Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

Exchange, an unincorporated association, is a reciprocal insurance exchange under Pennsylvania law, owned by its members, who are subscribers to Erie's insurance plans. Exchange has no independent officers nor a governing body. Indemnity, a Pennsylvania corporation, is the managing agent and attorney-in-fact for Exchange and receives a management fee from Exchange’s funds.Erie subscribers (Stephenson Plaintiffs) sued Indemnity in state court, claiming that Indemnity breached its fiduciary duty by charging an excessive management fee. They brought the case as a class action under Pennsylvania law on behalf of themselves and other “Pennsylvania residents” who subscribed to Erie policies. Invoking federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 119 Stat. 4 (CAFA), Indemnity removed the case to federal court. The Stephenson Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. A month later, Exchange filed another case in state court, alleging that Indemnity breached its fiduciary duty by charging an excessive management fee; the case is not pled as a class action but is pled in Exchange’s name “by” “Individual Plaintiffs,” on behalf of Exchange, “to benefit all members of Exchange.”Indemnity removed the case, again citing CAFA. The district court remanded the case to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court had jurisdiction because the case is a “class action” for purposes of CAFA or that federal jurisdiction exists because this case is a continuation of a previous federal class action against Indemnity involving similar parties and claims. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Erie Indemnity Co" on Justia Law

A group consisting primarily of union health and welfare insurance plans claims that Abbvie, the manufacturer of the drug Niaspan, paid off a potential manufacturer of a generic version of the drug to delay the generic’s launch. This putative class action was brought to recover damages based on the allegedly inflated prices charged by Abbvie in violation of state antitrust and consumer protection laws. The district court denied a motion for class certification, finding that the class was not ascertainable.The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to reconsider its “ascertainability” requirement. The court rejected an argument that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous because the court misunderstood their proposed methodology, overstated the prevalence of intermediaries in the pharmacy benefit managers’ data, and failed to consider the use of affidavits as a means of identifying class members. The court further noted that the new suggestion concerning affidavits was not properly put before the district court. The district court properly concluded that the proposed data matching technique is unreliable. View "In Re: Niaspan Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Askew formed Vantage to trade securities. He recruited investors, including the plaintiffs. Vantage filed a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form D to sell unregistered securities in a 2016 SEC Rule 506(b) stock offering. The plaintiffs became concerned because Askew was not providing sufficient information but they had no right, based on their stock agreements, to rescind those investments. They decided to threaten litigation and to report Vantage to the SEC to pressure Askew and Vantage to return their investments. Before filing suit, the plaintiffs engaged an independent accountant who reviewed some of Vantage’s financial documents and concluded that he could not say “whether anything nefarious is going" on but that the “‘smell factor’ is definitely present.”The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in subsequent litigation. The district court then conducted an inquiry mandated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and determined that the plaintiffs violated FRCP 11 but chose not to impose any sanctions. The Third Circuit affirmed that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11 in bringing their federal securities claims for an improper purpose (to force a settlement). The plaintiffs’ Unregistered Securities and Misrepresentation Claims lacked factual support. Askew was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the violations were not substantial. The PSLRA, however, mandates the imposition of some form of sanctions when parties violate Rule 11 so the court remanded for the imposition of “some form of Rule 11 sanctions.” View "Scott v. Vantage Corp" on Justia Law

The IRS investigated the companies to determine whether they are liable for penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters. Summonses led to the production of documents in 2014, including email chains involving the Delaware Department of Insurance, relating to the issuance of certificates of authority to the companies' clients and to a meeting with the Department’s Director of Captive and Financial Insurance Products. The IRS issued an administrative summons to the Department for testimony and records relating to filings by and communications with the companies. “Request 1” seeks all e-mails between the Department and the companies related to the Captive Insurance Program. The Department raised confidentiality objections under Delaware Insurance Code section 6920. The IRS declined to abide by section 6920's confidentiality requirements. The Department refuses to produce any response to Request 1.The government filed a successful petition to enforce the summons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Department’s argument that, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 15 U.S.C. 1011, Delaware law embodied in section 6920 overrides the IRS’s statutory authority to issue and enforce summonses. While the MFA does protect state insurance laws from intrusive federal action when certain requirements are met, before any such reverse preemption occurs, the conduct at issue (refusal to produce summonsed documents) must constitute the “business of insurance” under the MFA. That threshold requirement was not met here. View "United States v. State of Delaware Department of Insurance" on Justia Law

Ahmed was President of Aspen Construction, which failed to pay the IRS federal income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes withheld from employees' wages, 26 U.S.C. 7501, 3102(a), 3402(a). Aspen owed more than $600,000 in withheld taxes. Without recourse against Aspen’s individual employees (who were credited with withheld taxes when their net wages were paid), the IRS shifted liability to Ahmed, 26 U.S.C. 6672. Whether Ahmed received notification of proposed penalties is unclear. The IRS assessed the penalties and later filed liens against Ahmed’s property to secure the penalties. Ahmed immediately sought a Collection Due Process review with the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.While Ahmed’s petition was pending, he sent the IRS $625,000, with instructions that it be treated as a “deposit” to freeze the running of interest on his disputed penalties. The IRS instead applied the money as a direct payment to the tax bill, thereby ending the matter. Without any remaining tax liability to dispute, the Tax Court dismissed Ahmed’s petition. The Third Circuit vacated. Ahmed’s petition was moot only if the IRS properly treated his remittance as a payment, which depends on whether he sent money to the IRS after it validly assessed his penalties. There is ambiguity in the record on that issue. View "Ahmed v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit asserting federal securities claims. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants The district court subsequently performed a Federal Rule 11 inquiry mandated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and determined that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11 but did not award attorneys’ fees or impose any other sanctions.The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11 in bringing their federal securities claims by filing for an improper purpose. The plaintiffs expressly stated that their “strategy was to file these complaints to force a settlement.” In addition, their Unregistered Securities and Misrepresentation Claims lacked factual support in violation of Rule 11(b)(3). The plaintiffs had a reasonable basis for their Rule 10b-5 Securities Fraud Claim. The court vacated in part. The PSLRA creates a presumption in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees when a complaint constitutes a “substantial failure” to comply with Rule 11 but the district court did not err in finding that the Rule 11 violations were not substantial. Nonetheless, the PSLRA makes the imposition of sanctions mandatory after a court determines that a party violated Rule 11, so the court abused its discretion in declining to impose any form of sanctions. View "Scott v. Vantage Corp" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission conditionally approved Adelphia’s application under 15 U.S.C. 717f(c), the Natural Gas Act, to acquire, construct, and operate an interstate natural gas pipeline system. As part of that project, Adelphia sought to construct a compressor station in West Rockhill Township and applied to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to demonstrate compliance with the Federal Clean Air Act and Pennsylvania’s Air Pollution Control Act. The DEP granted Plan Approval.Adelphia successfully moved to dismiss appeals to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, arguing that federal courts of appeals have original and exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to environmental permits issued by the DEP. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed, reasoning that administrative proceedings are not “civil actions” and that the Natural Gas Act did not preempt the Board from exercising its jurisdiction. Adelphia then filed suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania requesting that it enjoin the Board from acting. Adelphia also appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.The district court dismissed Adelphia’s suit, holding that the issue preclusion doctrine bars Adelphia from bringing a federal action premised on arguments the Commonwealth Court rejected. The Third Circuit affirmed. Adelphia’s challenge impermissibly seeks to relitigate an issue decided by the Commonwealth Court. View "Adelphia Gateway LLC v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of Samsung SmartTVs, filed a putative class action in 2017, alleging that the SmartTVs used automatic tracking software to collect personally identifying information about them, such as the videos or streaming services they watch, and transmit that data to third-parties, who allegedly used the information to display targeted advertisements. When setting up their SmartTVs, plaintiffs had to agree to Terms and Conditions to access the Internet-enabled services. On some SmartTVs, the Terms and Conditions contained an arbitration provision. In 2018, the plaintiffs disclosed the Model Numbers for the named plaintiffs' SmartTVs, which enabled Samsung to determine whether they agreed to Terms containing an arbitration clause.The district court dismissed all except for the Wiretap Act claims. In 2020, Samsung notified the court that it would move to compel individual arbitration, arguing that it did not waive its right to arbitrate because “the prerequisites of waiver— extensive discovery and prejudice—are lacking.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Samsung waived its right to arbitrate and compelling arbitration would cause the plaintiffs to suffer significant prejudice. Samsung’s actions evinced a preference for litigation over arbitration. Samsung continuously sought and agreed to stays in discovery and pursued successful motions to dismiss on the merits. It assented to all pre-trial orders and participated in numerous court conferences. View "White v. Samsung Electronics America Inc." on Justia Law

Direct purchasers of drywall—not including Home Depot—sued seven drywall suppliers for conspiring to fix prices. Those cases were centralized in multi-district litigation. Home Depot was a member of the putative class. Georgia-Pacific was not sued. Before class-certification or dispositive motions were filed, a settlement with defendants USG and TIN was certified. Home Depot did not opt-out. Lafarge settled. The court certified a new settlement class; Home Depot opted out. The court later certified a new settlement class with respect to the remaining defendants with terms similar to the USG/TIN settlement—preserving the right of class members to pursue claims against alleged co-conspirators other than the settling defendants. Home Depot remained in the settlement class. The court entered judgment.Home Depot then sued Lafarge. Home Depot never bought drywall from Lafarge, but argued that Lafarge was liable for the overcharges Home Depot paid its suppliers; its expert opined that the pricing behaviors of Lafarge and other suppliers, including USG, CertainTeed, and Georgia-Pacific, were indicative of a conspiracy to fix prices. The court struck the expert report, citing issue preclusion and the law of the case, noting the grant of summary judgment to CertainTeed, that Georgia-Pacific had not previously been sued, and that alleged conspirator USG settled early in the class action.The Third Circuit vacated. Issue preclusion applies only to matters which were actually litigated and decided between the parties or their privies. Home Depot was not a party (or privy) to any of the relevant events. Two of the three events to which it was “bound” were not judicial decisions. The law of the case doctrine applies only to prior decisions made in the same case. View "Home Depot USA Inc v. Lafarge North America Inc" on Justia Law