Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Byrd, an inmate at SCI-Frackville, filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint against the prison’s Superintendent, Corrections Health Care Administrator, two nurses, and the Chief Grievance Officer, alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to provide him with prescription eye drops for his glaucoma. Byrd proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court ruled in favor of all defendants. Byrd moved to proceed IFP on appeal. The clerk’s office notified Byrd that he had “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) and had to show that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury in order to be eligible for IFP status. The Third Circuit denied his petition, noting that Byrd’s three potential strikes included two cases that were “clearly” dismissed for failure to state a claim and that the other was an appeal that was dismissed by the Third Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) as “without merit.” Byrd did not file a motion alleging imminent danger, but submitted a response arguing that the clerk’s office made a mistake in determining that he had three strikes. The court held that non-IFP dismissals can count as “strikes.” View "Byrd v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Montone was an officer with the Jersey City Police Department from 1981 until 2010, when she retired as a sergeant. Plaintiffs are present or former sergeants in the JCPD. The plaintiffs claim that retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights and discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New Jersey state law, was the basis of their failure to be promoted from the rank of sergeant to lieutenant during Healy’s tenure as mayor and Troy’s tenure as police chief. Healy’s mayoral campaign was heated and personal. Plaintiffs claim that all promotions from sergeant to lieutenant were halted by Healy and Troy to penalize Montone for her support of Healy’s opponent. Each plaintiff had passed the civil service examination required to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning defendants’ motivations for their decisions. View "Montone v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Gilliam was fatally shot outside a Pittsburgh bar in 1997. Grant was convicted on the testimony of one witness, who based his identification on clothing. The witness was apparently granted leniency with respect to a parole violation in exchange for testimony; the criminal history of the witness was not disclosed to or discovered by the defense. Others, who had been present and who stated that Grant was not the shooter, were not called as witnesses. There was no physical evidence tying Grant to the crime. The state court denied Grant’s petition for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding for the first time that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be raised in the first instance in post-conviction proceedings. Grant then filed an unsuccessful pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541. The federal district court denied his habeas petition. The Third Circuit remanded, directing the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the ineffective assistance claim.View "Grant v. Lockett" on Justia Law

Knoll filed suit following her termination from the city Parks Department, alleging gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 951. The district court dismissed the gender discrimination claim; the jury returned a verdict in favor of Allentown on the harassment and retaliation claims. Following Knoll’s unsuccessful motions for a new trial and for sanctions, the court concluded that the motions were frivolous but declined to order sanctions. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the court was not required to engage in a six-factor analysis before dismissal of a post-trial motion, based on procedural noncompliance. View "Knoll v. City of Allentown" on Justia Law

Denny, an inmate at the Fairton, New Jersey, Federal Correctional Institution, was punished with 60 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit after a “shank” was found in a vent between the cell he shared with another inmate and another cell. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation. Denny sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241 arguing that prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from contraband. The mere discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in that cell possessed the contraband. View "Denny v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Opponents sought to enjoin enforcement of N.J. STAT. ANN. 2 2C:58-2(a)(7) and 2C:58-3(i), the One Gun Law, as preempted by 15 U.S.C. 5001(g)(ii), which provides that no state shall prohibit sale (other than to minors) of traditional B-B, paint ball, or pellet-firing air guns that expel a projectile through the force of air pressure. The One Gun Law prohibits the purchase or sale of more than one handgun per person per month, including B-B and air guns. They also claimed that implementation of the Law violates the Due Process Clause because exemptions for certain groups, such as collectors of handguns and competitive shooters are essentially illusory. In order to purchase more than one handgun per month under an exemption, the applicant must list, on a state-provided application form, the particular handguns, by serial number, that she wishes to purchase, so that a collector must convince the seller to take a gun off the market while the application is processed. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Law is not so onerous as to be a de facto prohibition. Even if objectors have a property interest, they did not demonstrate a deprivation of that interest. View "Ass'n NJ Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tying him to the crime. The testimony of Robles, Johnson’s friend, that Johnson had confessed guilt to him, was pivotal. Johnson filed multiple petitions under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, unsuccessfully claiming violations of Brady v. Maryland. He then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed, noting that it was not until discovery in Johnson’s federal habeas case that previously undisclosed evidence was uncovered, showing that, at the time Robles testified, he was under investigation for his role in a shooting, an assault, and multiple shots-fired incidents. Robles, who was never charged with any crimes despite repeated dealings with police in investigations involving guns and drugs, supplied police with information concerning an unrelated crime when his own involvement in an assault came under investigation. The jury never heard the impeachment evidence because when Johnson sought discovery of information concerning any criminal activity of Robles, charged or uncharged, the District Attorney who prosecuted Johnson represented to the state court that it had no information or police reports naming Robles as a suspect. View "Johnson v. Folino" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted of drug-related offenses. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review. Jenkins timely filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, which the trial court denied. He timely filed notice of appeal, but the superior court granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw and affirmed denial of his petition on November 10, 2009. On December 2, 2009, Jenkins filed a pro se pleading with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entitled, “Motion to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, and for the Appointment of Counsel.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court notified the Superior Court that Jenkins had filed a petition for allowance of appeal, but, on December 16, issued notice, stating that his pleading failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure unrelated to timing. Jenkins perfected his pleading on December 29, but, on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court denied his pleading without opinion. On May 7, 2010, Jenkins filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court, sua sponte, raised the issue of timeliness and ultimately dismissed as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Jenkins is eligible for statutory tolling of AEDPA’s limitation period. View "Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands" on Justia Law