Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The U.S. chocolate market is dominated by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA (the Chocolate Manufacturers). A certified class of direct purchasers of chocolate products and a group of individual plaintiffs alleged that the Chocolate Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy products in the United States three times between 2002 and 2007. They offered evidence of a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in Canada. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Canadian conspiracy evidence was ambiguous and did not support an inference of a U.S. conspiracy because the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy; evidence that the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy was weak and, in any event, related only to Hershey. Other traditional conspiracy evidence was insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy. View "In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

In earlier litigation, Teva challenged the validity and enforceability of GSK’s patents on lamotrigine, Lamictal’s active ingredient. Teva was first to file an FDA application, alleging invalidity or nonenforceability, and seeking approval to produce generic lamotrigine tablets and chewable tablets for markets alleged to be annually worth $2 billion and $50 million,. If the patent suit resulted in a determination of invalidity or nonenforceability—or a settlement incorporating such terms—Teva would be statutorily entitled to a 180- day period of market exclusivity, during which time only it and GSK could produce generic lamotrigine tablets. After the judge ruled the patent’s main claim invalid, the companies settled; Teva would end its patent challenge in exchange for early entry into the chewables market and GSK’s commitment not to produce its own, “authorized generic” Lamictal tablets. Plaintiffs, direct purchasers of Lamictal, sued under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 & 2, claiming that the agreement was a “reverse payment” intended to induce Teva to abandon the patent fight and eliminate the risk of competition in the lamotrigine tablet market for longer than the patent would otherwise permit. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, citing Supreme Court precedent, holding that unexplained large payments from the holder of a drug patent to an alleged infringer to settle litigation of the patent’s validity or infringement (reverse payment) can violate antitrust laws. View "King Drug Co of Florence Inc, v. Smithkline Beecham Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are direct purchasers of traditional blood reagents, used to test blood compatibility between donors and recipients, from Immucor and OrthoClinical (defendants). By 1999, the entire domestic supply of that product was under defendants’ control. In 2000, defendants’ executives attended a trade meeting at which plaintiffs assert the conspiracy began. Defendants soon began rapidly increasing prices. By 2009, many prices had risen more than 2000%. Following a Department of Justice probe, private suits were filed, transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and consolidated. Plaintiffs sought damages under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, for alleged horizontal price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. After preliminary approval of plaintiffs’ settlement with Immucor, the court certified plaintiffs’ class of “[a]ll individuals and entities who purchased traditional blood reagents in the United States directly from Defendants ... at any time from January 1, 2000 through the present.” Plaintiffs relied in part on expert testimony to produce their antitrust impact analyses and damages models, which Ortho challenged. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Comcast v. Behrend, which reversed Behrend v. Comcast, on which the district court relied in granting class certification. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the court had no opportunity to consider the implications of Comcast; a court must resolve any Daubert challenges to expert testimony offered to demonstrate conformity with Rule 23 View "In re: Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Fair Wind owns sailing schools, including one in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. In 2007 Fair Wind hired Bouffard as a captain and instructor, under a contract precluding Bouffard from joining a competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for two years after the end of his employment. In 2010, relying on Bouffard View "Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster" on Justia Law

Ferring and Watson market competing prescription progesterone products. Progesterone plays a key role in helping women become pregnant and maintain pregnancies by preparing and maintaining the uterine lining to support the embryo during early pregnancy. Historically, women have received progesterone through intramuscular shots, which are not FDA-approved and which patients consider painful. Both companies manufacture a product that administers progesterone to women through vaginal inserts rather than shots. Ferring’s product, Endometrin, is delivered in capsule form. Watson’s product, Crinone, is a gel delivered via applicator. Ferring unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act, based on two presentations made by Watson in 2012 to healthcare professionals concerning Crinone. Watson’s consultant, Dr. Silverberg made statements concerning a “Black Box” warning on Endometrin’s package insert; a patient preference survey comparing the products; and Endometrin’s effectiveness in women over the age 35. Silverberg was alerted to the inaccuracy of his statement about a Black Box warning after the first webcast and certified to Ferring and to the court that he would not repeat the statement. The district court held that Ferring failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court holdings that a party bringing a claim under the Lanham Act is not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction and must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely. View "Ferring Pharm. Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law

Antitrust class actions alleged that defendants conspired to set a price floor for baby products. The court initially approved a settlement. Notice was sent to putative class members informing them of their right to submit a claim, opt out, or object. The deadline for submitting claims expired; the court approved the settlement and an allocation plan. Defendants deposited $35,500,000 into a settlement fund. After payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses, the remainder was slated for distribution to the settlement class. Claimants are entitled to different levels of compensation. The remainder would go to charitable organizations proposed by the parties and selected by the court. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that cy pres distributions are permissible, but inferior to direct distributions to the class, because they only imperfectly serve the purpose of compensating class members. The district court did not adequately consider that about $14,000,000 will go to class counsel, roughly $3,000,000 will be distributed to class members, and the rest, approximately $18,500,000 less administrative expenses, will be distributed to cy pres recipients. The court also needs to consider the level of direct benefit to the class in calculating attorneys’ fees. View "In re: Baby Products Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Ethypharm, a French corporation, contracted with Reliant, an American company. Ethypharm would manufacture and provide its drug (Antara®); Reliant would obtain approval and market the drug. Reliant sought FDA approval under 21 U.S.C. 505(b)(2), using data from an approved, fenofibrate drug, TriCor®, developed by Fournier and distributed in the U.S. by Abbott. Antara received approval. Reliant began marketing and sought a declaration of non-infringement or unenforceability of Abbott’s patents. Abbott counterclaimed. In 2006, the companies settled: Abbott and Fournier would license the patents to Reliant and Reliant would pay royaltys. The agreement prohibited Reliant from assigning its rights to or partnering with specific companies. Reliant sold its rights to Oscient, which was not a prohibited purchaser. Losing market share to generic fenofibrate, Oscient discontinued promotion of Antara and filed for bankruptcy. Ethypharm sued Abbott, alleging antitrust and sham litigation under 15 U.S.C. 1, asserting that the settlement agreement was designed to ensure that Antara would be marketed by a company with “limited resources and a relatively small sales force,” so that it could not effectively compete with TriCor and that the royalty payment weakened Antara’s profitability. The district court granted Abbott summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that Ethypharm lacked standing under the Sherman Act. View "Ethypharm SA France v. Abbott Labs" on Justia Law

AdvancePCS is a prescription benefits manager for plans sponsored by employers, unions, and others and is retained to achieve savings by negotiating discounts from drug manufacturers, providing mail order service, contracting with retail pharmacies, and electronic processing and paying of claims. Plaintiffs are retail pharmacies that entered into agreements with AdvancePCS that include an agreed reimbursement rate and an arbitration clause. In 2003, plaintiffs filed suit, asserting that AdvancePCS engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with plan sponsors to restrain competition in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; that AdvancePCS used the economic power of its sponsors to reduce the contractual amount it pays below levels prevailing in a competitive marketplace; and that the agreements impose other limitations. For almost a year, AdvancePCS litigated without mentioning arbitration. After denial of a motion to dismiss and reconsideration, AdvancePCS filed an answer with affirmative defenses, then sought to compel arbitration. The court granted the motion. Plaintiffs did not initiate arbitration, but sought dismiss pending appeal. A different judge vacated the order compelling arbitration. The Third Circuit remanded with directions to reinstate the order compelling arbitration. On remand, a third judge granted dismissal. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of plaintiffs, holding that AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate. View "In Re: Pharmacy Benefit Mgrs. Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

There are four direct purchasers of heavy duty truck transmissions in North America. Truck buyers dealing with those direct purchasers can select many of the components for their trucks, including transmissions, from catalogues called data books. Data book positioning is significant to likelihood that a buyer will choose a particular component. Eaton is a monopolist in the market for such transmissions. ZF-Meritor entered the market in 1989; otherwise no significant external supplier has entered the market in 20 years. ZF-Meritor sued Eaton, alleging anticompetitive practices embodied in long-term agreements between Eaton and every direct purchaser, including provisions relating to data books. A jury found Sherman Act and Clayton Act violations. The district court reasoned that notwithstanding Eaton‘s above-cost prices, there was sufficient evidence to establish long-term de facto exclusive dealing arrangements, which foreclosed a substantial share of the market and harmed competition. The Third Circuit affirmed. The claims are not subject to the price-cost test, but must be analyzed as de facto exclusive dealing claims under the rule of reason. There was sufficient evidence that Eaton engaged in anticompetitive conduct and of resulting antitrust injury. The court vacated an injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief. View "ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp." on Justia Law

Schering held a patent on the controlled release coating applied to potassium chloride crystals for treatment of potassium deficiencies. Potential generic manufacturers filed an abbreviated application for approval (ANDA),Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399, asserting that the Schering patent was invalid or would not be infringed by their new generic drugs. Schering’s subsequent infringement suits were resolved through agreements in which it paid the generic manufacturers to drop patent challenges and refrain from producing a generic drug for a specified period. Congress amended Hatch-Waxman to require pharmaceutical companies who enter into such settlements to file for antitrust review. The FTC filed an antitrust action with respect to Schering’s settlements. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of purchasers of the drug. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the class, but reversed its presumption that Schering’s patent was valid and gave Schering the right to exclude infringing products until the end of its term, including through reverse payment settlements. The court directed use of a “quick look rule of reason analysis” based on economic realities of the settlement rather than labels. The court must treat any payment from a patent holder to a patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade, rebuttable by showing that the payment was for a purpose other than delayed entry or offers some pro-competitive benefit. View "In Re: K-Dur Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law