Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) maintains bank accounts, which inmates use to purchase items such as soap, deodorant, toothpaste, and over-the-counter medications. Inmates are also responsible for the costs some medical and legal services. Inmates earn wages, capped at 51 cents an hour, for work conducted for the prison, or get gifts from friends and family. In 1998, the legislature authorized the DOC to deduct from inmate accounts to collect “restitution or any other court-ordered obligation or costs.” The DOC promulgated a policy that each DOC facility makes “payments of 20% of the inmate’s account balance and monthly income for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties associated with the criminal proceedings … provided that the inmate has a balance that exceeds $10.00.” DOC authority to make deductions is automatically triggered when it receives a sentencing order that includes a monetary portion. There is no requirement that the order provide for automatic deduction. DOC does not provide inmates with any hearing or other opportunity to be heard before deductions commence. Inmates filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process rights. After post-remand discovery, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding some claims time-barred, that one inmate had received all process he was due under the Constitution, and that corrections officials were entitled to qualified immunity from claims for monetary damages. The Third Circuit reversed as to the due process claims noting disputes of fact regarding notice and because the inmate never had any opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation, but otherwise affirmed. View "Montanez v. Sec'y PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Attorney Andrew Dwyer and his law firm (collectively, Dwyer) launched a website that published excerpts from judicial opinions by New Jersey judges about Dwyer’s lauded abilities as a lawyer. One of the judges requested that his quoted comments be removed from the website, but Dwyer refused on the ground that the quotation was not false or misleading. As a result of the dispute, the New Jersey Bar’s Committee on Attorney Advertising (Committee) proposed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually adopted, an attorney-conduct guideline that banned advertising with quotes from judges or judicial opinions. The final version of the guideline, however, allowed attorneys to advertise with the full text of judicial opinions. The day before the guideline went into effect Dwyer filed this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the guideline was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, concluding that the guideline was not a ban on speech but instead was a disclosure requirement. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the guideline, as applied to Dwyer’s accurate quotes from judicial opinions, violated his First Amendment right to advertise his commercial business. Remanded. View "Dwyer v. Cappell" on Justia Law

More than 20 years ago, Cox was convicted in Philadelphia of first-degree murder and related charges. In 2000, he sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed in 2004, finding that all but one of Cox’s claims were procedurally defaulted due to counsel’s failure to pursue them in initial post-conviction state court proceedings and that the preserved claim lacked merit. The Third Circuit affirmed. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, announcing an exception to longstanding precedent: under certain circumstances, for purposes of habeas review, post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims could excuse a procedural default of those claims. Within three months, Cox moved under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6), for relief from the 2004 order. The district court denied the motion, finding that the intervening change in law, “without more,” did not provide cause for relief. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. For relief to be granted under Rule 60(b)(6), “more” than the important change of law is required: what must be shown are “extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” What those extraordinary circumstances could be in the context of Martinez was neither offered to the district court by the parties nor discussed by the court. View "Cox v. Horn" on Justia Law

Cruz was arrested for assaulting, resisting, or impeding Social Security Administration employees and two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal on Count I, and a jury returned guilty verdicts on Count II and Count III. After the court received the pre-sentence investigation report, the prosecution successfully moved for a determination of competency. A Federal Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist concluded that Cruz was mentally incompetent and suffered from schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type. After a hearing, the court concluded that Cruz was incompetent and found that he could not proceed with sentencing. A second report concurred with the diagnosis, noted Cruz’s ongoing refusal to take anti-psychotic medication recommended by BOP personnel, concluded that without medication Cruz would remain incompetent, and stated that “there is a substantial probability that [his] competency can be restored with a period of” forced medication. The prosecution obtained an order authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz against his will. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the Supreme Court decision, United States v. Sell (2003), and reasoning that the government can have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to proceed with sentencing. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Political groups challenged the constitutionality (42 U.S.C. 1983) of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code that regulate ballot access. Sections 2911(b) and 2872.2(a), require that candidates seeking to be included on the general election ballot (other than Republicans and Democrats) submit nomination papers with a specified number of signatures. Section 2937 allows private actors to object to such nomination papers and have them nullified, and permits a Pennsylvania court, as that court deems “just,” to impose administrative and litigation costs on a candidate if that candidate’s papers are rejected. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the aspiring political parties established that their injury-in-fact can fairly be traced to the actions of the Commonwealth officials and that the injuries are redressable. View "Constitution Party of PA v. Aichele" on Justia Law

In 1993, Branch entered a Newark building, inhabited by drug dealers and addicts, just before Mosley was fatally shot. When the police arrested Branch the next day, he had the gun that shot Mosley. Branch testified that he went to the building to retrieve $50 that he had paid for fake cocaine. He encountered a lookout, and, though he claims to have been unarmed, insisted on going inside. Inside, Branch saw several people and asked who had supplied the fake cocaine. Lee produced a gun and told Branch to get out. Branch claims that in the ensuing scramble, Lee’s gun discharged, that Lee dropped her gun, and that he grabbed it and ran out. Branch called two witnesses who confirmed his account. The state called several witnesses who indicated that Branch went to the building to rob its occupants and killed Mosley. All of the witnesses had long criminal records. The arresting officer testified that Branch ran, fought him, and tried to pull a weapon. Despite apparent reservations, the jury convicted Branch. After state appellate proceedings and two remands, the trial court sentenced Branch to life for aggravated manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed. After unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Branch unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that it could not find any justification for trial counsel’s failure to call two potential witnesses; if they had testified consistently with their pretrial written statements, there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would not have favored the prosecution. The state courts’ conclusions were unreasonable applications of federal law, so the district court was required to hold a hearing to ascertain reasons for not calling the potential witnesses. View "Branch v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Powell, a former Pennsylvania state inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law when it revoked its decision to release him to a community correctional center. The DOC conceded that the revocation was based on an improper calculation of Powell’s sentence. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Pennsylvania inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of release to a community correctional center. View "Powell v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Hildebrand was a detective for the Allegheny County DA’s Office when he was terminated in 2011. He unsuccessfully filed an internal grievance. Hildebrand claimed that his termination was part of “a well-known and established practice to push out older workers through termination or forced resignation.” Hildebrand completed an Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC, indicating that he was the victim of age discrimination and that he “want[ed] to file a charge of discrimination.” The EEOC subsequently issued a right-to-sue letter. Hildebrand sued, asserting violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, Title VII (retaliation), 42 U.S.C.1983 (violation of the Equal Protection Clause; First Amendment free speech rights), and the Pennsylvania Whistleblower and Human Relations Acts. The district court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim and stated that the complaint failed to provide facts, i.e. specific dates, to establish exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the 1983 claims, but vacated dismissal of the ADEA claim. A state or local government employee may not maintain an age discrimination claim under section 1983, but may only proceed under the ADEA. A plaintiff is not obligated to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies with particularity, but may allege in general terms that the required administrative process has been completed. The EEOC Intake Questionnaire, when properly completed, constitutes a charge of discrimination. View "Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1986 when the United States sought an injunction under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997, and entered into a Consent Decree, under which the Virgin Islands would attempt to remedy the conditions at Golden Grove Correctional Facility with respect to unreasonable fire safety risks, physical violence by other inmates or staff, adequate sanitation, and medical care. The district court entered several additional orders when conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan. In 2011, the Virgin Islands sought to terminate prospective relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), (e). The court concluded that all but one of the orders entered after the 1986 Consent Decree constituted prospective relief under the PLRA and did not include the findings required under the statute. The court ordered a hearing to determine whether “prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right at Golden Grove … and, if so, to ensure that the prospective relief is narrowly tailored to that violation in the manner required by the PLRA.” Gillette, a prisoner at Golden Grove, was denied leave to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the United States adequately represents Gillette’s interests and that others will be prejudiced if intervention is permitted. View "United States v. Territory of VI" on Justia Law

Thomas was in custody pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines. He was assigned to a small unit with an upper level open to the lower level, housing minimum and medium security detainees. The facility has four or five fights reported every day; 20-30 are estimated to be unreported. Thomas had a reputation as a bully, known for stealing food. One day Thomas found about 12 angry inmates outside of his upper level cell. A verbal dispute ensued. Officer Martinez was with the crowd; Officer Wilde was on the lower level. Martinez said something about locking everybody down. The inmates laughed, but did not disperse. Inmate Santiago yelled, “come down here and take stuff from me.” Thomas began to walk to the lower level. Within seconds after he arrived, Santiago struck Thomas. Martinez restrained Santiago, but another inmate struck Thomas. Martinez was immediately next to Thomas yelled for everyone to lock down. The inmates complied. Three to four minutes had passed between the beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence on the lower level. Inmates stated that the officers could and should have stopped the argument. Thomas suffered a concussion and loss of sight in one eye. Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, The district court granted the county summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding genuine issues of material fact concerning deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack of such training had a causal relationship to Thomas’s injuries.View "Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty." on Justia Law