Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pearson is serving a life-term and alleged, in a 2009 suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a two-year campaign of harassment against him in retaliation for the filing of a 2006 civil lawsuit and grievances in 2006-2007. Pearson claimed that he was subjected to cell searches and relocations, denied a meal, and denied a job in retaliation for the filings. The district court dismissed on the basis that Pearson’s “non-trivial” allegations occurred before March, 2007 and were time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations; that Pearson’s allegation based on his termination from his position was timely, but failed to state a claim because there were no facts that allow a plausible inference that it was caused by any protected activity. Pearson objected that the judge failed to toll the limitations period while Pearson exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and erred by not accepting the complaint’s allegations as true with respect to retaliatory discharge. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the PLRA is a statutory prohibition under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute. If the court determines that Pearson has exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim, it should proceed to discovery. View "Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

The Special Management Unit housing unit within the Lewisburg U.S. Penitentiary houses inmates identified as having violent tendencies or having a history of gang involvement while incarcerated. Inmates assigned to the SMU are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day, but can spend the remaining hour in a recreation cage. When first assigned to the SMU, inmates are interviewed by prison officials to ensure that inmates who may be hostile to each other are not housed in the same cell. Shelton, a USP inmate, filed a purported class action, alleging that the defendants have engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of improperly placing inmates who are known to be hostile to each other in the same cell. He also claims that the defendants fail to intervene when the predictable inmate-on-inmate violence erupts, and that defendants improperly restrain inmates who refuse cell assignments with inmates who are known to be hostile to them. The district court denied Shelton’s motion for class certification and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act claim, but vacated the denial of class certification and summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment claim. View "Shelton v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Working for “Cali Connect,” Thompson transported cocaine from California to Pittsburgh. Cooperating witnesses named Thompson. In wiretapped phone conversations, Thompson made drug-related comments. Texas troopers on I-40 near Amarillo, a “known corridor for narcotics,” stopped his truck, traveling eastbound at 84 mph in a 70 mph zone, and ran Thompson’s criminal history, which showed dated narcotics offenses, and a firearm offense. Thompson declined to consent to a search, but accepted responsibility for anything discovered in the truck. A K-9 unit dog alerted. The officers opened the truck-bed and smelled marijuana. Beneath a tarp lay five tubs containing marijuana. After speaking with DEA investigators, troopers searched the tailgate and found six kilograms of cocaine. Thompson was charged locally for the marijuana and was not informed about the discovery of cocaine. Weeks later, DEA officers executed search warrants on residences associated with Cali Connect, including Thompson’s. Investigators recovered two kilograms of cocaine. At DEA offices, six hours later, Thompson offered information about his sources and co-conspirators. He received a written waiver of his right to prompt presentment 12 hours after his arrest. Thompson continued to cooperate the next day and was presented 48 hours after his arrest. After denial of motions to suppress, Thompson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress the fruits of a search, finding reasonable suspicion, but vacated as to statements made while in custody, prior to being presented to a magistrate judge. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Lagano was fatally shot in 2007, in front of an East Brunswick, New Jersey diner. In 2012 his estate filed suit against the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) and former BCPO Chief of Detectives Mordaga, alleging that BCPO personnel improperly revealed to members of organized crime that Lagano was an informant, which established a state-created danger in violation of his due process rights. The estate also challenged a 2004 search of Lagano’s home and seizure of his property. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that claims based on the 2004 search were time-barred, but reversed in part. Mordaga, sued in his official and personal capacities, is amenable to suit as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. The allegations supported a reasonable inference that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO acted within classic investigatory and prosecutorial functions with respect to the state-created danger claim so the district court erred in viewing them as part of the state, not amenable to suit under sections1983 and 1985. The court reinstated a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and instructed the district court with respect to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment analysis. View "Estate Frank P. Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutors Offi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Reyes was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery of a grocery store, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)1; using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)t. He appealed only his Hobbs Act conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Reyes filed a pro se habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court appointed counsel and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Before the court ruled, Reyes sought to amend his petition, to add claims under the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. In Alleyne, the Court clarified that, under the Sixth Amendment, “‘any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime” and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. The district Court denied Reyes’ petition and his request to amend. While appeal was pending, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Winkelman, finding that the new rule of criminal procedure announced by the Supreme Court in Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Gonzalez sued his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor, a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York-New Jersey. He sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment. The Commission had determined that Gonzalez, an employee (detective) since 1999 had made false statement in an affidavit concerning another employee’s discrimination suit. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated the suit, finding that the Younger abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, clarifying the abstention inquiry and defining the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the decision to abstain was appropriate under the Sprint decision. View "Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of NY Harbor" on Justia Law

In 2001, the Bryan family’s adopted son, J.O., repeatedly raped and molested his younger foster brother, K.B., in the room the boys shared. After weeks of abuse, K.B. told his foster parents, who contacted the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (ECOCY), which had facilitated J.O.’s adoption, and had J.O. removed from their home. The Bryans blamed ECOCY for K.B.’s ordeal, claiming that ECOCY employees concealed J.O.’s history of violent behavior and sexual misconduct. The Bryans sued ECOCY and seven employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on a theory that permits recovery from state actors when “the state’s own actions create the very danger that causes the plaintiff’s injury.” During trial, the parties agreed to a high-low settlement. Regardless of the verdict, the Bryan family was to receive at least $900,000 and defendants were to pay no more than $2.7 million. The jury returned an $8.6 million verdict; the defendants tendered $2.7 million. The Bryans claimed breach of the settlement agreement’s confidentiality clause, rendering the deal unenforceable. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether to enforce those terms or the verdict. The Third Circuit remanded. The case was not dismissed, nor was the verdict satisfied. A district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at the moment jury deliberations do. View "Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth" on Justia Law

Sara sued the City of Newark and Police Officer Borrero, alleging that Borrero, who had an extensive disciplinary history and who was off-duty at the time, stopped Sara for alleged unsafe driving. Borrero then entered her car and attacked Sara, threatened a bystander who tried to intervene, charged Sara with attacking an officer, and held her without counsel for 12 hours. A jury found that Borrero and the city were liable and awarded $2,700,000 in compensatory damages. The district court remitted Sara’s award to $750,000 and informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the quantum of her compensatory damages. A second jury was convened and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Instead of addressing the city’s new motion for remittitur, the court entered a final order, vacating the second jury’s verdict and the earlier order of remittitur, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court should resolve the city’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict, but stating that it saw little merit to any of the arguments on appeal.View "Lesende v. Borrero" on Justia Law