Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Collins, a Pennsylvania prisoner convicted in 1993 of first-degree murder, appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. The court certified two questions for appeal: whether Collins was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel “inadequately prepared for trial and completely failed to conduct any investigation, including into the ballistics evidence” and whether trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, combined with alleged errors of the trial court, cumulatively caused him prejudice. The Third Circuit affirmed, while expressing “serious doubt that trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation.” In light of the uncontroverted evidence presented against Collins at trial, the state court’s determination that Collins failed to show he suffered prejudice was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington, which sets the standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Collins also did not exhaust his claim of cumulative error, which was, therefore, procedurally defaulted. View "Collins v. Sec'y, PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Sharif, an inmate housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit, punched a corrections officer. Sharif claims that C.O. Picone punched Sharif first. Picone testified that once he was struck, he attempted to protect himself and that C.O. Potance, who was helping Picone retrieve dinner trays, attempted to restrain Sharif. Sharif asserted that once Picone began to hit him, Potance and C.O. Pinto entered his cell and joined in the attack by choking him. Following the altercation, Sharif was handcuffed and moved to a “suicide cell.” He continued to cause commotion and was moved to a restraint chair. Sharif contends that while he was in the restraint chair, he was punched repeatedly by unnamed corrections officers, observed and permitted by Lieutenant Kospiah. Sharif was charged with aggravated assault, entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was convicted as charged. Sharif filed an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and moved to exclude evidence of his nolo contendere plea under Rule 410. The court admitted the evidence when Sharif took the stand and denied wrongdoing. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that Sharif’s credibility was already “suspect” and that the plea was, therefore, of minimal relevance.View "Sharif v. Picone" on Justia Law

Andrea and Aaron lived together with their infant son from 2007 until 2009, when Andrea obtained an order of protection that described Aaron’s history of violence, including incidents of choking, slapping, and giving Andrea a black eye. Aaron had a criminal history that included check fraud, intimidation of another woman with whom he had a child, and shoplifting as a juvenile. He had also been charged with “indecent assault/rape” but found not guilty. Aaron’s father, Michael, a police officer, was aware of his son’s history and that two of Aaron’s children had died under mysterious circumstances while in his custody (he later confessed to killing them). Aaron had a room in his father’s home, drove his father’s truck, and received mail at his father’s address. Five days after the order issued Aaron returned to Andrea’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up.” An arrest warrant for Aaron issued. While Michael was on vacation, Aaron went to his home, found a copy of the criminal complaint against him, drank a bottle of 99-proof alcohol, ransacked the house and found his father’s service-issued gun, then used it to kill Andrea. Aaron was later killed by police, outside his father’s house. Andrea’s estate sued Michael for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Michael’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, with instructions to dismiss, finding that Michael’s conduct fell within the immunity established by the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 922(z)(3). View "Estate of Arrington v. Michael" on Justia Law

George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), states that provide special education funds are eligible for federal funds to implement state-wide special education programs that guarantee a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to eligible disabled children, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). Pennsylvania enacted 24 P.S. 25-2509.5, its special education funding formula, under which each school district receives a base supplement, calculated by apportioning the total amount of base supplement money available among all districts based on the average daily membership of the district from the prior year under the assumption that 16% of students in each district are disabled. Plaintiffs, disabled students who attend schools in districts with a 17% or greater enrollment of special needs students and with a market value/personal income ratio of .65 or greater, claimed that Pennsylvania’s method violates IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act The district court found that the formula did not deprive the class of a FAPE as required by the IDEA and did not discriminate in violation of either the ADA or RA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that any class member was deprived of a service available to nonclass members. View "CG v. PA Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Since September 11, 2001, efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency have included revising internal FBI guidelines. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), released by the Attorney General in 2008, authorizes FBI agents to engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when conducting proactive assessments of criminal and terrorist threats and allows the FBI to collect and map data related to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU launched an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI,” including a series of coordinated FOIA requests (28 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A)) seeking records related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data. One request targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought information concerning implementation of authority to collect information and map racial and ethnic demographics and behaviors in local communities. The FBI identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records, eventually released 312 pages (some of which were partially redacted), withheld 186 pages as duplicative, and withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure. The ACLU sought an injunction for release of the withheld records. The district court ruled in favor of the FBI. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the in camera procedure employed for determining whether reliance on FOIA exclusion provision was justified.View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Doreen Proctor’s body was found beside a Pennsylvania country road in 1992, shot in the head and chest, badly beaten, and stabbed repeatedly. She had been scheduled to testify that day as a witness against Tyler, the defendant’s brother, in state court, as a confidential informant in making four controlled buys of cocaine from Tyler and from three other individuals: Evans, Hodge, and Brooks. She had testified against the four at their preliminary hearing and her testimony at Hodge’s trial resulted in a conviction. After Proctor’s death, the remaining trials were halted. Defendant was acquitted of murdering Proctor, but convicted of witness intimidation and served a term in state prison. After his release, federal prosecutors charged him with witness tampering by murder and by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 1512. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed. In 2009 the defendant filed a pro se motion, arguing that two recent Supreme Court decisions limited the scope of the witness tampering statute and rendered the acts for which he was convicted non-criminal. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to give defendant an opportunity to present evidence of actual evidence. View "United States v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Three individuals, each serving a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for offenses committed as juveniles, sought authorization to file successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 to raise Miller claims. The parties agreed that Miller states a new rule of constitutional law, but Pennsylvania (the state in which two petitioners were convicted) argued that Miller was not retroactive; the federal prosecutor claimed that Miller was retroactive but that the other petitioner’s sentence satisfied the new Miller rule. The Third Circuit found that the petitioners had made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive and authorized successive habeas petitions. View "In re: Grant" on Justia Law

Figueroa joined the Camden police force in 2003. In 2008, he was transferred to a new Special Operations Unit created to target guns, drugs and violence with his regular partner, Bayard. In 2011, Figueroa and Bayard were charged with a series of civil rights violations concerning falsification of evidence in drug cases. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242, Figueroa was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred by admitting the out-of-court statement of co-defendant Bayard; by excluding, as cumulative, police reports that Figueroa offered into evidence; by allowing improper expert opinion testimony from a prosecution fact witness on issues of constitutional law; and by refusing to give the jury a requested instruction concerning specific intent. The court properly applied the drug distribution sentencing guideline to the civil rights violations after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Figueroa was involved in distribution of narcotics. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In 1998 Keitel was convicted of first degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault, and five counts of recklessly endangering another person. His aggregate sentence was life imprisonment plus 35-70 years of imprisonment. Keitel’s appeals of the conviction and sentence were unsuccessful, as were his efforts to seek relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. While an appeal was pending, Keitel died. His family wanted to pursue the appeal to clear his name. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, View "Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz" on Justia Law