Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Political groups challenged the constitutionality (42 U.S.C. 1983) of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code that regulate ballot access. Sections 2911(b) and 2872.2(a), require that candidates seeking to be included on the general election ballot (other than Republicans and Democrats) submit nomination papers with a specified number of signatures. Section 2937 allows private actors to object to such nomination papers and have them nullified, and permits a Pennsylvania court, as that court deems “just,” to impose administrative and litigation costs on a candidate if that candidate’s papers are rejected. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the aspiring political parties established that their injury-in-fact can fairly be traced to the actions of the Commonwealth officials and that the injuries are redressable. View "Constitution Party of PA v. Aichele" on Justia Law

In 1993, Branch entered a Newark building, inhabited by drug dealers and addicts, just before Mosley was fatally shot. When the police arrested Branch the next day, he had the gun that shot Mosley. Branch testified that he went to the building to retrieve $50 that he had paid for fake cocaine. He encountered a lookout, and, though he claims to have been unarmed, insisted on going inside. Inside, Branch saw several people and asked who had supplied the fake cocaine. Lee produced a gun and told Branch to get out. Branch claims that in the ensuing scramble, Lee’s gun discharged, that Lee dropped her gun, and that he grabbed it and ran out. Branch called two witnesses who confirmed his account. The state called several witnesses who indicated that Branch went to the building to rob its occupants and killed Mosley. All of the witnesses had long criminal records. The arresting officer testified that Branch ran, fought him, and tried to pull a weapon. Despite apparent reservations, the jury convicted Branch. After state appellate proceedings and two remands, the trial court sentenced Branch to life for aggravated manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed. After unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Branch unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that it could not find any justification for trial counsel’s failure to call two potential witnesses; if they had testified consistently with their pretrial written statements, there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would not have favored the prosecution. The state courts’ conclusions were unreasonable applications of federal law, so the district court was required to hold a hearing to ascertain reasons for not calling the potential witnesses. View "Branch v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Powell, a former Pennsylvania state inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law when it revoked its decision to release him to a community correctional center. The DOC conceded that the revocation was based on an improper calculation of Powell’s sentence. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Pennsylvania inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of release to a community correctional center. View "Powell v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Hildebrand was a detective for the Allegheny County DA’s Office when he was terminated in 2011. He unsuccessfully filed an internal grievance. Hildebrand claimed that his termination was part of “a well-known and established practice to push out older workers through termination or forced resignation.” Hildebrand completed an Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC, indicating that he was the victim of age discrimination and that he “want[ed] to file a charge of discrimination.” The EEOC subsequently issued a right-to-sue letter. Hildebrand sued, asserting violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, Title VII (retaliation), 42 U.S.C.1983 (violation of the Equal Protection Clause; First Amendment free speech rights), and the Pennsylvania Whistleblower and Human Relations Acts. The district court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim and stated that the complaint failed to provide facts, i.e. specific dates, to establish exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the 1983 claims, but vacated dismissal of the ADEA claim. A state or local government employee may not maintain an age discrimination claim under section 1983, but may only proceed under the ADEA. A plaintiff is not obligated to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies with particularity, but may allege in general terms that the required administrative process has been completed. The EEOC Intake Questionnaire, when properly completed, constitutes a charge of discrimination. View "Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1986 when the United States sought an injunction under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997, and entered into a Consent Decree, under which the Virgin Islands would attempt to remedy the conditions at Golden Grove Correctional Facility with respect to unreasonable fire safety risks, physical violence by other inmates or staff, adequate sanitation, and medical care. The district court entered several additional orders when conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan. In 2011, the Virgin Islands sought to terminate prospective relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), (e). The court concluded that all but one of the orders entered after the 1986 Consent Decree constituted prospective relief under the PLRA and did not include the findings required under the statute. The court ordered a hearing to determine whether “prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right at Golden Grove … and, if so, to ensure that the prospective relief is narrowly tailored to that violation in the manner required by the PLRA.” Gillette, a prisoner at Golden Grove, was denied leave to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the United States adequately represents Gillette’s interests and that others will be prejudiced if intervention is permitted. View "United States v. Territory of VI" on Justia Law

Thomas was in custody pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines. He was assigned to a small unit with an upper level open to the lower level, housing minimum and medium security detainees. The facility has four or five fights reported every day; 20-30 are estimated to be unreported. Thomas had a reputation as a bully, known for stealing food. One day Thomas found about 12 angry inmates outside of his upper level cell. A verbal dispute ensued. Officer Martinez was with the crowd; Officer Wilde was on the lower level. Martinez said something about locking everybody down. The inmates laughed, but did not disperse. Inmate Santiago yelled, “come down here and take stuff from me.” Thomas began to walk to the lower level. Within seconds after he arrived, Santiago struck Thomas. Martinez restrained Santiago, but another inmate struck Thomas. Martinez was immediately next to Thomas yelled for everyone to lock down. The inmates complied. Three to four minutes had passed between the beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence on the lower level. Inmates stated that the officers could and should have stopped the argument. Thomas suffered a concussion and loss of sight in one eye. Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, The district court granted the county summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding genuine issues of material fact concerning deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack of such training had a causal relationship to Thomas’s injuries.View "Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty." on Justia Law

New Jersey enacted the 2002 Off-Track and Account Wagering Act, N.J. Stat. 5:5-127, providing for establishment of 15 off-track wagering (OTW) facilities. The Act authorized a license for the N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority, conditioned upon NJSEA entering into a participation agreement with other entities that held horse racing permits in 2000 (ACRA and Freehold). NJSEA, ACRA, and Freehold entered into an agreement, allocating permit rights. By 2011, only four facilities had opened. NJSEA had leased control of its tracks to the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA) and another. The 2011 Forfeiture Amendment provided that permit holders would forfeit rights to any OTW not licensed by 2012, unless they demonstrated “making progress” toward establishing an OTW; forfeited rights would be available to other “horsemen’s organizations” without compensation to the permit holder. NJTHA qualified for forfeited rights. The 2012 Deposit Amendment extended the forfeiture date and allowed a permit holder to make a $1 million deposit for each OTW facility not licensed by December 31, 2011, retaining the “making progress” exception. The Pilot Program Act allowed installation of electronic wagering terminals in some bars and restaurants, by lessees or purchasers of NJSEA-owned racetracks, who could exchange unused OTW licenses to install electronic terminals. NJTHA secured such a license. ACRA and Freehold submitted challenged the constitutionality of the amendments under the Contracts, Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. The Commission determined that both ACRA and Freehold had made progress toward establishing their unlicensed OTW facilities and absolved them of the obligation to submit deposits. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on Younger abstention grounds. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, (2013), clarifying the Younger abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the action does not fit within the framework for abstention. View "Acra Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki" on Justia Law

The Winkelman brothers, have a “long and protracted litigation history” involving challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought while in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit denied certificates of appealability. The current motion, to reinstate their direct appeals, argued that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, Alleyne v. U.S. that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit denied the motion, which it characterized as “successive.” A successive section 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The Supreme Court may have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne, but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” View "United States v. Winkelman" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Glenn was convicted of the murder of Griffin and is currently a Pennsylvania prisoner. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought collateral review in state courts, then sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to grant a mistrial after an eyewitness proffered contradictory testimony, opting instead to strike the entirety of the testimony and provide cautionary jury instructions and that his trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to strike other evidence in the record that referred to that witness’s identification of Glenn as the murderer. View "Glenn v. Dist. Attorney Allegheny Cty." on Justia Law