Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A large communications equipment manufacturer, Avaya, and its dealer and service provider, TLI had a falling out. Avaya subsequently aggressively acted to block TLI from providing independent maintenance services for Avaya equipment. Meanwhile, the newly-independent TLI took various “legally dubious actions” to gain access to Avaya communications systems used by clients the parties once shared. Avaya filed suit, alleging several business torts and breach of contract; TLI counter-sued for antitrust violations. After years of pre-trial litigation, and in the midst of a months-long trial, the district court granted TLI’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all of Avaya’s affirmative claims. The court later instructed the jury that none of TLI’s actions could be considered unlawful. The jury found Avaya liable for two antitrust violations and awarded substantial damages. The Third Circuit vacated. Given how intertwined the two sides’ claims are, and given that Avaya’s antitrust defense relied in large part on justifying Avaya’s conduct as a response to TLI’s conduct, the erroneous Rule 50 judgment infected the jury’s verdict. View "Avaya Inc v. Telecom Labs Inc" on Justia Law

Generic drug manufacturers (plaintiffs) originally sued name-brand drug companies (defendants) that manufacture and sell “Doryx,” the delayed-release doxycycline hyclate, an oral antibiotic of the tetracycline class used to treat severe acne. Tetracyclines are a broad category of antibiotics, the most common being doxycycline monohydrate and minocycline, which vary in their use and efficacy. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants conspired to protect their position in the market through “product hopping,” by making four critical changes to Doryx, all of which required generics to go through a cumbersome regulatory approval process if they wanted to continue to benefit from state substitution laws. Several plaintiffs settled their cases and the district court rejected, on summary judgment, remaining claims of unlawful monopoly and attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act; agreement in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act; and tortious interference with prospective contractual relationships under Pennsylvania law. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that defendants’ conduct was not anticompetitive, and that, even if it was, it was not established that defendants had the requisite market power in the relevant product market. Adoption of plaintiffs’ theory of “anticompetitive product redesign” could have adverse, unintended consequences, including slowing innovation. View "Mylan Pharma. Inc v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co." on Justia Law

Penn State Hershey Medical Center is a leading academic medical center, with 551 beds and more than 800 physicians. Hershey offers all levels of care, but specializes in more complex, specialized services, unavailable at most other hospitals. Hershey draws patients from a broad area. PinnacleHealth System has three hospital campuses, two in Harrisburg, and another in Mechanicsburg, focusing on cost-effective primary and secondary services, with only a limited range of more complex services. It employs fewer than 300 physicians and provides 646 beds. In 2014, Hershey and Pinnacle signed a letter of intent for a proposed merger. Their respective boards subsequently approved the merger; the Hospitals notified the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and, in 2015, executed a “Strategic Affiliation Agreement.” The FTC opposed the merger and filed suit under the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. The district court denied a preliminary injunction pending the FTC’s adjudication on the merits, finding that the opponents of the merger did not properly define the relevant geographic market, a necessary prerequisite to determining whether a proposed combination is sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive as to warrant injunctive relief. The Third Circuit reversed after determining the government’s likelihood of success and weighing the equities, finding that a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. The Hospitals did not rebut the government’s prima facie case that the merger is likely to be anticompetitive. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Eaton manufactures truck transmissions for sale to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), which offer “data books,” listing the options for truck parts. Customer choose among the options; the OEM sources the parts from the manufacturers and uses them to build custom trucks then sold to that customer. Eaton was a near-monopolist in supplying Class 8 truck transmissions. In 1989, ZF emerged as a competitor. Eaton allegedly sought to retain its market share by entering agreements with the OEMs, with increasingly large rebates on Eaton transmissions based on the percentage of transmissions a given OEM purchased from Eaton as opposed to ZF. ZF closed in 2003. In 2006, ZF successfully sued Eaton for antitrust violations. Separately, indirect purchasers who bought trucks from OEMs’ immediate customers brought a class action; that case was dismissed. In this case, Tauro attempt to represent direct purchasers in an antitrust suit was rejected because Tauro never directly purchased a Class 8 truck from the OEMs, but rather purchased trucks from R&R, a direct customer that expressly assigned Tauro its direct purchaser antitrust claims. The Third Circuit reversed. An antitrust claim assignment need not be supported by bargained-for consideration in order to confer direct purchaser standing on an indirect purchaser; it need only be express. That requirement was met. The presumption that a motion to intervene by a proposed class representative is timely if filed before the class opt-out date applies in this pre-certification context. View "Wallach v. Eaton Corp" on Justia Law

Hartig filed a putative class action, alleging antitrust violations involving medicated eyedrops manufactured by the Defendants. Hartig claimed that the Defendants’ wrongful suppression of generic competition resulted in supracompetitive pricing of those eyedrops. Although not a direct purchaser of the medications, Hartig claimed it had standing to sue because of an assignment of rights from Amerisource, a direct purchaser. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that an anti-assignment clause in a distribution agreement between Allergan (the assignee of the named inventors) and Amerisource barred any assignment of antitrust claims from Amerisource to Hartig. The Third Circuit vacated; the district court erred in treating antitrust standing as an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court distinguished between Article III standing and antitrust standing and stated that, when the correct procedures are followed, the court may consider the impact of the anti-assignment clause. View "Hartig Drug Co., Inc v. Senju Pharma. Co., Ltd" on Justia Law

Deborah is a New Jersey charity hospital. CGPA is a group of New Jersey cardiologists. Because no CGPA physician could perform advanced cardiac interventional procedures (ACI) procedures, in 1992, CGPA and Deborah began a relationship that resulted in the transfer of numerous ACI patients to Deborah. In 2005, the CGPA doctors entered into an exclusive agreement to provide Virtua Hospital with cardiovascular services. Referrals to Deborah dropped off significantly. In 2006, CGPA hired a doctor who had previously worked at Deborah and was capable of performing some ACIs. CGPA terminated its agreement with Deborah. In 2007, CGPA signed agreements with doctors who worked primarily at Penn Presbyterian Hospital. Virtua is not mentioned in those contracts, but Deborah alleges that Virtua was an unnamed participant in negotiations and that the goal was to drive Deborah out of business. Deborah sued, asserting that this arrangement constituted an illegal restraint on trade and resulted in harm to competition, in violation of the Sherman Act. The district court granted Virtua and CGPA summary judgment, holding that Deborah did not introduce sufficient evidence to show injury to competition in the designated market. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that Deborah identified the “products” and i the market at issue. Virtua did not challenge Deborah’s market definitions in the district court. Having set the parameters for the dispute, Deborah failed to meet its self-imposed burden. View "Deborah Heart & Lung Center v. Virtua Health Inc" on Justia Law

Sanofi has sold Lovenox, an anticoagulant drug, in the U.S. since 1993. Fragmin, a competing injectable, sold only abroad until 2005, when Eisai obtained a U.S. license. Some Fragmin indications overlap Lovenox’s indications. The relevant product market also includes two other injectable anticoagulant drugs. In 2005-2010, Lovenox had the most indications of the four drugs, the largest sales force, and a market share of 81.5% to 92.3%. Fragmin had the second largest market share at 4.3-8.2%. In 2005-2010, Sanofi offered the “Lovenox Acute Contract Value Program.” Eisai alleged anticompetitive conduct by: market share and volume discounts, a restrictive formulary access clause, and aggressive sales tactics in marketing the Program. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Sanofi. What Eisai called “payoffs” were only discounts Sanofi offered its customers; what Eisai called “agreements with hospitals to block access” were actually provisions proscribing customers from favoring competing drugs over Lovenox. What Eisai called “a campaign of ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt’” was simply Sanofi’s marketing. Under the rule of reason, there was no evidence that Sanofi’s actions caused broad harm to the competitive nature of the anticoagulant market. If Sanofi’s conduct caused damage to its competitors, that is not a harm for which Congress has prescribed a remedy. View "Eisai Inc v. Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC" on Justia Law

An Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) is a U.S. communication service between land and vessels in navigable waterways, existing on specific broadcast frequencies. Advances in technology have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTSs. Under the original site-based system, small geographic regions were defined by location and the waterway served and the FCC provided licenses at no cost to the first applicant. In 2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began issuing licenses by competitive bidding; it divided the U.S. into 10 regions and, at public auctions, sold “geographic” licenses for two blocks of AMTS frequencies in each region. Although geographic licensees may generally place stations anywhere within their region, they may not interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations, so the location of a site-based station creates a gap in a geographic licensee’s coverage area. Plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying pre-existing site-based licenses. Site-based operators refused to provide plaintiffs with the operating contours for their site-based locations within plaintiffs’ geographic locations. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FCA claims and a determination that no antitrust conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs did not identify particular actions that were determined by the FCC to be unreasonable or unjust and, therefore, do not possess a private right of action. View "Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Hanover Realty contracted with Wegmans to develop a supermarket on its New Jersey property, requiring Hanover to secure necessary permits and approvals before breaking ground. ShopRite and its development subsidiary filed administrative and court challenges to Hanover’s applications. Believing these filings were baseless and intended only to frustrate the entry of a competitor, Hanover sued for antitrust violations. The district court dismissed, holding that Hanover did not have standing because it was not a competitor, consumer, or participant in the restrained markets and did not sustain the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to the claim for attempted monopolization of the market for full-service supermarkets. Hanover can establish that its injury was “inextricably intertwined” with defendants’ anti-competitive conduct. Hanover sufficiently alleged that the petitioning activity at issue was undertaken without regard to the merits of the claims and for the purpose of using the governmental process to restrain trade, so that defendants are not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity because their conduct falls within the exception for sham litigation. The court affirmed as to the claim for attempted monopolization of the rental space market; there was no standing because Hanover does not compete with defendants in that market. View "Hanover 3201 Realty LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

The U.S. chocolate market is dominated by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA (the Chocolate Manufacturers). A certified class of direct purchasers of chocolate products and a group of individual plaintiffs alleged that the Chocolate Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy products in the United States three times between 2002 and 2007. They offered evidence of a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in Canada. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Canadian conspiracy evidence was ambiguous and did not support an inference of a U.S. conspiracy because the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy; evidence that the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy was weak and, in any event, related only to Hershey. Other traditional conspiracy evidence was insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy. View "In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law