Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rinaldi, a Lewisburg inmate, alleged that he had been assaulted by Cellmate 1. His informal and subsequent formal "Assault Requests" were denied. The following day, Rinaldi was transferred. According to Rinaldi, Counselor Baysore had warned Rinaldi that unless he stopped filing requests, she would have him placed with a cellmate who was known for assaulting his cellmates. Officer Gee allegedly told Rinaldi he was being moved was because he “didn’t listen.” Cellmate 2, Rinaldi alleges, threatened to kill Rinaldi. Rinaldi claims he “suffered cuts and bruises and emotional distress” from altercations with Cellmate 2. Rinaldi allegedly was concerned about further retaliation and did not file an informal resolution with Lewisburg. He filed his “Retaliation Request” with the Regional Director, where it was rejected with directions to file it at Lewisburg. Separately, Rinaldi sought relief for the assault by Cellmate 2. The Regional Director responded: [T]here is no record of you being assaulted by your previous or current cellmate. . . your appeal is denied." Rinaldi’s further appeal to the General Counsel was denied on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, in part, the dismissal of RInaldi’s claims. Rinaldi’s Assault Request was denied at the highest level on the merits and was properly exhausted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Rinaldi’s Retaliation Request satisfies the objective test for unavailability. Accepting his allegations as true, “a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude” would be “deter[red] . . . from lodging a grievance.” A Federal Tort Claims Act claim was properly dismissed as concerning discretionary functions. View "Rinaldi v. United States" on Justia Law

Jutrowski was involved in a single-car accident while intoxicated. During his subsequent arrest, Jutrowski was kicked in the face, breaking his eye socket. Two Riverdale Police Officers and two New Jersey State Troopers involved in the arrest and their employers acknowledge that an officer kicked Jutrowski. Each officer asserts he neither inflicted the blow nor saw who did so. Jutrowski, whose face was pinned to the pavement when the kick occurred, cannot identify his assailant. Jutrowski brought excessive force and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court, relying on Third Circuit precedent that a civil rights action defendant must have “personal involvement” in the alleged wrongs, determined that Jutrowski’s inability to identify his attacker defeated his claims and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed as to Jutrowski’s excessive force claim but reversed and remanded his conspiracy claim. Despite the unfortunate situation created for plaintiffs who are unable to identify their attackers through no fault of their own, a plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the “personal involvement” of each named defendant to survive summary judgment. Nonetheless, where a plaintiff adduces sufficient evidence of an after-the-fact conspiracy to cover up misconduct, even of an unidentified officer, he may be able to state a claim for the violation of the due process right of access to the courts. View "Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale" on Justia Law

Workman, one of two people to shoot Hunt in 2006, was convicted of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania on a theory of transferred intent. His trial counsel, pursuing “a unique theory of criminal liability,” did not meaningfully test the Commonwealth’s case, having told Workman that he could not be convicted of murder because Hunt was already dead when he was struck by Workman’s bullet. Based on this representation, Workman declined a plea bargain for a 20-year term of imprisonment. Workman’s post-conviction counsel failed to make a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to present a cogent defense. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Although his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally defaulted in state post-conviction relief proceedings, that default should be excused because his state post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance. On the face of the record, trial counsel’s assistance was manifestly ineffective, having included calling no witnesses, presenting no evidence, and arguing inconsistently with the testimony in evidence. View "Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI" on Justia Law

Brown, a federal prisoner. filed his “Kemmerer” complaint, alleging that prison officials had injured him by placing him in restraints; he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which waives fees if the prisoner demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the “three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has on three or more prior occasions, brought an action that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Brown later filed his “Sage” complaint, alleging that prison employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health issues. Brown again sought to proceed IFP. Brown subsequently filed an explanation that he had been informed that he had three strikes and would invoke section 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception. The court denied Brown’s motion in Sage, concluding that he did not qualify for the exception, and vacated its Kemmerer IFP decision. Brown then filed his third Bivens action, claiming that a prison physician assistant denied him treatment for burns after he spilled hot water on himself. The court again held he did not meet the exception and dismissed the case. In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that it must use its own precedent to evaluate whether prior cases are strikes, rather than that of the Circuit from which the potential strikes emanated. Brown's third "strike" did not qualify because the case was closed for failure to state a claim without having actually been filed in the district court. View "Brown v. Sage" on Justia Law

A shooting death occurred during a 2000 fight between the victim, Preston, and Preston’s brother Leonard. Leonard took the stand at his own trial and was convicted of third-degree murder. Preston was later convicted and is serving a 20-40-year sentence for third-degree murder. Preston sought habeas relief based on an alleged violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. Faced with Leonard's invocation of the Fifth Amendment (his appeal was pending) the trial court had allowed the Commonwealth to use Leonard’s police statement and his prior testimony. The prosecutor read aloud portions of those statements, occasionally stopping to ask Leonard if he remembered making them. Leonard largely replied “no comment.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Preston’s petition. While the use of the prior statements against Preston violated the Confrontation Clause, Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted. Rejecting Preston’s argument that counsel’s failure to raise an objection at trial provided cause to excuse the procedural default, the court stated that Preston failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-pronged "Strickland" test. Preston cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure, which was objectively unreasonable, given the cumulative evidence against him. Even absent Leonard’s testimony, the jury would have concluded that Leonard was the shooter. View "Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania State Police employed Conard for 17 years as a 911 dispatcher. Conard left her employment in 2002 to move with her husband, who was on active military deployment. She had “outstanding personnel evaluations” but her supervisors, Tripp and Hile, had disagreements with Conard, arising from Conard’s earlier lawsuit. Conard returned to Pennsylvania in 2004 and reapplied for her position. The Police told Conard that she would be hired subject to a background check but ultimately did not offer her employment. Conard alleges that she was told that Hile and Tripp caused rejection of her application. Conard filed an administrative charge of gender discrimination, then filed her initial civil rights action, alleging retaliation. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Conard alleges that in the following years, she was unable to obtain employment because the defendants gave prospective employers “negative, false, and defamatory” statements in response to reference requests and stated that “[she] was not eligible to return.” The district court held that most of Conard’s claims were barred, having been adjudicated in her prior action, and dismissed her retaliation claim. The Third Circuit reversed as to Conard’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The framework for First Amendment claims brought by government employees against their employers does not apply to Conard’s claim, because the speech which Conard alleges triggered the retaliation—filing administrative complaints and a lawsuit—occurred after she had left her employment. While significant time passed between Conard’s earlier complaint and the alleged retaliation, there is no bright-line rule for the time that may pass between protected speech and actionable retaliation. View "Conard v. Pennsylvania State Police" on Justia Law

In 2006, Geness lived at McVey's Uniontown Pennsylvania assisted living facility for intellectually disabled people. Another resident, Fiffik, fell from the porch, sustaining serious injuries. Fiffik was discharged from the hospital that day but returned that evening. His condition deteriorated, resulting in his death weeks later. Three contemporaneous records from the day of the incident indicated that Fiffik merely fell in an accident. Despite these reports by Fiffik and his wife, once Fiffik was on life support, his daughter reported that her father might have been shoved. Officer Cox conducted a one-day investigation, speaking to Fiffik’s daughter, hospital personnel, and McVey. With a possible lawsuit looming, McVey reported for the first time that immediately before Fiffik’s fall he heard Geness scream “shut up” and then saw Geness walk quickly to his bedroom. Cox reported that after Geness signed a Miranda waiver, he provided a confession closely tracking McVey’s account. Geness was charged with murder. Cox claims he subsequently did not have an active role in the prosecution. Between Fayette County Prison and a locked-down mental institution, Geness remained incarcerated for nine years without further investigation, a habeas hearing, or a trial. Charges were eventually dropped. Geness sued, claiming reckless investigation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, 42 U.S.C. 1983, due process violations, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C 12131. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of several section 1983 claims as time-barred, but reversed for Geness to amend his complaint and for reinstitution of his due process and ADA claims against the Commonwealth. View "Geness v. Cox" on Justia Law

After a 2001 joint trial with co-defendants, Eley and Eiland, a jury convicted Mitchell of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery for the shooting death of a Harrisburg taxi driver. He is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. Mitchell and Eley had unsuccessfully moved to have their cases severed. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, Mitchell sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that the admission of testimony by jailhouse informants concerning Eiland’s out-of-court statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The district court concluded that Eiland’s statements to the informants were nontestimonial under Supreme Court precedent (Crawford (2004)) so their admission did not violate his rights even though he could not cross-examine Eiland. Mitchell argued that the Supreme Court decided Crawford after the last state court proceeding dealing with the Sixth Amendment issue so that Crawford principles were not “clearly established” at the time. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mitchell, by focusing narrowly on the “clearly established Federal law” language of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and by relying on the law in effect at the time of his proceedings, misstates the standard applicable to habeas corpus review of a state court conviction. Relief is available “only on the ground that [a prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Mitchell is not in custody pursuant to what is now recognized as a Sixth Amendment violation. View "Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI" on Justia Law

Mayo is currently serving a 23-year term of imprisonment for a 2001 conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) recidivist enhancement provision, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), having committed three prior offenses in Pennsylvania that the court treated as violent felonies under ACCA: aggravated assault, in 1993, and two robberies, in 1993 and 1994. Mayo argued that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, invalidating ACCA’s residual clause, his sentence is now unconstitutional because none of his prior convictions were for crimes that qualify as a “violent felony” as defined in ACCA. The district court rejected Mayo’s claim for post-conviction relief. The Third Circuit vacated. The aggravated assault conviction was under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(1), which prohibits “attempt[ing] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or caus[ing] such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” As Pennsylvania interprets section 2702(a)(1), it does not necessarily involve the element of physical force required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ACCA. At least one of the convictions that the court relied on to enhance Mayo’s sentence does not qualify as a violent felony. View "United States v. Mayo" on Justia Law

Kane went to the hospital and reported that she may have been the victim of a sexual assault. Coraopolis Police Officer Barger interviewed Kane there. Kane says Barger told her to bring the clothes she wore during the alleged incident to the police station. The next day, Kane, with a friend, took her clothes to the station. Contrary to department policy, Barger met alone with Kane in a back room and used his personal cell phone to photograph Kane’s body. Barger pulled Kane’s shorts down to photograph a bruise on her right buttock. Kane says she “felt something touch her butt crack which caused her to jump.” Again, without asking Kane to do so, Barger pulled Kane’s tank top down to expose a bruise on her chest. Kane says that Barger repeatedly asked about her breasts, vagina, and buttocks. Despite Kane’s consistent denials, Barger’s relentless questioning led Kane to expose her vagina. Barger failed to document the clothing evidence. When Kane reported Barger’s actions, he gave inconsistent accounts, initially denying photographing Kane at all. Kane alleges that Barger violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. The district court granted Barger summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Kane supports an inference that Barger acted for personal gratification rather than investigative ends, Barger’s conduct shocks the conscience and the right to bodily integrity was clearly established. View "Kane v. Barger" on Justia Law