Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A citizen of India, Desai was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1980. He acquired convictions for: burglary and criminal mischief (1991), burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary (1992), burglary (1992), theft (1993), theft (1994), shoplifting (1997), possession of marijuana (2000), disorderly conduct (2001), and theft and possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (2002). In 2008, Desai was charged with removability based on his 1994 and 2002 convictions. He applied for relief under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that his HIV-positive status made him vulnerable to discrimination and persecution in India. A year after Desai’s removal, his 2002 conviction was vacated. After the 90-day window, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C), Desai moved to reopen sua sponte. The BIA held that it lacked jurisdiction because the post-departure bar, 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d), precludes a removed person from filing a motion to reopen. The Third Circuit denied appeal. While the court previously held the post-departure bar invalid to the extent it conflicted with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7), (granting aliens the right to file one motion to reopen under certain conditions), it can be invoked as a basis for refusing to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a).View "Desai v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

In connection with a loan, Bayonne provided Nuveen with an audit report authored by accounting firm, Withum and an opinion letter from Bayonne’s counsel, Lindabury. Soon after the transaction, Bayonne filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. 101. Nuveen claimed that the audit report and opinion letter concealed problems with Bayonne’s financial condition and that, had it known about these financial issues, it would not have entered into the transaction. The district court dismissed claims of fraud (Withum), negligent misrepresentation, and malpractice (Lindabury) based on Nuveen’s noncompliance with New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-26, which requires an affidavit of merit for certain actions against professionals. The Third Circuit remanded for reconsideration of diversity jurisdiction. On remand, the court accepted an argument that the action was “related to” Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding, establishing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1334(b), and again dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to jurisdiction and held that the AOM Statute can be applied by a federal court without conflicting with FRCP 8. If the AOM Statute applies, noncompliance requires dismissal. The court certified to the New Jersey Supreme Court questions relating to the “nature of the injury” and “cause of action” elements of the statute. View "Nuveen Mun. Trust v. Withumsmith Brown PC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s counsel failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment or order (Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A)). Defendant sought attorneys’ fees and costs under FRCP 68. The motion was withdrawn. Plaintiff then moved for issuance of an order pursuant to RCP 58(e), or, in the alternative, for an order granting an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, arguing that his attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was caused by excusable neglect as the result of a busy caseload. The court granted the extension. The Third Circuit vacated the extension as improvidently granted and dismissed plaintiff’s appeal. A ruling in favor of plaintiff “in the current circumstances could be read as condoning and even rewarding otherwise avoidable mistakes—and even outright incompetence—on the part of even experienced attorneys.” View "Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits" on Justia Law

Jewish Home of Eastern Pennsylvania (JHEP) provides nursing care to Medicare beneficiaries and is required to comply with the mandatory health and safety requirements for participation. JHEP must submit to random surveys conducted by state departments of health. In 2005, the Pennsylvania Department of Health conducted a survey that concluded that JHEP had eight regulatory deficiencies, including violations of 42 C.F.R. 483.25(h)(2), which requires a facility to ensure that each resident receives adequate supervision and assistance with devices to prevent accidents. Based on those deficiencies and those found in a 2006 survey, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services imposed fines totaling $17,150 and $12,800. JHEP claimed that the allegations of noncompliance were based on the inadmissible disclosure of privileged‖ quality assurance records and that the monetary penalties violated its right to equal protection because they were the product of selective enforcement based on race and religion. An ALJ upheld the fines against JHEP. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Jewish Home of E. PA v. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Servs." on Justia Law

Father and son, citizens of Pakistan, were admitted to the U.S. as nonimmigrant visitors in 1990. After they overstayed their visas, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings. Father sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, claiming that he was persecuted in Pakistan based on his membership in the Pakistan People’s Party. Son, a minor, was listed as a derivative beneficiary. In 2000, an Immigration Judge denied the applications because they presented no credible evidence of past persecution or fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed in 2003, and the two did not petition for review. In 2010, seven and one-half years later, they filed with the BIA a motion for an emergency stay of removal and a motion to reopen their case. Before the BIA rules, they sought review by the Third Circuit, and, after the BIA denial, they again sought review. After concluding that it had jurisdiction despite the premature filing, the Third Circuit denied review. View "Khan v. Attorney Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart cleaning crew members sought compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment. The workers, illegal immigrants who took jobs with contractors and subcontractors Wal-Mart engaged to clean its stores, alleged: Wal-Mart had hiring and firing authority over them and closely directed their actions such that Wal-Mart was their employer under the FLSA; Wal-Mart took part in a RICO enterprise by transporting and harboring illegal immigrants, encouraging illegal immigration, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and involuntary servitude (18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(F)); Wal-Mart‘s practice of locking some stores at night and on weekends, without always having a manager available with a key, constituted false imprisonment. Over eight years and multiple opinions, the district court rejected final certification of an FLSA class and rejected the RICO and false imprisonment claims on several grounds, and rejected the false imprisonment claim on the merits. The Third Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 626(b). View "Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Marcus leased a 2007 BMW from a dealership in New Jersey. Marcus suffered four “flat” tires during his three-year lease. Each time, he drove his car to a BMW dealership in New York and had the tire replaced. BMW billed Marcus between $350 to $390 for parts, labor, fees, and taxes. In each instance, the run-flat tires (RFT) worked as intended. Marcus sued Bridgestone, asserting consumer fraud, breach of warranty, and breach of contract claims. He claims that Bridgestone RFTs are “defective” because they: are highly susceptible to flats, punctures and bubbles, and fail at a significantly higher rate than radial tires or other run-flat tires; cannot be repaired, only replaced, in the event of a small puncture; and are “exorbitantly priced.” He claimed RFT-equipped BMWs cannot be retrofitted to operate with conventional tires, and that they are difficult to replace. The district court certified the suit under FRCP 23(b)(3) as an opt-out class action on behalf of all purchasers and lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped with Bridgestone RFTs sold or leased in New Jersey with tires that have gone flat and been replaced. The Third Circuit vacated. Marcus’s claims do not satisfy the numerosity and predominance requirements. View "Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers entered a private residence without a warrant because they believed the house to be abandoned. Upon searching the house, they found Harrison sitting in a recliner with a gun, scales, pills, and cocaine base on the table next to him. The police took Harrison into custody, seized the gun, and obtained a warrant to seize the rest of the items. Harrison was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base and moved to suppress the physical evidence. The district court denied the motion; although Harrison, a tenant, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, the police officers were operating under the mistaken but reasonable belief that the house was abandoned. The Third Circuit affirmed. A house can be abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes; the officers did not make a mistake of law. Their mistake of fact was reasonable, based on their observations over several months that the house appeared unfit for human habitation. There was trash strewn about, the lawn was overgrown with weeds, and windows on both levels were either boarded up or exposed. The front door was left open, and the lock may have been broken. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Mitchell was convicted on charges related to his possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97, a police department employee, because the law does not categorically impute bias to coworkers of key witnesses in a trial. Under the circumstances, Mitchell’s right to trial by an impartial jury was protected adequately by inquiry for actual bias, and that inquiry yielded no evidence of actual bias. The court remanded for additional fact-finding with respect to Juror 28, a “close cousin” of the prosecutor. The law presumes bias in jurors who are close relatives of the parties in a case and the court did not elicit sufficient information on the nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and Juror 28. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Debtors took a mortgage and a second mortgage on their residence. They later filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition. They claimed exemptions for their residence, citing 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(1) and 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(5). Amounts claimed on Schedule D and Schedule F were not referenced or listed on Schedule C. There were no objections to exemptions within the within the 30-day limit. After the selling the house, the trustee moved to value the exemption in the former residence at zero or to declare that the exemption did not extend to sales proceeds, because debtors had no equity in their home to which the homestead exemption could attach. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court and ruled in favor of debtors, holding that the trustee’s late objection to claimed exemptions was barred. On remand, in light the Supreme Court in decision Schwab v. Reilly,(2010), the district court held that the trustee has no duty to object to to claimed exemptions within the 30-day limit under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b). The Third Circuit affirmed. The Trustee’s objection was timely and valid. Debtors did not provide sufficient notice through their disclosure in Schedule C that they intended to exempt the property’s full value. View "In Re: Messina" on Justia Law