Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Tazu left his native Bangladesh, entered the U.S. without inspection, and applied for asylum based on political persecution. Eight years later, an IJ denied that application. Tazu appealed to the BIA, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2003, the BIA denied his appeal, giving him 30 days to depart. Nearly six years later, he was detained for removal. An attempt at removal failed. His passport had expired; the airline would not let him board the plane. A passport would not likely be issued quickly. In 2009, Tazu was granted supervised release. He complied with the terms of his release, held a job, paid taxes, and raised his children. Seeking a provisional waiver, in 2017, his son, a U.S. citizen, filed Form I-130, which was approved. Tazu did not immediately take the next step, a Form I212. In 2019, the government got Tazu’s renewed passport and re-detained him for removal. He sought habeas relief in New Jersey, filed his Form I-212, and moved to reopen his removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He lost on every front.The Third Circuit ordered the dismissal of the habeas petition; 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) strips courts of jurisdiction to review any “decision or action by the Attorney General to ... execute removal orders.” Section 1252(b)(9) makes a petition for review—not a habeas petition—the exclusive way to challenge a removal action and funnels Tazu’s claims to the Second Circuit. Tazu has a petition for review pending in the Second Circuit. He can stay with his family while that litigation is pending,. View "Tazu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Jeffrey was at home in York County, Pennsylvania with his daughter, young grandson, and their pet dog, Ace, a seven-year-old Rottweiler/Labrador Retriever mix. Jeffrey opened the door to let Ace outside, unaware that Trooper Corrie and other officers were swarming his property to serve an arrest warrant on an armed robbery suspect believed to be living there. Corrie heard Trooper Drum yell “whoa” several times, prompting Corrie “to turn around.” He saw a large dog coming toward him, “already mid-leap, within an arm’s reach.” Ace “was showing teeth, and growling in an aggressive manner.” Corrie says he “backpedaled to create distance,” and Ace circled around him, “attempt[ing] to attack.” Corrie “believe[s] there was another snarl,” and he fired a shot. Ace “began to come after [him] again.” Corrie fired a second shot and then a third. The dog yelped, ran to Jeffrey, and died within minutes. Trooper Drum stated that Ace had behaved aggressively. The family did not witness the incident.The family sued Corrie, claiming unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Corrie. The use of deadly force against a household pet is reasonable if the pet poses an imminent threat to the officer’s safety, viewed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer. Unrebutted testimony established that Act aggressively charged at Corrie, growled, and showed his teeth, as though about to attack. View "Bletz v. Corrie" on Justia Law

In 2008, State Trooper DiLillo stopped a car for speeding. Allen was the passenger. His uncle, Andrew, was driving. Allen had rented the vehicle. Each man was subject to an outstanding warrant. They were placed under arrest. Allen admitted that he had marijuana on his person. DiLillo discovered baggies of marijuana in Allen’s shoes. Trooper Nugnes arrived; DiLillo left with the men. When a tow truck arrived, the driver attempted to unlock the car and accidentally opened the trunk. Nugnes told the truck driver not to do anything and pulled out something wrapped in black plastic, which Nugnes correctly believed to be a bundle of heroin.The court denied Allen’s motion to suppress the heroin, finding that the evidence was in plain view. Allen pled guilty, admitting in court that: there was heroin in the car and that he intended to distribute it. On remand, the trial court heard testimony from the tow truck driver and Nugnes and was “not persuaded, by even the preponderance of the evidence, that the mannitol or the heroin was visible prior to the trooper’s incursion into the trunk.” The Supreme Court of New Jersey vacated Allen’s conviction because of Nugnes’s warrantless search.Allen filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Allen did not establish a malicious prosecution claim because he failed to show that his case was terminated in a way indicative of his innocence. With respect to claims against the state police, New Jersey has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "Allen v. New Jersey State Police" on Justia Law

In 2006, a McVey assisted living resident fell and suffered injuries that resulted in his death. An investigation led to a homicide charge against Geness, a permanently mentally disabled McVey resident. A judge deemed Geness incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to a psychiatric hospital for assessment. Approximately 10 months after his arrest, Geness was transferred to a psychiatric facility where he was deemed incompetent with a “poor” prognosis for improvement. He remained imprisoned for years, while his case remained on the court’s monthly “call of the list.” About five years after Geness’s arrest, a second competency evaluation was conducted, at the prison. It was again determined that Geness was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to improve. A judge released him for involuntary commitment to a Long Term Structured Residence. Geness’s case remained the monthly “call of the list.” In 2015, a judge entered a nolle prosequi order. After nine years in custody without a trial, Geness was released.Geness sued the county and city, former detective Cox, and McVey under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983. All defendants were dismissed except Cox. Following a remand, Geness added ADA “Title II” and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Commonwealth and the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC). The Third Circuit remanded for dismissal of AOPC. While Congress abrogated sovereign immunity for Title II claims, Geness has not stated a Title II claim against AOPC, which had no power over the disposition of his case. There is no allegation regarding how AOPC’s alleged failure to contact the Supreme Court connects to Geness’s disability. View "Geness v. Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts" on Justia Law

Porter was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1986. Since then, he has been incarcerated in solitary confinement on death row. In 2003, the district court granted, in part, Porter’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, determining that his penalty phase verdict form was unconstitutional. The order vacated Porter’s death sentence. Appeals from the order were held in abeyance pending the Pennsylvania courts' ruling on another petition and remain in abeyance.Porter then claimed violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by continuing to confine him on death row even though his death sentence had been vacated. Porter alleged that his solitary confinement has caused “irreversible damage” to his mental health. The district court held that Porter does not have a procedural due process interest in avoiding solitary confinement because Porter’s death sentence remains active; Porter has not offered evidence of actual injury or deliberate indifference so he cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim; and Porter cannot make a substantive due process claim based on the same allegations at issue in his Eighth Amendment claim.The Third Circuit reversed in part. The existence of the stay does not extinguish procedural due process rights. While 33 years of solitary confinement may violate the Eighth Amendment, the claimed Eighth Amendment right has not been clearly established so representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2018, New Jersey made it illegal to possess a magazine capable of holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition. N.J. Stat. 2C:39-1(y), 2C:39-3(j). Prior to that, it had been illegal in New Jersey to possess magazines capable of holding more than 15 rounds of ammunition. Owners of large-capacity magazines (LCMs) could modify their LCMs, render firearms with LCMs or the LCM itself inoperable, register firearms with LCMs that could not be modified; transfer the firearm or LCM to an individual or entity entitled to own or possess it; or surrender the firearm or LCM to law enforcement.The Third Circuit previously affirmed an order denying a preliminary injunction and directly addressed the merits of the constitutionality of the Act. The court held that the Act did not violate the Second, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. On remand, the district court ruled on summary judgment that it was bound by that decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The opponents of the law appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in treating the prior panel’s opinion as binding. The Third Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed. View "Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Harvard gave Mazzetti (a stranger) a ride home because Mazzetti was afraid of her boyfriend (Sutton). Upon their arrival, Sutton made threats, tried to get Mazzetti out of the vehicle, and used racial slurs against Harvard, a Black male. Harvard called 911 and proceeded to leave with Mazzetti. Sutton jumped onto the hood of Harvard’s moving vehicle, making death threats. Harvard believed Sutton had a firearm and a knife. Harvard informed the 911 operator of the situation and drove onto the highway. The operator instructed Harvard to take a specific exit.At the police roadblock, Trooper Cesnalis did not respond to Harvard’s explanation, made no effort to locate the knife or the firearm, and asked Harvard to take a Breathalyzer test. Harvard agreed. After six tries, Harvard completed the test, which indicated that his blood alcohol content was below the legal limit. Cesnalis nonetheless inferred that Harvard was under the influence because he was sweaty, speaking rapidly, and not directly answering questions. Harvard was handcuffed and taken to the police station. Cesnalis was aware that Sutton had a criminal record but accepted Sutton’s explanation that Harvard had hit him with his vehicle. Sutton was not charged. Mazzetti corroborated Harvard’s statements. Despite negative results from additional testing, Cesnalis charged Harvard with DUI, recklessly endangering another person, reckless driving, simple assault, aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct, referring to Sutton as “the victim.” He omitted several exculpatory facts from the affidavit and referred to Harvard’s criminal history, although there was no evidence that Harvard had a criminal history.Harvard, exonerated, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and Equal Protection but affirmed as to the remaining claims and as to another officer. View "Harvard v. Cesnalis" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Harris filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, which was recharacterized as a motion for compassionate release. The district court concluded that Harris had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. A prisoner may file a motion for compassionate release with the sentencing court “after [he or she] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,” 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court concluded that because the Warden denied Harris’s request within 30 days, he was required to completely exhaust the administrative remedy process.The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the government concedes that its argument regarding exhaustion was in error. The statute states that the defendant may file the motion 30 days after the warden receives his request. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In reliance on a Pennsylvania statute and the Supreme Court’s 1977 “Abood” decision, the unions collected “fair-share fees” from the plaintiffs over the plaintiffs’ objections. The plaintiffs did not join the unions but were represented by the unions, which served as the exclusive bargaining agents for their bargaining units. In 2018, the Supreme Court overruled Abood in Janus v. AFSCME, holding that state legislation condoning public-sector fair-share fees was unconstitutional.The plaintiffs filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuits seeking reimbursement of the sums they were required to pay. The district courts, joining a consensus of federal courts across the country, dismissed the claims for monetary relief, ruling that because the unions collected the fair-share fees in good faith reliance on a governing state statute and Supreme Court precedent, they are entitled to, and have successfully made out, a good faith defense to monetary liability under section 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. The good faith defense to section 1983 liability is “narrow” and “only rarely will a party successfully claim to have relied substantially and in good faith on both a state statute and unambiguous Supreme Court precedent validating that statute.” View "Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Education Association" on Justia Law

PSBA is a non-profit association created by Pennsylvania’s school districts. Campbell energetically used Pennsylvania's Right to Know Law (RTKL) to obtain records from PSBA’s constituent school districts. In 2017, Campell sent RTKL requests to public school agencies, seeking contact information for district employees and union representatives. PSBA’s attorney advised member districts that they were required to release publicly-available information, but they did not have to provide private data and that they could simply make the results “available for pickup.” When Campbell received copies of PSBA’s legal guidance, he established a web page entitled “PSBA Horror,” mocking PSBA's Executive Director. PSBA’s counsel threatened to sue Campbell for defamation. Campbell submitted another, 17-page, RTKL request, seeking 27 types of documentation regarding the districts' relationship with PSBA.PSBA sued Campbell, alleging defamation, tortious interference with contractual relations, and abuse of process. Campbell then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging that PSBA’s state suit was motivated by an improper desire to retaliate against him for proper RTKL requests, violating his First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Campell’s suit. Campbell’s RTKL requests and PSBA’s state tort claims were both protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which shields constitutionally-protected conduct from civil liability, absent certain exceptions. The district court erred in requiring a heightened burden of proof on PSBA’s motives in bringing its state court tort claims but Campbell’s civil rights claim would fail under any standard of proof. View "Campbell v. Pennsylvania School Boards Association" on Justia Law