Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Until late 2008, Sprint included a flat-rate early termination fee provision in its cellular telephone contracts, which allowed it to charge a set fee to customers who terminated their contracts before the end date stated in the contract. Class action lawsuits were brought against cellular phone service providers who charged flat-rate ETFs, including Sprint. In this case, the plaintiffs entered into negotiations with Sprint, and, after five months of mediation, the parties decided to settle the matter for $17.5 million. Over objections lodged by several class members, the district court certified the settlement class and approved the Settlement Agreement. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court did not adequately protect the rights of absent class members when it determined that it would be unreasonable to require a search of billing records for the purpose of providing individual notice to those class members. The court also suggested that the district court consider whether class representatives can adequately represent all members. View "Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC" on Justia Law

The Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith was founded by Johnson in 1919. In 1947, Johnson established a non-profit corporation to hold and manage the assets of the Church. Following a 1992 schism, two factions claimed authority over the Church and ownership of church assets. In 2000 Pennsylvania courts concluded that Kenneth Shelton was the rightful General Overseer of the Church. Askew was a member of the faction loyal to Roddy Shelton. He does not accept Bishop Kenneth Shelton as the General Overseer of the Church. On multiple occasions since the schism, Bishop Shelton declared all followers of Roddy Shelton nonmembers of the Church. Asserting claims on behalf of himself as a church member and derivatively on behalf of the Church, Askew sued, alleging that Bishop Shelton and officers of the affiliated Board of Trustees misappropriated church assets and breached their fiduciary duties to the Church. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that as a nonmember, Askew lacked standing and that First Amendment non-entanglement principles shields membership decisions from civil court review. View "Askew v. Trs., Gen. Assembly Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former assistant branch manager at Enterprise, filed a nationwide class action, claiming that Enterprise violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), by failing to pay required overtime wages. The district court held that the parent company, which is the sole stockholder of 38 domestic subsidiaries, was not a “joint employer,” and granted summary judgment in favor of the parent company. The Third Circuit affirmed after examining a number of factors concerning the relationship between the parent company and the direct employer. View "In Re: Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig." on Justia Law

Humana sued, alleging that Glaxo was obligated to reimburse Humana for expenses Humana had incurred treating its insureds’ injuries resulting from Glaxo’s drug, Avandia. Humana runs a Medicare Advantage plan. Its complaint asserts that, pursuant to the Medicare Act, Glaxo is in this instance a “primary payer” obligated to reimburse Humana as a “secondary payer.” The district court dismissed, agreeing with Glaxo that the Medicare Act did not provide Medicare Advantage organizations with a private cause of action to seek such reimbursement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Medicare Secondary Payer Act, in 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(3)(A), provides Humana with a private cause of action against Glaxo. Even if the provision is ambiguous, regulations issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services make clear that the provision extends the private cause of action to MAOs. View "Humana Med. Plan Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC" on Justia Law

Seven states sought to recover proceeds of matured but unredeemed U.S. savings bonds from the Treasury, asserting that Treasury has possession of approximately $16 billion worth of matured but unredeemed savings bonds, of which persons whose last known addresses were within the plaintiff states own $1.6 billion. The states contended that their respective unclaimed property acts obliged Treasury to account for and deliver the proceeds of these bonds to the states for reunification with their owners. The district court dismissed, reasoning that sovereign immunity and intergovernmental immunity barred the action and that federal law and regulations preempted the states’ statutory authority to obtain the proceeds of the savings bonds. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although the federal government has waived sovereign immunity (5 U.S.C. 702), states may not directly regulate the federal government’s operations or property and federal law is sufficiently pervasive so as not to leave room for the enforcement of the unclaimed property acts to achieve the result that the states seek. View "Treasurer, State of NJ v. U.S. Dept of Treasury" on Justia Law

Figueroa admits that he sold heroin to an undercover officer, who returned later and purchased cocaine and heroin. During the second purchase, the officer saw what appeared to be a gun tucked into Figueroa’s waistband. It was dark and he only saw a few inches of the object. Officers then stopped the car driven, and owned, by Figueroa’s girlfriend. Figueroa was in the front passenger seat. Officers removed both from the car, opened the glove compartment, and recovered a handgun. Both occupants denied knowledge of the firearm. No forensic evidence connected either to the firearm. The jury convicted on the drug counts, but was split on the charge of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). After releasing the jury, the judge changed courses, asked that the jury be held, and had them deliberate a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The jury convicted and Figueroa was sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for possession by a felon. The Third Circuit affirmed. Reconvening after declaring a mistrial on Count III did not violate Double Jeopardy or subject the jury to outside influences. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In 1993 Vasquez was sentenced to 262 months for heroin offenses. In 1996, he was sentenced to 14 months, to run consecutively, for possession of a prohibited object. His projected release date is October, 2012. The Second Chance Act, which applies, increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and requires the Bureau of Prisons to make individual determinations that ensure that placement is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of success and to provide incentives for participation in skills development programs. Vasquez’s team recommended a 151-180 day placement in a Residential Re-entry Center. Vasquez had not regularly participated in educational programs during his incarceration. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the BOP failed to comply with the reentry initiative and improperly added a factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been considered for incentives that were never properly implemented. The district court rejected the petition. Vasquez was not merely challenging construction of the Second Chance Act or implementation of the reentry initiative; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. There was no abuse of discretion in how the factors were balanced with goals of the Act. View "Vasquez v. Strada" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action challenging 62 Pa. Stat. 1414, which was enacted to regulate special needs trusts. The comprehensive Medicaid eligibility rules enacted by Congress generally mandate that trusts be counted as assets of those seeking Medicaid, but exempt special needs trusts, which are intended to provide disabled individuals with necessities and comforts not covered by Medicaid. Plaintiffs allege Section 1414 is preempted by 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4). The district court held that all but one of the challenged provisions of Section 1414 was preempted, finding that plaintiffs had a private right of action under both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause. The court also held that Section 1414 was severable, certified a class, and appointed class counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the case is justiciable and that plaintiffs have a private right of action. Section 1414's 50% repayment provision, "special needs" provision, expenditure provision, and age restriction are all preempted by federal law. The enforcement provision of Section 1414, however, when used to enforce provisions not otherwise preempted, is a reasonable exercise of the Commonwealth's retained authority to regulate trusts. View "Lewis v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress. View "Cardona v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thompson was indicted on two counts, and pled guilty to one, of distributing fewer than five grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)). Because he had two prior felony convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Had Thompson not been classified as a career offender, his Guidelines range would have been 46 to 57 months, but he was sentenced to 151 months, the bottom of the range for career offenders. After the United States Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses, Thompson moved to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). He conceded that Third Circuit precedent (United States v. Mateo, 2009) foreclosed his argument, and the district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that Mateo remains valid in light of Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011). View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law