Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lagano was fatally shot in 2007, in front of an East Brunswick, New Jersey diner. In 2012 his estate filed suit against the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) and former BCPO Chief of Detectives Mordaga, alleging that BCPO personnel improperly revealed to members of organized crime that Lagano was an informant, which established a state-created danger in violation of his due process rights. The estate also challenged a 2004 search of Lagano’s home and seizure of his property. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that claims based on the 2004 search were time-barred, but reversed in part. Mordaga, sued in his official and personal capacities, is amenable to suit as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. The allegations supported a reasonable inference that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO acted within classic investigatory and prosecutorial functions with respect to the state-created danger claim so the district court erred in viewing them as part of the state, not amenable to suit under sections1983 and 1985. The court reinstated a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and instructed the district court with respect to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment analysis. View "Estate Frank P. Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutors Offi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Reyes was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery of a grocery store, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)1; using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)t. He appealed only his Hobbs Act conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Reyes filed a pro se habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court appointed counsel and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Before the court ruled, Reyes sought to amend his petition, to add claims under the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. In Alleyne, the Court clarified that, under the Sixth Amendment, “‘any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime” and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. The district Court denied Reyes’ petition and his request to amend. While appeal was pending, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Winkelman, finding that the new rule of criminal procedure announced by the Supreme Court in Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Gonzalez sued his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor, a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York-New Jersey. He sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment. The Commission had determined that Gonzalez, an employee (detective) since 1999 had made false statement in an affidavit concerning another employee’s discrimination suit. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated the suit, finding that the Younger abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, clarifying the abstention inquiry and defining the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the decision to abstain was appropriate under the Sprint decision. View "Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of NY Harbor" on Justia Law

In 2001, the Bryan family’s adopted son, J.O., repeatedly raped and molested his younger foster brother, K.B., in the room the boys shared. After weeks of abuse, K.B. told his foster parents, who contacted the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (ECOCY), which had facilitated J.O.’s adoption, and had J.O. removed from their home. The Bryans blamed ECOCY for K.B.’s ordeal, claiming that ECOCY employees concealed J.O.’s history of violent behavior and sexual misconduct. The Bryans sued ECOCY and seven employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on a theory that permits recovery from state actors when “the state’s own actions create the very danger that causes the plaintiff’s injury.” During trial, the parties agreed to a high-low settlement. Regardless of the verdict, the Bryan family was to receive at least $900,000 and defendants were to pay no more than $2.7 million. The jury returned an $8.6 million verdict; the defendants tendered $2.7 million. The Bryans claimed breach of the settlement agreement’s confidentiality clause, rendering the deal unenforceable. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether to enforce those terms or the verdict. The Third Circuit remanded. The case was not dismissed, nor was the verdict satisfied. A district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at the moment jury deliberations do. View "Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth" on Justia Law

Sara sued the City of Newark and Police Officer Borrero, alleging that Borrero, who had an extensive disciplinary history and who was off-duty at the time, stopped Sara for alleged unsafe driving. Borrero then entered her car and attacked Sara, threatened a bystander who tried to intervene, charged Sara with attacking an officer, and held her without counsel for 12 hours. A jury found that Borrero and the city were liable and awarded $2,700,000 in compensatory damages. The district court remitted Sara’s award to $750,000 and informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the quantum of her compensatory damages. A second jury was convened and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Instead of addressing the city’s new motion for remittitur, the court entered a final order, vacating the second jury’s verdict and the earlier order of remittitur, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court should resolve the city’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict, but stating that it saw little merit to any of the arguments on appeal.View "Lesende v. Borrero" on Justia Law

Responding to a dispatch, Pennsylvania State Trooper Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the Carman home to search for a man who had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey plates. Arriving at the Carman residence, the troopers bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. In a suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, the Carmans challenged Carroll’s warrantless entry onto their’ property. Carroll argued that he did not violate the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” encounter. The district court denied the Carmans’ judgment as a matter of law on their unlawful entry claims; a jury found that Carroll acted reasonably. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the back of the property and did not begin his visit at the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement dd not apply. The court affirmed the jury verdict regarding the unlawful seizure claim; there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably.View "Carman v. Carroll" on Justia Law

In 1985 the bodies of an eight-year-old boy and his seven-year-old sister were found in the basement of a New Jersey apartment building, in which Halsey, then age 24, lived with their mother. The children had been sexually assaulted and mutilated. The killer was ultimately determined to be their next-door neighbor, Hall, who had a record for attempted sexual assault. Hall asked the police whether he would be locked up, but was not considered a suspect at the time. Halsey had an arrest record, but no history of incarceration. Halsey had a sixth-grade education and was “Mildly Mentally Retarded.” Halsey, who had previously worked at the apartment building, was at his new job at another location when he learned about the murders. He returned home and was taken to the police station, where he was isolated in an interview room, accused of the murders, told he had failed a polygraph examination (he had actually passed), and confronted with false evidence. After being interrogated for several days, in a state of great fear, he signed a document purporting to be his confession, with details that investigators must have inserted because Halsey could not have known them. He was convicted, and sentenced to life. He was released 22 years later, after it was clear that he had not committed the offenses. Halsey filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. An officer who fabricates evidence to obtain a conviction violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. Without the false confession, there would not have been direct evidence linking Halsey to the crimes so that the prosecutor would not have had cause to prosecute Halsey. View "Halsey v. Pfeiffer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that African American students who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” in the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The claimed that the disproportionate placement of African American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory purpose and was the result of racial bias The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C 12101, 12132; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The Third Circuit affirmed. Looking at the whole record, which included statistical evidence showing that minorities are overrepresented in low achievement classes, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent to discriminate against plaintiffs or that LMSD had knowledge of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices against African American students. View "Blunt v. Lower Merion Schs." on Justia Law

Christopher was a troubled man with a long history of mental health and substance abuse problems. He committed suicide in 2004, while in custody at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (HRYCI) in Wilmington, Delaware, awaiting transportation to the Violation of Probation Center in Sussex County, Delaware. He had been arrested the previous day on an administrative warrant. Christopher was on probation for a domestic abuse conviction, and had been arrested for loitering while waiting to purchase drugs. His widow and children sued. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that prison administrators are not entitled to qualified immunity from an Eighth Amendment claim that serious deficiencies in the provision of medical care by a private, third-party provider resulted in an inmate’s suicide. View "Barkes v. First Corr. Med. Inc." on Justia Law