Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brown was shot and killed at a Philadelphia playground. Several witness accounts implicated Baxter and McBride as the shooters. Baxter was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to engage in murder, and first-degree possession of an instrument of a crime with intent to employ it criminally.The trial judge had described the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “the highest standard,” stating that the Commonwealth “is not required to meet some mathematical certainty” or “to demonstrate the complete impossibility of innocence.” A “doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to pause, to hesitate, to refrain from acting upon a matter of the highest importance to your own affairs or to your own interests” "If you were advised by your loved one’s physician that that loved one had a life-threatening illness and that the only protocol was a surgery, very likely you would ask for a second opinion.... You’d probably start researching the illness ... if you’re like me, call everybody you know in medicine... At some moment, however, you’re going to be called upon to make a decision.... If you go forward, it’s because you have moved beyond all reasonable doubt. "[R]easonable doubt must be a real doubt” and “may not be a doubt that is imagined or manufactured to avoid carrying out an unpleasant responsibility.”Baxter's federal habeas corpus petition argued for the first time that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reasonable doubt instruction. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The reasonable doubt instruction did not prejudice Baxter, given the evidence of his guilt. View "Baxter v. Superintendent Coal Township SCI" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma court ordered Boyd to stay away from his ex-wife and his son, surrender his firearms, and undergo a mental health evaluation. After his arrest in Pennsylvania with a loaded handgun, Boyd was convicted of possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence protective order, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).The Third Circuit affirmed. After Boyd’s trial, the Supreme Court issued “Rehaif,” requiring that the government show both that a defendant was subject to a qualifying protective order at the time he possessed a gun and that he knew about the protective order. The district court had not instructed the jury on this knowledge element, but the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of Boyd’s knowledge, including his own admissions in a letter to the court. The admission into evidence of statements that Boyd made about harming the Trump family did not contribute to the verdict, leaving any error harmless. Statements in the prosecution’s closing argument that accused the defense of “misleading” the jury, were also harmless given the context, jury instructions, and weight of the evidence.Section 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Boyd and others whose protective orders were issued without an explicit finding that they pose a credible threat to their intimate partners or their children. The application of section 922(g)(8) survives heightened scrutiny; the statute is substantially related to the goal of reducing domestic violence, an indisputably important state interest. View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

In 1999, Holland was charged with drug and conspiracy crimes and using a gun to murder someone during those crimes. Count Three charged him with using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime and with aiding and abetting that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Holland’s customer, Stewart, testified that she regularly bought crack cocaine from him and had once traded a gun to Holland for cash and drugs. Based on that exchange, the jury found that the gun had been used during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. Holland was convicted on all charges, except the murder count. The court imposed two life sentences plus a five-year consecutive term on Count Three.After an unsuccessful direct appeal, he unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2007, the Supreme Court held, in “Watson,” that a person does not “use” a gun under section 924(c) when he trades away drugs for a gun. Holland sought habeas relief under section 2241. The district court dismissed, reasoning that he should have filed under 2255.The district court dismissed two more identical 2241 petitions as successive under section 2244(a). The Third Circuit affirmed. Holland's fourth 2241 petition based on Watson was not treated as successive. The court found that the petition was properly filed under 2241 since a 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of Holland’s detention but denied Holland’s petition on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that neither Holland nor his trading partner appears to have violated section 924(c), so he may be actually innocent. View "Holland v. Warden Canaan USP" on Justia Law

Doe became a TCNJ tenure-track Assistant Professor in 2016, after giving birth to her third child. She alleges that the Dean and the Department Chair suggested that they were relieved that she would not need pregnancy-related accommodations in the future. Doe received positive reviews for 2017. Doe claims that after she became pregnant again, she was reassigned to a less desirable class. After Doe had her fourth child, the Dean, the Chair, and others, repeatedly asked whether she was done having children. She notified TCNJ that she was pregnant again. In 2018, a TCNJ professor attended the same class that the professor had positively reviewed in 2017 but entered a negative review; Doe claims there were no material changes. The Chair reported “non-material deficiencies” after having given her a positive review in 2017. Doe complained to the Provost, who allegedly “placed a record of discipline” in Doe’s personnel file for the Reappointment Committee. She claims she “suffered emotional trauma, became depressed, and had a miscarriage,” and that she was falsely accused of canceling classes, supported by “doctored” student comments. Doe was not reappointed.She filed suit, alleging gender, national origin, and pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of her motion to proceed anonymously. Doe’s case does not merit appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. Nothing indicated that Doe’s interest in anonymity outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. View "Doe v. The College of New Jersey" on Justia Law

In 1995, firefighters responded to a fire at a house where Brown, age 17, lived with family members. Three firefighters died when a staircase collapsed. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) opened an arson investigation and offered a $15,000 reward. Wright’s testimony undermined Brown’s alibi. Abdullah testified that Brown later confessed that he had started the fire. The prosecution’s witnesses denied receiving payment or having been promised payment in exchange for their testimony. The state court jury convicted Brown, who was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment.Brown filed unsuccessful post-sentence motions concerning payment to witnesses. In 2001, Brown unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. Years later, Brown filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), alleging newly-discovered evidence based on an expert opinion about the cause of the fire. In response to an FOIA request, ATF provided canceled checks showing it had made payments of $5,000 and $10,000 in 1998 relating to the fire. Abdullah acknowledged receiving $5,000 from ATF after Brown’s trial; Wright acknowledged receiving $10,000. The PCRA court found that Brown’s claims about the prosecution’s nondisclosure of the witnesses’ rewards satisfied exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar and granted Brown a new trial.Meanwhile, a federal grand jury indicted Brown for the destruction of property by fire resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. 844(i). The state court dismissed the state charges. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss the federal indictment. Retrying a defendant because the conviction was reversed for trial error is not second jeopardy. The court declined to consider an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine, under which a state crime is not “the same offense” as a federal crime, even if for the same conduct. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Peroza-Benitez awoke, hearing Reading Police Officers breaking down his apartment door. They were executing a search warrant related to suspected drug offenses. Peroza-Benitez climbed out of his window onto the roof wearing undergarments and flip flops and led officers on a rooftop chase. Officer Smith radioed that Peroza-Benitez had a firearm. Peroza-Benitez apparently dropped the firearm, which landed in an alley. Peroza-Benitez denies having a firearm. Peroza-Benitez entered an abandoned building and attempted to escape through a window. Smith and Haser grabbed Peroza-Benitez and attempted to hoist him back inside; he resisted. Haser punched Peroza-Benitez. The officers let go. Peroza-Benitez fell and landed in a below-ground, concrete stairwell. Officers’ testimony differs as to whether Peroza-Benitez voluntarily moved upon landing. Peroza-Benitez testified that he was knocked temporarily unconscious. Officer White tased Peroza-Benitez, without providing a verbal warning. Peroza-Benitez was taken to the hospital, where he underwent surgery for arm injuries and a fractured leg.The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit vacated. There was a “clearly established” right for an injured, visibly unarmed suspect to be free from temporarily paralyzing force while positioned as Peroza-Benitez was. A reasonable jury could conclude that Haser “repeatedly” punched Peroza-Benitez in the head and caused him to fall, in violation of that right. Tasing a visibly unconscious person, who just fell over 10 feet onto concrete, also violates that person’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "Peroza-Benitez v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Department of General Services (DGS) solicited bids for a Shenango Township Youth Development Center, closed since 2013. HIRA, a consultant for Islamic educational groups, submitted the highest bid, $400,000, planning to establish a youth intervention center and Islamic boarding school. DGS and HIRA entered into a contract. Legislators sent a letter to Governor Wolf, claiming HIRA was not in a financial position to turn the property into an economic driver, that New Jersey had revoked HIRA’s corporate status, that HIRA reported low income, that HIRA had not returned their phone calls, and that contract paperwork remained incomplete. When Governor Wolf did not act, the Legislators spoke with the press and at a community meeting where some participants made comments about Muslims. Lawrence County opened a criminal investigation into the bidding process. The Legislators tried, unsuccessfully, to pass a law divesting DGS of authority to sell the property, then tried to persuade DGS to halt the sale. Shenango Township rezoned the property.The sale fell through. DGS solicited new bids. HIRA offered $500,000; another group offered $2,000,000. Legislators promised to ensure the new purchaser secured funding. HIRA sued the officials, including the Legislators in their individual capacities, citing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the Legislators’ motions to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Whether HIRA alleged conduct outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activities or that violates clearly established law is a question of law over which it had jurisdiction. Some of the allegations concerned “quintessentially legislative activities” for purposes of absolute immunity. Other allegations fell “well short of showing that the rights [HIRA] seeks to vindicate here were clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity. View "HIRA Educational Services North America v. Augustine" on Justia Law

Gibbs applied to be a Pittsburgh policeman, passed the written test, and got a conditional job offer. He had to “[b]e personally examined by a Pennsylvania licensed psychologist and found to be psychologically capable [of] exercis[ing] appropriate judgment or restraint in performing the duties of a police officer.” Three psychologists interviewed him; two said he was unfit to serve. Gibbs claims that once they learned of his ADHD diagnosis, they reflexively rejected him without exploring whether his ADHD would interfere with the job. He alleges that his ADHD was under control: Five other police departments have found him mentally fit. He has never misbehaved as a police officer or as a Marine. Gibbs misbehaved as a child before he was treated for ADHD. Gibbs claims that Pittsburgh hired other applicants with similar childhood issues not caused by ADHD. Gibbs sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of his claims. Governments have a right to ensure that their policemen are mentally fit but they may not use psychological testing as a cover to discriminate. Gibbs has plausibly alleged that the psychologists discriminated against him; the city cannot avoid liability by labeling the psychologists’ approval as a job qualification. View "Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Bracey was convicted of murder in 1995. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of Plummer, an alleged eyewitness, and Bell, who claimed Bracey had confessed to him. At trial, both acknowledged that they had received favorable plea agreements in exchange for their testimony. Bracey's appeal and state habeas petitions were unsuccessful. In 2010, Bracey learned the Commonwealth had disclosed only some of the cases that were pending against Plummer and Bell. State courts rejected Bracey's petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act as time-barred; the factual basis of the claim could have “been ascertained [earlier] by the exercise of due diligence.” The district court dismissed Bracey's 2011 federal habeas petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D), reasoning that the plea agreements were public records; Brace filed his petition more than one year after the “factual predicate” for his Brady claim “could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” The Third Circuit denied review.Three years later, the circuit held (Dennis) that a defendant has no burden to “scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material” even if the material part could be found in public records. The prosecution’s “duty to disclose under Brady is absolute.” Bracey moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b). The Third Circuit vacated a summary denial. Dennis effected a material change in Circuit law. A defendant can reasonably expect—and is entitled to presume—that the government fulfilled its Brady obligations because the prosecution’s duty to disclose in no way hinges on defense efforts. View "Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI" on Justia Law

When LaSpina began working for the Scranton Public Library, all Library employees were exclusively represented in collective bargaining by Local 668. No employee had to join the Union; an employee could join and pay full membership dues or decline to join and pay a lesser nonmember “fair-share fee.” LaSpina joined the Union. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in "Janus," that compelling nonmembers to pay fair-share fees violates their First Amendment associational rights. LaSpina resigned from the Union and sued, seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, including a refund of the portion of the dues she paid the Union equal to the nonmembers’ fair-share fees, and a refund of membership dues deducted from her paycheck after she resigned.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. LaSpina had no standing to seek a refund of any portion of the dues she made prior to Janus because she cannot tie the payment of those dues to the Union’s unconstitutional deduction of fair-share fees from nonmembers. If LaSpina is due a refund of monies that were deducted from her wages after she resigned, the claim is not a federal one. LaSpina’s claim that the Union may not collect any dues from an employee until that employee knowingly and freely waives their constitutional right to resign from membership and withhold payments is moot as LaSpina no longer is a Union member. View "LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council" on Justia Law