Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1993 Vasquez was sentenced to 262 months for heroin offenses. In 1996, he was sentenced to 14 months, to run consecutively, for possession of a prohibited object. His projected release date is October, 2012. The Second Chance Act, which applies, increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and requires the Bureau of Prisons to make individual determinations that ensure that placement is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of success and to provide incentives for participation in skills development programs. Vasquez’s team recommended a 151-180 day placement in a Residential Re-entry Center. Vasquez had not regularly participated in educational programs during his incarceration. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the BOP failed to comply with the reentry initiative and improperly added a factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been considered for incentives that were never properly implemented. The district court rejected the petition. Vasquez was not merely challenging construction of the Second Chance Act or implementation of the reentry initiative; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. There was no abuse of discretion in how the factors were balanced with goals of the Act. View "Vasquez v. Strada" on Justia Law

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress. View "Cardona v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendants, then 18 and 16 years old, accompanied by a group of other young Shenandoah residents began partying and drinking, then encountered Ramirez and became engaged in an argument with him that involved racial slurs. The incident escalated to the savage beating of Ramirez, who died two days later as a result of injuries he sustained. They were acquitted of all but minor state charges and each served six months. Following public outcry, they were convicted of criminal violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3631, which penalizes actions taken against an individual on account of his race, color or national origin, and with the specific intent to intimidate the victim or others like him from exercising their right to housing free of discrimination. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to a jury instruction that the government was not required to prove that issues of race and occupancy were the only motivations in beating Ramirez. The court also rejected claims that double jeopardy barred the federal trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction under 3631. View "United States v. Piekarsky" on Justia Law

Rolan was convicted in 1984 of murder and possession of an instrument of crime for a 1983 shooting death involving a drug sale. He obtained habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a retrial, the jury convicted Rolan of murder again. After exhausting appeals, he again sought habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was based on closing argument statements about the reliability of an alibi witness. The court properly allowed reading of a transcript of testimony by a witness, who died before retrial. View "Rolan v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 1993 Simon and others burglarized a house; the occupant arrived during the burglary and was shot dead. Simon was tried for felony murder, first degree robbery, and third degree burglary. Simon repeatedly moved to dismiss his appointed defender, Ayala. Ayala moved to withdraw claiming that Simon was hostile and was planning to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined. Ayala did not give an opening statement, call witnesses, or object to closure of the courtroom during closing arguments and jury instructions. Simon was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His direct appeals were unsuccessful. Another participant, who testified against Simon, had his sentence reduced for his assistance. Virgin Islands court rejected a petition for habeas corpus and, on appeal, Simon's attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The motion was granted and the petition was ultimately denied. The Third Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The Appellate Division did not err in applying Anders procedures to assess motions filed by court-appointed counsel to withdraw on post-conviction appeal, but erred in finding the Anders brief sufficient on its face. There were nonfrivolous issues that should be reviewed on the merits. View "Simon v. Gov't of the VI" on Justia Law

In 1977 defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. He was released in 1992, and, still on parole, was accused of inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter. He was convicted; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections recommended that his sentence include participation in a sex offender treatment program. He has been repeatedly denied parole based on refusal to participate. He claims that the program requirement that he admit committing the sex crime for which he was convicted would amount to self-incrimination and would have compromised his then-pending appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to address whether petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Even assuming that refusal to participate was the sole reason for denying parole, the actions of the Board did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of the program is not simply to gather information and an inmate has no right to parole. Penalties that merely alter the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amend View "Roman v. DiGuglielmo" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the Third Circuit addressed the FRCP 17 obligation to appoint counsel in cases involving parties who appear to be incompetent. The court held that the court abused its discretion in not appointing a representative for a prisoner for his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting deliberate indifference to medical needs. After multiple extensions, the inmate explained that he was in a psychiatric facility for four months. The judge denied further extensions and requests to appoint counsel. Meanwhile, he pled guilty to threats against the President and mailing threatening communications. A psychiatrist concluded that the inmate suffered delusional disorder, that some of his conduct is beyond his control, and that he has limited cognitive abilities. The court granted a motion to withdraw the plea, finding the inmate mentally incompetent. In the civil case, the judge, aware of the criminal proceedings, noted his concerns about mental competence, but again denied a motion to appoint counsel, stating that "it is unlikely that counsel could be found." The district court dismissed his case. In the other case, the court remanded for a determination of Rule 17 obligations. View "Powell v. Dr. Symons" on Justia Law

Serving a life sentence for murder, petitioner exhausted state appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. The petition was not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Allegedly "new," exculpatory evidence of witness tampering and the identity of the "actual shooter" was known to petitioner in 1994. Petitioner did not establish his diligence or extraordinarily burdensome circumstances and the evidence did not establish actual innocence. View "Sistrunk v. Rozum" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder after a third trial concerning a 1996 shooting death. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act, then sought federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted prior testimony from an unavailable government witness, even though petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness with newly-discovered impeachment evidence. Petitioner had a full opportunity for cross-examination at his second trial. The court also rejected claims based on the judge questioning a juror in camera, without petitioner present. View "Ross v. Dist. Attorney of the Cnty of Allegheny" on Justia Law

In 2005, an inmate filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, alleging personal injuries caused by defendants' exposing him to second-hand smoke. The district court dismissed, but news of the dismissal did not reach him for almost a year because of a prison transfer. The district court denied untimely motions to reopen the time for appeal and for reconsideration. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not relax the timing requirements for filing a motion to reopen the time for appeal under FRAP 4(a)(6), even for prison delay, because those requirements are governed by statute and are jurisdictional. The situation is not one in which time lost due to prison delays can be excluded. While prison delay may make an untimely motion for reconsideration timely, that motion was delayed by clerks' office errors, not by prison delay. View "Baker v. United States" on Justia Law