Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michtavi, a prisoner, had an operation to treat his prostate performed by Dr. Chopra, who is not a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee. After surgery, Michtavi noticed that the quantity of his ejaculate had reduced. He was diagnosed with retrograde ejaculation. Dr. Chopra advised that Psuedofel be prescribed to close the hole that was opened during the laser surgery, to prevent ejaculate from leaking into the bladder. Michtavi was concerned that without treatment, he might become impotent. The BOP did not provide the medication because “[i]t is the Bureau of Prison’s position that the treatment of a sexual dysfunction is not medically necessary, and . . . medical providers are not to talk to inmates about ejaculation, since it is a prohibited sexual act.” The district court stated that “prisoners retain a fundamental right to preserve their procreative abilities for use following release from custody” and, because Michtavi had alleged that retrograde ejaculation could make him sterile, held that his Eighth Amendment claims should survive summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to treatment of retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction is not clearly established. View "Michtavi v. Scism" on Justia Law

Bare Exposure operates “Atlantic City’s Only All Nude Entertainment.” HMS, a private corporation, leases expressway service plazas from the South Jersey Transportation and New Jersey Turnpike Authorities to operate restaurants and convenience stores. The Authorities are not involved in day-to-day operations or management, but only perform long-term maintenance to parking areas, building exteriors, and lobbies. HMS entered into a contract, allowing CTM to install and service brochure display racks in plaza lobbies. HMS “must approve all brochures or publications” before placement. The Authorities were not a party to the CTM contract. HMS discovered a Bare Exposure brochure in a CTM display rack. HMS instructed CTM to remove all Bare Exposure brochures. HMS did not consult with or receive any direction from the Authorities and did not consider the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Authorities never directed HMS to take any actions regarding the brochures. Bare Exposure contends that the Authorities placed government signs and photographs in lobbies and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that HMS violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of HMS. HMS did act not “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,” absent direct involvement by state authorities either in the decision to remove the brochures or in general plaza operations. View "P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Faush was an employee of a temporary staffing agency. He was assigned to Tuesday Morning, Inc., where he claimed he was subjected to slurs and accusations based on his race. Ultimately he was terminated. Appellant filed suit against Tuesday Morning, claiming violations of Title VII of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Tuesday Morning on the ground that because appellant was not Tuesday Morning’s employee, Tuesday Morning was not liable for employment discrimination. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that a rational jury, applying the factors announced by the Supreme Court in “Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,” could have found on these facts that appellant was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Human Relations Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc." on Justia Law

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, since January 2002, the New York City Police Department has conducted a secret program “to monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship, organizations, and schools in New York City and surrounding states, particularly New Jersey.”.The claim that NYPD mounts remotely-controlled surveillance cameras on light poles, aimed at mosques and sends “undercover officers” into mosques, student organizations, businesses, and neighborhoods that “it believes to be heavily Muslim.” Plaintiffs allege that the program is based on the false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity “is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the public at large.” The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit reversed. The allegations “tell a story in which there is standing to complain and which present constitutional concerns that must be addressed and, if true, redressed.” The court analogized the situation to that faced by Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II. View "Hassan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2003, Foy was charged in Pennsylvania with threatening a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). The government also sought revocation of probation imposed by a Texas district court. The Pennsylvania court found that Foy was incapable of assisting in his defense and committed him for 120 days (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)). In 2005, the court found that Foy continued to be incompetent and that there was no substantial probability that he would attain competency in the foreseeable future. The government successfully moved to dismiss the criminal complaint. Three years later the Pennsylvania court terminated Foy’s Texas probation. The warden at the Missouri Federal Medical Center certified that Foy was suffering from a mental disease or defect so that his release would pose a substantial risk and that suitable arrangements for state custody were not available. A Missouri district court ordered Foy committed under section 4246(d). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Annual reports have recommended Foy’s conditional release. Rather than accept a conditional release, Foy sought unconditional release by instituting proceedings in both district courts.The Pennsylvania court denied his FRCP 60(d)(3) motion and declined to vacate the order of civil commitment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction because Foy’s commitment is currently pursuant to a Missouri order. View "United States v. Foy" on Justia Law

In 2000, Bronowicz was charged with crimes ranging from terroristic threats to driving under the influence. He entered a negotiated plea, served his term of imprisonment, and was released. A complicated sequence of probation revocation and sentencing proceedings allegedly had the cumulative effect of unlawfully imposing additional penalties for criminal judgments that had already been satisfied. Bronowicz successfully appealed his additional prison sentence in state court and then filed a federal suit, seeking damages for wrongful incarceration under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims as barred by the 1994 Supreme Court decision, Heck v. Humphrey. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that an order from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacating a sentence imposed by a court of common pleas constitutes a favorable termination of the proceedings against a plaintiff within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey, notwithstanding the fact that the order failed expressly to address the inmate’s specific legal challenges to the sentence, so that any section 1983 claims stemming from the invalidated sentence are not barred by Heck. View "Bronowicz v. County of Allegheny" on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

Saranchak entered open plea of guilty to murdering his grandmother and uncle and was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder following a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing. A jury found that Saranchak should be sentenced to death for his crimes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Saranchak’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Saranchak then sought state post-conviction relief, asserting that his attorney, Watkins, had been constitutionally ineffective. The same judge who had presided over both phases of his trial denied relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9541–9546, The PCRA court—the same judge who presided over both phases of Saranchak’s trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The district court denied Saranchak’s federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that the degree-of-guilt phase of his trial was suffused with prejudice from the cumulative errors arising out of his counsel’s performance at trial. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to the death sentence, finding that the court did not adequately evaluate mitigation evidence concerning Saranchak's childhood and mental health. View "Saranchak v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Young, a Pennsylvania prisoner with a long history of mental illness, filed suit, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by securing him in a four-point restraint chair, naked, for 14 hours, although he did not pose a threat to himself or others. Since childhood, Young has been diagnosed with various forms of mental illness, including bipolar disorder and schizo-affective disorder. Since his detention in solitary confinement, consisting of isolation for 23 hours per day and one hour of recreation time in a solitary pen on weekdays, for several years, Young’s symptoms of mental illness have intensified, including visual and auditory hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, throwing and smearing his own feces, episodes of self-harm, and suicidal impulses. The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Applying the use of excessive force test, analyzing the record under the criteria identified in Supreme Court precedent, and drawing all inferences in favor of Young as the non-moving party, there were genuine disputes as to material facts. View "Young v. Martin" on Justia Law