Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Before 2003 Doe pled guilty to two simple assaults in Pennsylvania. In 2003, he pled guilty in federal court to distribution and possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of crack cocaine. His sentence as a career offender occurred under precedent categorically designating his prior convictions as crimes of violence. He did not appeal his 262-month sentence. In 2004 the government moved to reduce Doe’s sentence for “substantial assistance” in a different criminal investigation. While that Rule 35 motion was pending, Doe filed a section 2255 motion arguing that his assault convictions were not crimes of violence. The 2008 Supreme Court decision, Begay, held that a DUI conviction is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it does not involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” The career-offender Sentencing Guideline was similar to the ACCA. In 2009, the district court granted Doe Rule 35 relief; counsel withdrew the 2255 motion. The Third Circuit then held that courts must inquire into the part of the statute to which the defendant actually pled guilty to determine whether the career-offender enhancement applies. In 2012 Doe filed a section 2255 motion, again raising his Begay argument. The statute of limitations on Doe’s Begay argument expired in 2009, when he withdrew his 2008 motion. The court concluded that there was no basis to toll the limitations period because Doe’s 2008 counsel was not deficient. The Third Circuit remanded. The court noted that while Doe has been released from prison, his case is not moot; proceeded under an assumption that the 2255 motion was not a second or successive motion over which the district court lacked jurisdiction; held that Doe had not procedurally defaulted his claim; and held that claims of Begay error are cognizable on collateral review. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Juanya, age 15, participated in a mandatory swimming class run by his physical education teacher, Rodgers. Juanya, a non-swimmer, was submerged for a few seconds, possibly inhaling or swallowing water. Juanya exited the pool and told Rodgers that his chest hurt. Rodgers told Juanya to sit on the bleachers. Several minutes later, Rodgers went over to check on Juanya, who requested to remain out of the pool for the rest of class. Rodgers denied the request. Juanya followed instructions and stayed in the shallow end for the remainder of the period. In his next class, nearly an hour and a half after leaving the pool, Juanya fell backward and hit the desk behind him. As he rolled off his chair and onto the floor, he had a seizure. A school nurse attempted to revive Juanya. Paramedics took Juanya by ambulance to a hospital, where he died that day, apparently of a rare form of asphyxiation called “dry” or “secondary drowning.” Juanya’s mother sued Rodgers and the Bethlehem Area School District, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Rodgers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, which the court denied. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rodgers’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, View "Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2007 fraudulent checks in the amount of $181,577 were cashed against the accounts of seven Citizens Bank customers in New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Fraud investigator Swoyer discovered that Tolliver’s employee number was the only one used to access all of the accounts; only Tolliver and one assistant manager worked on all of the days on which the accounts were accessed.. Swoyer, Postal Inspector Busch, and a Secret Service agent interviewed Tolliver. At trial, Swoyer testified that he reviewed Tolliver’s entire logbook with her and that Tolliver told him that she had not given her password to anyone and that she always logged off her computer when she walked away from a terminal. Seven of Tolliver’s former co-workers testified they never knew Tolliver’s password or saw it written down. A jury convicted Tolliver of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a), and unauthorized use of a computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030. The court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment and restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. Tolliver, represented by newly appointed counsel, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, claiming that her trial counsel was ineffective by failure to investigate. The district court granted her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit vacated. View "United States v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

Taylor, working at Dollar Express in 2000, observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor planned a robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington then ran into the store and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with merchandise. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained conditional federal habeas corpus relief, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried non-testifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. Following remand for consideration under the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall (2014), the Third Circuit again affirmed. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

WICO was founded as a coal bunkering business before the U.S. acquired the Virgin Islands (VI) in 1917 and grew to serve as “Port Agent” for cruise lines that visit the port of Charlotte Amalie and to manage the port's Havensight Mall. In 1986, WICO began dredging St. Thomas harbor, leading to public opposition and litigation. In 1993, the VI Government purchased all of the shares of WICO. The purchase was approved by the VI Legislature. The Act stated that “the Company is hereby granted the status and authority of a public corporation and governmental instrumentality … and shall be deemed to be a public entity operating on behalf of the Government, rather than a private corporation.” All WICO shares were transferred to the VI Public Finance Authority, a public corporation and governmental instrumentality. Two former WICO employees filed suit, alleging violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed, finding that “WICO cannot be considered a purely public entity,” and that its employees are not public employees, so its conduct could not be considered to have been “under color of state law” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed in part, applying the 1995 Supreme Court decision, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, to hold that WICO is a government entity for the purposes of Sprauve’s and Smith’s constitutional claims. View "Gershwain Sprauve v. West Indian Company Limited" on Justia Law

Lee’s daughter, Ji, suffered severe mental illness, with suicidal and homicidal ideation. One morning in 1989 police found Lee in the street, retrieving items that Li had thrown out the window. Officers entered the house and found Ji in a manic state, but observed no evidence of violence. At the suggestion of his pastor, Lee took Ji the same day to a religious retreat. Upon arrival, she took a walk and jumped into a body of water; she became agitated and had to be physically restrained. During the night, a fire began in their cabin. Lee escaped, but his daughter died. Lee was charged with arson and murder, based on fire-science and gas-chromatography evidence. The defense argued suicide. Lee was convicted. On appeal, state courts received evidence about developments in fire science that “provided ample reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation,” but denied Lee’s claims. In 1995 Lee filed a pro se post-conviction petition. The Commonwealth did not respond; the petition remained pending. An attorney submitted an amended petition in 2005, claiming newly discovered, exculpatory scientific evidence, and that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise that claim. State courts rejected the argument. Lee filed a federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed a 2010 denial and ordered the district court to grant discovery. On remand the court found that “admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial” and that the Commonwealth failed to show other “‘ample evidence’ of guilt.” The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. View "Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI" on Justia Law

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) supervisor Outlaw suspended Jones with full pay after he discovered apparent fraud in her timesheets. Jones complained to SEPTA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office that Outlaw had “sexually harassed” and “retaliated against” her. Outlaw referred the timesheet matter to SEPTA’s Office of Inspector General, which concluded that Jones collected pay for days she hadn’t worked by submitting fraudulent timesheets. SEPTA terminated her. Jones filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. SEPTA ended its internal investigation, concluding that Outlaw had engaged in inappropriate behavior by once asking Jones to step on his back to relieve spinal pain. This was noted in Outlaw’s performance evaluation, and he was required to attend training regarding SEPTA’s sexual harassment policy. Jones filed suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; common law wrongful termination; and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Jones’s suspension with pay did not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. Any adverse actions Jones did suffer were not sufficiently linked to any alleged misconduct to support a claim of discrimination or retaliation. View "Jones v. SE Pa. Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Temporary civil commitment at New Jersey psychiatric hospitals is subject to regular review; patients have the right to counsel, to be present at the hearing, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. In a challenge to the state’s “Rennie process” for forcible medication, the Third Circuit held, in 1984, that civilly committed psychiatric patients “have a qualified constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication” in nonemergency situations and the process accommodated that right consistent with the Due Process Clause. A 2010 challenge alleged that the Rennie process violated the Constitution, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act, and demanded that the state “provide patients who refuse the non-emergency administration of psychotropic medication with meaningful due process protections—including legal counsel, notice and a hearing before a judicial decision-maker.” The state replaced the Rennie process with policies for forcible treatment in emergencies (AB 5:04A), which were not challenged, and nonemergent situations (AB 5:04B). The nonemergency policy permits longer-term forcible medication of a patient, involuntarily committed, who, as a result of a diagnosed mental illness, poses a substantial risk of serious harm to self, others, or property “within the reasonably foreseeable future” if psychotropic medication is not administered. Patients who satisfy the substantive requirements may be forcibly medicated only pursuant to procedures that stop short of prior judicial review. The Third Circuit affirmed that AB 5:04B is valid, except as to patients who have been not to require continued commitment but who remain in custody pending transfer. View "Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm'r N.J. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Fazio, a permanent resident alien, was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Fazio pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of conspiring to distribute more than 200 grams but fewer than 300 grams of cocaine, waiving the right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence, except if the government appealed from the sentence or the sentence exceeded the applicable statutory limits or unreasonably exceeded the Sentencing Guidelines range. Fazio waived the right to move to vacate sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) and the right to file any other collateral proceeding attacking his conviction or sentence. The plea agreement stated: Fazio recognizes that pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status … no one, including his own attorney or the district court, can predict to a certainty the effect of his conviction on his immigration status. The court reviewed the waiver in detail at the hearing. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of Fazio’s subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, in which he argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to warn Fazio properly of the immigration consequences of his plea, as required by the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 2010. View "United States v. Fazio" on Justia Law