Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In February 2009, Santini was working at his family’s Harmony Township, New Jersey dairy farm, when a fight broke out. Santini and 10 others witnessed the fight. About 20 local and state police officers arrived after the fight ended. Santini, standing outside of the milk house, spoke with a Greenwich Township officer about what he had witnessed. According to Santini, State Trooper Fuhrmann yelled at Santini to take his hands out of his pockets. Santini maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were cold because he had been working all day milking cows. Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. Keep them where I [can] see them.” Santini continued to try to warm his hands and Fuhrmann continued to object. Santini told Fuhrmann that he was going to return to work because he had already told the other officers his story and began to walk away. Santini claims he was kicked, punched, and held on the ground, then was sprayed with pepper spray and handcuffed. His medical records from the incident reveal no lasting injuries. The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s. The district court rejected Santini’s civil rights suit on summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding material issues of fact as to whether Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. View "Santini v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

DEA agents executed a search warrant in Reading, Pennsylvania and arrested Bui at 1307 Lorraine Road. Bui admitted that “the only reason they purchased that house was to . . . convert it into a marijuana grow factory.” Bui was indicted on: conspiracy to manufacture more than 1,000 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 846; manufacturing, and aiding and abetting the manufacturing, of more than 100 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2; using the house to manufacture and to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); and manufacturing and distributing marijuana within 1,000 feet of Hampden Park, a school district athletic field, 21 U.S.C. 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Bui pled guilty to counts one and four and stipulated that the house was within 1000 feet of Hampden Park, so that his base offense level should be increased two levels. According to Bui, he pled guilty because counsel told him he would receive a reduced sentence by doing so and told family members that Bui was eligible for a reduced sentence under the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553. At sentencing, counsel withdrew that motion, explaining that section 3553(f) did not apply to 21 U.S.C. 860 convictions. Bui was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The district court rejected his pro se habeas petition. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that Bui’s counsel provided ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Bui" on Justia Law

Norris was arrested in 1999 for aggravated assault. Norris complained; the court appointed new counsel for post-verdict motions, but rejected claims of ineffective assistance and imposed sentence under Pennsylvania’s “three strikes” law. In 2003, Norris filed a pro se petition for collateral relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on speedy trial grounds because more than three years elapsed between issuance of the criminal complaint and the trial. The state court dismissed, ruling that the issue lacked merit. On appeal, his attorney (Wolfe) abandoned that argument despite Norris’s insistence that it be included. In pro se filings, Norris presented the argument and claimed ineffective assistance. The court affirmed dismissal, holding that Wolfe had not provided ineffective assistance by declining to make the argument. Norris filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective in failing to raise the speedy trial issue. The court denied the petition because of procedural default. In 2012, Norris moved for relief from judgment invoking a 2012 Supreme Court holding that attorney error in collateral proceedings may sometimes excuse procedural default of a habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim. The district court denied his motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Norris’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was presented on initial collateral review and only waived on collateral appeal, so Martinez does not justify relief. View "Norris v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Boyd and Smith, both Caucasians, alleged that their former employer, Boeing, discriminated against them on the basis of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, when it terminated their employment after they appeared in a photograph taken at work with a third employee looking like members of the KKK. The district court granted Boeing summary judgment, finding that Boyd and Smith failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because they were not similarly situated to Kenta Smith, the African-American employee who took the photograph and reported the incident. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that “[e]ven if a jury could somehow find that the evidence met the prima facie threshold,” “[t]here is no evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Boeing did not really fire the plaintiffs for posing as the KKK, or that a more likely cause was Boeing’s animus toward” Caucasians. View "Barker v. Boeing Co" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, requires each federal district court to establish a plan to furnish representation to indigent persons charged with federal crimes. In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender (FCD) as counsel, based on that organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant funds to appear in state proceedings. FCD acknowledges that it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal court order directing it to do so, but claims that it uses federal grant funds only for preparatory work that will be relevant to a federal habeas petition and only if it has received a federal court order appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is working to obtain such an appointment. FCD removed the motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commonwealth moved, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), to return each to state court, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FCD argued that the Commonwealth lacked a federal private right of action and that federal law preempted the motions. The district courts split. The Third Circuit held that FCD properly invoked removal jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth’s attempts to disqualify it as counsel proceedings are preempted. View "In Re: Commonwealth's Motion" on Justia Law

Bonkowski worked for Oberg. He has health conditions, including an aortic bicuspid, diabetes, possible aortic aneurysm, and colon removal. On November 14, Bonkowski met with supervisors to discuss his suspension for allegedly sleeping on the job. According to Bonkowski, he experienced shortness of breath, chest pain, and dizziness, and the supervisors gave him permission to go home. He clocked out at 5:18 p.m. That night, his wife drove him to the hospital. He was admitted shortly after midnight. After testing, he was released in the early evening of November 15, with a doctor’s note. On November 16, Oberg notified Bonkowski that his employment was terminated because he had walked off the job on November 14. The district court rejected his suit under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2611(11)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed, based on a Department of Labor regulation, defining a “serious health condition.” The court held that “an overnight stay” means a stay for a substantial period of time from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by the time of admission and time of discharge. Bonkowski was admitted and discharged on the same calendar day. View "Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc" on Justia Law

The 1988 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act requires producers of visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” to keep records documenting the identity and age of every performer in those depictions, 18 U.S.C. 2257(a). The 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 2257A, extended similar requirements to producers of depictions of “simulated sexually explicit conduct.” Producers are required to examine “an identification document” for each performer and maintain records listing each performer’s name, date of birth, and any other name that the performer has previously used, and to maintain records, available for inspection “at all reasonable times.” Producers must “affix[] to every copy” of covered depictions “a statement describing where the records required . . . with respect to all performers . . . may be located.” After the district court dismissed a challenge, the Third Circuit identified viable as-applied and facial claims under the First and Fourth Amendments. On remand, the district court upheld the laws except that inspections without prior notice to examine records located in private residences violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted only declaratory relief. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The administrative search regime violates the Fourth Amendment as applied; the laws do not violate the First Amendment. View "Free Speech Coal. v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Around midnight, 15-year old Tabitha had a severe asthma attack at her North Philadelphia home. Her mother, Vargas, called 911. Waiting for the paramedics to arrive, Vargas went outside and found Tabitha lying on the sidewalk, gasping for air. She quickly lapsed into unconsciousness. Tabitha’s cousin unsuccessfully performed CPRl. Neighbors lifted Tabitha into a car belonging to Diaz, so that Diaz could take her to the hospital. Meanwhile, Vargas and Diaz placed five frantic 911 calls between 12:08 a.m. and 12:14 a.m. In response to “a person screaming” in a call made at 12:10 a.m. officers were dispatched. Neither was aware that the call involved a medical emergency. The events following the arrival of the officers at 12:13 are disputed. The family claims the officers blocked Diaz’s car. Both officers assert that they did not. Contemporaneous dispatch records indicate that, from the time the officers noted their arrival, to the time the ambulance arrived, was just over one minute. Paramedics loaded Tabitha into the ambulance and provided CPR. She arrived at the hospital at 12:28, having suffered a severe anoxic brain injury, and died two weeks later. The district court dismissed claims against the city and officers. The Third Circuit affirmed. The undisputed facts show that the actions of the officers were reasonable in responding to a volatile situation. View "Vargas v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Siluk is an indigent state prisoner who was allowed to file in forma pauperis (IFP). He currently owes a filing fee of $350 to the Clerk of the District Court and $505 to the Clerk of the Third Circuit. Siluk argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(2), only requires a 20% deduction from his prison account each month until both fees are paid, and that the deductions should be made in the order in which they were incurred. The government argued that section 1915(b) requires that a monthly 20-percent deduction must be made concurrently for fees owed in both courts until the fees are paid, which would result in a 40-percent deduction from Siluk’s account. After noting a conflict among the circuits, the Third Circuit adopted the sequential recoupment rule: section 1915 permits the recoupment of only 20% of a prisoner’s monthly income for filing fees, regardless of how many civil actions or appeals the prisoner elects to pursue. View "Siluk v. Merwin" on Justia Law

Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. at a young age without inspection and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. He married a U.S. citizen, but is now divorced; he has sons who are citizens. In 2000, while serving in the U.S. Army, he was convicted by a General Court-Martial of giving false official statements (10 U.S.C. 907), sodomy (10 U.S.C. 925), and violating the general article (10 U.S.C. 934). He served 13 months and was released in 2002. ICE agents arrested him in 2012, charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his conviction on an aggravated felony. He was ordered detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed with instructions that Alvarez must be afforded a prompt bond hearing. Beginning sometime after the six-month time-frame considered by the Supreme Court in Demore, the burdens to Alvarez’s liberties outweighed any justification for using presumptions to detain him without bond to further the goals of the statute. The statute’s goals would not have been, and will not be undermined by requiring the government to produce individualized evidence that Alvarez’s continued detention was or is necessary. View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison" on Justia Law