Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Rights
In Re: Commonwealth’s Motion
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, requires each federal district court to establish a plan to furnish representation to indigent persons charged with federal crimes. In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender (FCD) as counsel, based on that organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant funds to appear in state proceedings. FCD acknowledges that it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal court order directing it to do so, but claims that it uses federal grant funds only for preparatory work that will be relevant to a federal habeas petition and only if it has received a federal court order appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is working to obtain such an appointment. FCD removed the motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commonwealth moved, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), to return each to state court, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FCD argued that the Commonwealth lacked a federal private right of action and that federal law preempted the motions. The district courts split. The Third Circuit held that FCD properly invoked removal jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth’s attempts to disqualify it as counsel proceedings are preempted. View "In Re: Commonwealth's Motion" on Justia Law
Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc
Bonkowski worked for Oberg. He has health conditions, including an aortic bicuspid, diabetes, possible aortic aneurysm, and colon removal. On November 14, Bonkowski met with supervisors to discuss his suspension for allegedly sleeping on the job. According to Bonkowski, he experienced shortness of breath, chest pain, and dizziness, and the supervisors gave him permission to go home. He clocked out at 5:18 p.m. That night, his wife drove him to the hospital. He was admitted shortly after midnight. After testing, he was released in the early evening of November 15, with a doctor’s note. On November 16, Oberg notified Bonkowski that his employment was terminated because he had walked off the job on November 14. The district court rejected his suit under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2611(11)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed, based on a Department of Labor regulation, defining a “serious health condition.” The court held that “an overnight stay” means a stay for a substantial period of time from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by the time of admission and time of discharge. Bonkowski was admitted and discharged on the same calendar day. View "Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. of the United States
The 1988 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act requires producers of visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” to keep records documenting the identity and age of every performer in those depictions, 18 U.S.C. 2257(a). The 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 2257A, extended similar requirements to producers of depictions of “simulated sexually explicit conduct.” Producers are required to examine “an identification document” for each performer and maintain records listing each performer’s name, date of birth, and any other name that the performer has previously used, and to maintain records, available for inspection “at all reasonable times.” Producers must “affix[] to every copy” of covered depictions “a statement describing where the records required . . . with respect to all performers . . . may be located.” After the district court dismissed a challenge, the Third Circuit identified viable as-applied and facial claims under the First and Fourth Amendments. On remand, the district court upheld the laws except that inspections without prior notice to examine records located in private residences violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted only declaratory relief. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The administrative search regime violates the Fourth Amendment as applied; the laws do not violate the First Amendment. View "Free Speech Coal. v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law
Vargas v. City of Philadelphia
Around midnight, 15-year old Tabitha had a severe asthma attack at her North Philadelphia home. Her mother, Vargas, called 911. Waiting for the paramedics to arrive, Vargas went outside and found Tabitha lying on the sidewalk, gasping for air. She quickly lapsed into unconsciousness. Tabitha’s cousin unsuccessfully performed CPRl. Neighbors lifted Tabitha into a car belonging to Diaz, so that Diaz could take her to the hospital. Meanwhile, Vargas and Diaz placed five frantic 911 calls between 12:08 a.m. and 12:14 a.m. In response to “a person screaming” in a call made at 12:10 a.m. officers were dispatched. Neither was aware that the call involved a medical emergency. The events following the arrival of the officers at 12:13 are disputed. The family claims the officers blocked Diaz’s car. Both officers assert that they did not. Contemporaneous dispatch records indicate that, from the time the officers noted their arrival, to the time the ambulance arrived, was just over one minute. Paramedics loaded Tabitha into the ambulance and provided CPR. She arrived at the hospital at 12:28, having suffered a severe anoxic brain injury, and died two weeks later. The district court dismissed claims against the city and officers. The Third Circuit affirmed. The undisputed facts show that the actions of the officers were reasonable in responding to a volatile situation. View "Vargas v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law
Siluk v. Merwin
Siluk is an indigent state prisoner who was allowed to file in forma pauperis (IFP). He currently owes a filing fee of $350 to the Clerk of the District Court and $505 to the Clerk of the Third Circuit. Siluk argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(2), only requires a 20% deduction from his prison account each month until both fees are paid, and that the deductions should be made in the order in which they were incurred. The government argued that section 1915(b) requires that a monthly 20-percent deduction must be made concurrently for fees owed in both courts until the fees are paid, which would result in a 40-percent deduction from Siluk’s account. After noting a conflict among the circuits, the Third Circuit adopted the sequential recoupment rule: section 1915 permits the recoupment of only 20% of a prisoner’s monthly income for filing fees, regardless of how many civil actions or appeals the prisoner elects to pursue. View "Siluk v. Merwin" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law
Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison
Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. at a young age without inspection and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. He married a U.S. citizen, but is now divorced; he has sons who are citizens. In 2000, while serving in the U.S. Army, he was convicted by a General Court-Martial of giving false official statements (10 U.S.C. 907), sodomy (10 U.S.C. 925), and violating the general article (10 U.S.C. 934). He served 13 months and was released in 2002. ICE agents arrested him in 2012, charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his conviction on an aggravated felony. He was ordered detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed with instructions that Alvarez must be afforded a prompt bond hearing. Beginning sometime after the six-month time-frame considered by the Supreme Court in Demore, the burdens to Alvarez’s liberties outweighed any justification for using presumptions to detain him without bond to further the goals of the statute. The statute’s goals would not have been, and will not be undermined by requiring the government to produce individualized evidence that Alvarez’s continued detention was or is necessary. View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison" on Justia Law
Wilson v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs.
Wilson was convicted of the Swift murder in 1984 and was sentenced to life in prison. Four years later, Wilson was convicted of the unrelated Lamb murder and was sentenced to death. After Wilson exhausted direct and collateral appeals in Pennsylvania state court, he sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 claiming that the Swift jury was empaneled in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. In 2004, the district court granted the writ. The Third Circuit affirmed. The state did not seek a stay or an extension of the 180- day period, but Wilson was neither retried nor released because he was on death row for the Lamb murder. Wilson then sought to invalidate the Lamb conviction, claiming Brady violations. The Third Circuit affirmed issuance of a conditional writ. In 2010, he was re-arraigned for both murders. Wilson moved to enforce habeas corpus. The district court denied the motions, reasoning that after the 180 days passed, the government could no longer imprison Wilson for the Swift murder, but he was held for the Lamb murder. Since 2010, Wilson has been held as a pretrial defendant for both murders. Denying his Rule 60(b) motion, the court reasoned that speedy trial rights exist to protect against claimed prejudice as the result of the delay. Such claims had to be exhausted in state court and Wilson did not establish extraordinary circumstances. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion and did not err in requiring Wilson to exhaust the new claims in state court. View "Wilson v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law
Werkheiser v. Pocono Township
In 2007, Werkheiser was elected to the three-member Pocono Township Board of Supervisors. Supervisor Hess was elected in 2009; Bengel was elected in 2011. Supervisors are permitted to be employed by the Township. Werkheiser was appointed Township Roadmaster by the Board. Hess, as Chairman of the Board, Secretary, and Treasurer, received $36,000 per year in salary and benefits. In 2012, Hess took 10-days leave. Froio was selected to assume Hess’s administrative duties. Over Werkheiser’s objection, Bengel and Hess voted to hire Froio as Township Administrator, with compensation of $70,000. As Froio’s position developed, Hess’s responsibilities and workload decreased. Hess continued to be paid. Werkheiser objected to creation of a new position with greater expense and to paying Hess when his duties were being performed by Froio. Hess and Bengel began private deliberations to deny Werkheiser reappointment and to replace him with Bengel. In 2013, Werkheiser was formally denied reappointment. Werkheiser sued, asserting First Amendment retaliation and state law violations. The district court reasoned that there were important differences between public employees and elected officials; found that Werkheiser had established a constitutional violation; and denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; the contours of the First Amendment right at issue were not clearly established. View "Werkheiser v. Pocono Township" on Justia Law
Fantone v. Latini
Fantone was incarcerated in a Pennsylvania state correctional institution. The Parole Board granted him parole, but rescinded that decision because of pending prison discipline proceedings. Fantone sued, alleging that defendants unlawfully caused him to be confined in a prison Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU), which led the Parole Board to rescind his parole. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded a claim that correctional officer Burger unlawfully retaliated against Fantone by having him retained in the RHU after the expiration of his disciplinary confinement because Fantone would not confess to the disciplinary charges and because Fantone filed a grievance charging that Burger threatened him. The court affirmed dismissal of Fantone’s due process and conspiracy claims, agreeing that where state law provides parole authorities with complete discretion to rescind parole prior to an inmate’s release, the inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being paroled before his actual release. In addition, an inmate does not have a right to be confined in any particular housing unit in a prison; absent significant hardship, when an inmate is placed in a restrictive custody unit, his liberty interests have not been infringed. View "Fantone v. Latini" on Justia Law
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Allstate Ins. Co
In 1999, Allstate reorganized its business and terminated the at-will employment contracts of about 6,200 sales agents, offering them conversion to independent contractor status; $5,000 and an economic interest in their accounts, to be sold to buyers approved by Allstate; severance pay equal to one year’s salary; or severance pay of 13 weeks’ pay. Employees who chose independent contractor status received a bonus of at least $5,000, were not required to repay any office-expense advances, and acquired transferable interests in their business two years after converting. All employees who chose not to convert and left the company were bound by noncompetition covenants in their original contracts. As a condition of becoming independent contractors, agents were required to sign a release waiving existing legal claims against Allstate. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued, claiming that the company violated federal anti-retaliation laws. The district court reversed. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the settled rule that employers can exchange consideration for releases of claims and that EEOC established neither protected activity nor an adverse action. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Allstate Ins. Co" on Justia Law