to file a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. On September 25, he filed the motion with a letter explaining that he had not received the filings until September 22, because of a transfer from one prison to another. The district court treated the motion as timely, but rejected it on the merits. The order was entered on the docket October 6. On October 31, Long signed a notice of appeal that was timely from the denial of reconsideration, but untimely from the dismissal order. The Third Circuit affirmed without deciding the delay issue, finding that it had jurisdiction based on the denial of reconsideration. View "Long v. Atl. City Police Dep't" on Justia Law

An inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections brought a civil rights action in 2000 claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group, a subgroup of Sunni Muslims. Several claims were dismissed, and, following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of individual defendants on a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that policies and practices violated the inmate's right to practice his religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The Third Circuit affirmed. RLUIPA does not permit individual-capacity suits and defendants had qualified immunity with respect to the 1983 claims. Plaintiff did not have a clearly established right to separate religious services in accordance with the Habashi sect when Sunni Islamic services were already available. View "Sharp v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff led a demonstration at the entrance to the Liberty Bell Center at Independence National Park, sharing the sidewalk with tourists, carriage operators, and Komen Foundation walk participants. A ranger told plaintiff to vacate the sidewalk because it was not a designated First Amendment area; he issued an oral permit to continue on the opposite side. Plaintiff refused. Two hours later, the ranger escorted him off the sidewalk. Plaintiff was convicted of violating a permit, 36 C.F.R. 1.6(g)(2), and interfering with agency functions, 36 C.F.R. 2.32. The Third Circuit found insufficient evidence of violating a permit, and vacated conviction for interfering with agency functions as invalid under the First Amendment. Plaintiff sued the Park Service, the Department of the Interior, and the rangers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding the rangers entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not clearly established at the time, and he could not show that the rangers acted without probable cause when arresting him. Plaintiff was not similarly situated to other groups that were allowed to stay. Claims for declaratory relief were moot; the Park Service has revised regulations to designate the sidewalk as a First Amendment area, and now exempts small groups from permit requirements. The Third Circuit affirmed View "Marcavage v. Nat'l Park Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1990 of murder and arson after his 20-year-old mentally ill daughter died in a fire at a religious retreat. His attorney argued that the deceased set the fire as a suicidal act. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. On remand for an evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court received substantial evidence about developments in the field of fire science that provided reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation. The court nonetheless affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied an appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit remanded for discovery. Petitioner was diligent in state court to develop his claims that newly developed scientific evidence establishes that the expert testimony at his trial was fundamentally unreliable, in violation of due process, and that he is actually innocent. He has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that discovery is essential to the development of his federal claims. View "Lee v. Tennis" on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner was sentenced to death following his convictions in Pennsylvania state court for first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. After exhausting state court remedies, he filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied relief on guilt phase claims, but granted the writ as to the death sentence, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or introduce expert mental health testimony and institutional records in mitigation. Petitioner then filed, and the court denied, an FRCP 59(e) motion to amend the judgment based on alleged newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase of trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first holding that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is not a second or successive petition, whether or not it advances a claim; such a motion lies outside jurisdictional limitations that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) imposes upon multiple collateral attacks. The district court was within its discretion in finding that the evidence submitted was not newly discovered, since petitioner had possession of it many months before the District Court denied habeas relief. Trial counsel's performance was inadequate and petitioner can show prejudice. View "Blystone v. Horn" on Justia Law

The municipalities that make up the fire protection district had populations that were 69.6% Hispanic, 22.9% white, and 3.4% African-American. In 2008, the district employed 302 firefighters: 240 whites, 58 Hispanics, and two African-Americans. When this litigation began, the district sought to fill 35 to 40 new firefighter positions. Six Hispanic applicants earned passing scores on the firefighter exam and satisfied a residency requirement. Based on their scores they ranked 21, 25, 26, 45, 49, and 70 on the residents-only list. They would rank much lower if non-residents were included on the same list. The NAACP successfully sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the residency requirement was invalid as having a disparate impact on African-American applicants. The fire district and the Hispanic applicants appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the district's claims of concerns about impact on Hispanic applicants.View "Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue" on Justia Law

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony. View "Brown v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

Plaintiiff, a deputy serving a bench warrant, entered a garbage-filled residence. She and her partner discovered that they were covered with fleas and were directed to proceed to an Emergency Management Building. They were told to stay inside their cruiser until a superior officer arrived. About 20 minutes later, superior officers arrived and began to film plaintiff for a training video. Despite the heat and biting insects, plaintiff was told to remain in the car. Plaintiff alleges that officers laughed at her and filmed her in a semi-nude state at the hospital, taunted her because of a tattoo, and showed the video to other officers.The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, with respect to unreasonable search and seizure and failure to train claims, but reversed with respect to a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim. Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the decontamination area, particularly with respect to members of the opposite sex. A dispute of material fact exists as to which of her body parts were exposed to members of the opposite sex or filmed while she was in that area. View "Doe v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white male, applied for the position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark. He was rejected because he lived in Rutherford; Newark has a residency requirement for non-uniformed employees. Plaintiff claimed the rule had a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanics because Newark's population does not reflect the racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding area. In a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1),the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Third Circuit reversed. Factual issues exist as to how to define the appropriate relevant labor market. Even if the city of Newark itself is the relevant labor market, the court erred in its statistical analysis and applied an incorrect standard when analyzing the business necessity defense.

The Township proposed redevelopment that would eliminate 327-329 existing homes in a neighborhood, occupied predominantly by low-income minority residents, and replace them with more expensive housing, unaffordable to current residents. About half of the existing brick row houses, built in the 1950s, were owner-occupied. A 2000 report described the area as characterized by blight, excess land coverage, poor land use, and excess crime; the Township began to acquire properties. By 2008, 75 homes had been destroyed and 148 had been acquired and left vacant. By 2009, 110 more homes were destroyed, causing noise, vibration, dust, and debris. Residents alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3604(a)); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. 1982) ; and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the Township. The Third Circuit reversed. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the residents, the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA. The court must ask whether the Township's legitimate objectives could have been achieved in a less discriminatory way. Contrasting statements about the cost and feasibility of an alternative relying on rehabilitation, create genuine issues of material fact.