Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ball, an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to her medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ball, pro se, asked to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Third Circuit determined that she is not eligible for IFP status and denied her motion for appointment of counsel, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 110 Stat. 1321 Ball had accrued three “strikes” under the PLRA and was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Ball v. Famiglio" on Justia Law

Washington’s friend, Taylor, worked at Dollar Express in 2000. Taylor observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no guards, cameras, or other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor met at Waddy’s home to plan the robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove the group to the store. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered, carrying tools to open the safe, and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington heard the shots, ran into the store, and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with items to sell. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. After learning that police had designated him a person of interest, Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify in exchange for a sentence of 55 to 110 years. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy for his participation as the driver. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained a conditional federal writ of habeas corpus, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried nontestifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause; the redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Keep A Breast Foundation educates young women about breast cancer and believes that negative body image inhibits awareness. To “start a conversation about that taboo in a lighthearted way” and break down inhibitions keeping young women from performing self-examinations, the Foundation began its “I [heart] Boobies!” initiative, which included selling bracelets emblazoned with that motto, KEEP A BREAST” and “check yourself!” The School District banned the bracelets. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the ban. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Supreme Court precedent does not sustain the ban. Under those decisions plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments on political or social issues; speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be categorically restricted if it cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues; and speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues may not be categorically restricted. The bracelets are not plainly lewd and comment on a social issue. The District did not show that the bracelets threatened to substantially disrupt school. View "B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Individuals who wish to carry a handgun in public for self-defense must obtain a license under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. Police evaluate applications based on criminal history, age and mental health requirements, familiarity with safe handling and use of handguns, and “a justifiable need to carry a handgun.” The meaning of “justifiable need” is: [T]he urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun. If the officer determines that the applicant has met all the requirements, the application is approved and sent to a judge, who “shall issue the permit to the applicant if, but only if, it is satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character and meets the statutory criteria. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of arguments that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry arms in public for self-defense; that the “justifiable need” standard was an unconstitutional prior restraint; and that the standard fails any level of means-end scrutiny. View "Muller v. Maenza" on Justia Law

In 1999, Shotts was charged with a string of burglaries. Following his arrest, Shotts offered to assist in an investigation into corruption at the county prison and the District Attorney helped secure Shotts’ release on bail. Once released, Shotts engaged in another crime spree and was charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, criminal conspiracy, receiving stolen property, passing bad checks, criminal trespass, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person, driving under the influence of alcohol, and with three probation violations. Because Shotts had made confessions, his attorney pursued a plea deal, but did not request discovery of police records. The Commonwealth offered a plea deal with a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The judge commented that the sentence seemed high, given Shotts’ assistance with the corruption investigation. Shotts rejected the deal and entered a general guilty plea, confirming that his lawyer had explained the maximum sentences. Despite evidence of Shotts’ cooperation and his earlier statement, the judge sentenced Shotts to 30½ to 133 years. Following state collateral review, during which Shotts had five different lawyers, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted. The Third Circuit affirmed on the merits, but stated that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s determination that Shotts’ claim was defaulted because he failed to raise it when first represented by new counsel was “an exorbitant application of an otherwise independent and adequate state rule” that cannot bar federal review. View "Shotts v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers stopped and frisked men they believed to be engaged in an illegal drug transaction. One of the men, Artis, accused the officers of stealing money. When the officers returned to headquarters, they learned that a complaint had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, and were taken to an office. They did not feel free to leave.They were joined by other superior officers and instructed to stay in the office and not use their cell phones. The officers obeyed instructions to remove their jackets and to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs and pull down their socks, and open their wallets, because they feared discipline and possible loss of employment. Internal Affairs officers questioned them for 15-20 minutes, then spoke to Artis, then stated that they believed Artis and told the officers that they were not needed for anything further. When they opened their lockers, it appeared that they had been searched. About 14 months later, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed. When police administrators undertake employment-related, non-criminal detentions, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure; the searches were reasonable. View "Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Brittany and Emily Morrow were subjected to threats and physical assaults by Anderson, a fellow student at Blackhawk High School. After Anderson physically attacked Brittany in the lunch room, the school suspended both girls. Brittany’s mother reported Anderson to the police at the recommendation of administration. Anderson was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. Anderson continued to bully Brittany and Emily. A state court placed Anderson on probation and ordered her to have no contact with Brittany. Five months later, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent and was again given a “no contact” order, which was provided to the school. Anderson subsequently boarded Brittany’s school bus and threatened Brittany, even though that bus did not service Anderson’s home. School officials told the Morrows that they could not guarantee their daughters’ safety and advised the Morrows to consider another school. The Morrows filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of their substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the school did not have a “special relationship” with students that would create a constitutional duty to protect them from other students and that the Morrows’ injury was not the result of any affirmative action by the defendants, under the “state-created danger” doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Morrow v. Balaski" on Justia Law

On May 25, 2011, Lassiter filed a complaint alleging Fourth Amendment violations for excessive force and false arrest. The complaint stated that the incident giving rise to Lassiter’s cause of action took place on May 22, 2009. On August 2, 2011, defendants filed an answer asserting six affirmative defenses, but did not raise the two-year statute of limitations as a defense. During a pretrial conference on September 20, 2011, without being prompted by either party, the district court observed that the statute of limitations appeared to have expired but that defendants failed to raise the issue in their answer. Defendants’ counsel acknowledged that they had missed this issue. The court suggested that defendants could amend their answer. On February 23, 2012, over Lassiter’s opposition, the court granted leave to amend the answer. On May 29, the court dismissed the complaint as time-barred. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had authority to raise the statute of limitations issue during the Rule 16 conference. View "Lassiter v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration officials “shall take into custody any‖ deportable alien who has committed various crimes” when the alien is released from detention for those crimes, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1). The Act requires officials to hold such aliens without any possibility of release while awaiting removal. Sylvain, a citizen of Haiti, entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1988. He has been convicted of more than 10 drug-related crimes and served a three-year prison sentence for making and selling cocaine. He was convicted for unlawfully possessing a weapon and for criminal mischief. Sylvain was last arrested in 2007 for possessing drugs. He pled guilty and received a conditional discharge. Under New York law, a conditional discharge does not require imprisonment or probation. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials arrested him in 2011, concluding that he was deportable and subject to mandatory detention, although he was last in custody four years earlier. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus, finding that mandatory detention did not apply. Sylvain received a hearing, paid bond, and is not in custody. His next removal hearing is in 2014. The Third Circuit reversed; mandatory detention does not require immediate detention. View "Sylvain v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law