Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ICE officers entered the home Ramos shared with relatives with an administrative warrant for a sister, with no information about the identity or legal status of other occupants. During the next 15 hours, the agents detained and questioned the occupants, under circumstances that were allegedly extremely stressful. Ramos produced documents showing that he is a citizen of Guatemala; he did not produce any documentation that he was lawfully present in the U.S. The IJ denied a motion to suppress evidence found during the raid, although Ramos was detained without a warrant. Ramos asserted that the agents entered his home without valid consent and in violation of administrative regulations. He sought production of documents related to his search, seizure, and arrest, and ICE procedures. The IJ never ruled on that motion, but found Ramos removable. The BIA dismissed an appeal, declining to address a Fourth Amendment claim and finding that any regulatory violations did not alter the outcome. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The exclusionary rule may apply in cases where constitutional violations by immigration officers are widespread or evidence was obtained as a result of egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence. View "Oliva-Ramos v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

TriCenturion audited Nichole Medical as a Program Safeguard Contractor under the Medicare Integrity Program, 42 U.S.C. 395ddd(a), and concluded that Nichole “might” be improperly billing for medical equipment; that Nichole had received overpayments; and that it had not maintained sufficient medical records to establish reasonableness or medical necessity. TriCenturion directed Nichole’s carrier, HealthNow, to withhold payments. TriCenturion calculated the actual overpayment of several specific claims, used those as a representative sampling, and extrapolated an overpayment amount for all relevant claims. The Attorney General found no evidence of fraud and refused to prosecute; HealthNow stopped withholding payments. TriCenturion instructed HealthNow’s successor to re-institute the offset. Nichole went out of business, but pursued an appeal. An ALJ determined that Nichole was entitled to reimbursement on some, but not all, appealed claims and found that the process for arriving at the extrapolated overpayment was flawed. The Medicare Appeals Council found that all 39 claims had been reopened and reviewed improperly. The district court dismissed Nichole’s suit against TriCenturion, which alleged torts and breach of the statutory duty of care under 42 U.S.C. 1320c-6(b). The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendants are immune from suit as officers or employees of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. View "Nichole Medical Equip & Supply, Inc. v. Tricenturion, Inc." on Justia Law

D.F. was a five-year-old African-American male kindergartener during the 2008-2009 school year, his first in Collingswood. He had previously been educated in the Camden school system, which had identified him as a special needs student and developed an Individualized Education Plan for him. Collingswood adopted the Camden IEP in substantial part, with the consent of D.F.’s mother, A.C. In January 2009, A.C. filed a due process petition alleging violation of D.F’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act; later, she filed a second petition expanding the claims. D.F. and A.C. subsequently moved out of state and the New Jersey Administrative Law Judge dismissed the pending petitions as moot. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the move did not render all claims moot. The ALJ did not make any factual findings that related to the claim for compensatory education for violations of the right to a free and appropriate public education beyond the absence of a one-to-one aide during the September 2008-January 2009 period, nor any related to the summer 2009 compensatory education claim. View "D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Green, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 2002. In 2006, his status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. Weeks later, he was arrested on charges of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. He pled guilty. In 2008, Green was arrested again on charges of possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance and pled guilty. In 2010, DHS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Green applied for deferred removal under the Convention Against Torture, testifying that he feared that he would be tortured by the Shower Posse, a Jamaican drug gang. He had witnessed the 1998 killing of a police officer and an informant and had identified the shooters. His sister and his brother were subsequently killed; Green himself had been attacked in downtown Kingston. Although the IJ found Green’s testimony credible, she denied his application; he “failed to meet his burden to establish that the Shower Posse would be acting on behalf of the government of Jamaica or that the government of Jamaica would acquiesce in the actions of the Shower Posse,” as required under CAT. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Green v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Newark detectives were watching a building in connection with a crime that occurred at another location, two months earlier. They did not have a description of anyone involved and had no information whatsoever about Navedo. After watching an interaction between Navedo and Pozo, the officers thought that Pozo had a gun. The officers approached and identified themselves and clearly saw that Pozo had a gun. Pozo threw it into his bag and ran. As one officer chased Pozo, Navedo ran up the stairs to his home with another officer pursuing him into the building. As Navedo opened the door to his apartment, he was tackled by the officer, who testified that he handcuffed Navedo, then observed a shotgun, rifles, and ammunition on the floor. The court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Navedo and that Navedo’s flight elevated the reasonable suspicion to “probable cause for arrest and justified entry” under the theory of hot pursuit. The Third Circuit vacated. The police had no reason to suspect that Navedo was involved in criminal activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and investigate, not arrest. View "United States v. Navedo" on Justia Law

In 2003, Berberena pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of powder cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 210-262 months but varied downward to impose a sentence of 150 months. In 2006, Gayle was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court calculated a range of 168-210 months for two counts, but varied downward to 120 months. Because one count carried a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence, the court sentenced him to 180 months. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act changed the threshold quantities of crack that trigger mandatory minimum sentences. Berberena and Gayle moved for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court applied a policy statement that generally prohibits a reduction below the low end of a prisoner’s new range, even if the prisoner originally received a below-Guidelines sentence. Berberena’s motion was denied. Gayle’s motion was granted in part. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority, violated separation-of-powers principles, and failed to comply with APA notice-and-comment requirements. View "United States v. Gayle" on Justia Law

The Port Authority’s subsidiary, PATH, operates the Grove Street Station in Jersey City. The Station was built in 1910. In 2000 PATH planned to expand the Station to accommodate larger trains and persons with disabilities, a project that would have involved construction of a new entrance and two elevators. After September 11, 2001, and the resulting closure of two stations, ridership increased at the Station. Concerned about congestion and safety, PATH scrapped its renovation plans and undertook a “fast track” project. Construction began in 2002 and concluded in 2005. Plaintiffs alleged that the renovations triggered an obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213, to make the Station accessible to handicapped persons. They also alleged violations under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination and certain state construction code provisions. The district court dismissed, state-law claims on the basis that allowing such claims to proceed would violate the interstate compact between New York and New Jersey that created the Authority, but ordered the Authority to make the east entrance accessible. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the state law claims, but remanded the ADA issue for trial on the issue of feasibility. View "Hip Heightened Indep. & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ" on Justia Law

In 1986 Munchinski was convicted of two counts of first-degree homicide and two counts of second-degree homicide arising out of a pair of murders that occurred in 1977 in Bear Rocks, Pennsylvania. Munchinski later discovered that prosecutors had withheld from his counsel almost a dozen articles of exculpatory evidence. After unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction relief several times in state and federal court, Munchinski filed a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244 & 2254(d), arguing that the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady, when it declined to grant Munchinski post-conviction relief. The district court granted habeas relief. The court equitably tolled the statute of limitations for some untimely claims; excused certain procedural defaults, finding that applying the procedural default doctrine would effect a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied Brady. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the scope of the Brady violations was “staggering.” Munchinski demonstrated actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. View "Munchinski v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Roye, a 58-year-old native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. in 1984 as the spouse of a citizen. In 1992, he pled guilty to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child by having sexual intercourse with his eight-month old daughter. The trial judge sentenced Roye to six to 20 years’ imprisonment but strongly recommended transfer into a psychiatric facility. Fourteen years later, DHS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An Immigration Judge found that Roye granted for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ emphasized testimony indicating “that mentally ill detainees and prisoners are often sexually and physically assaulted in the Jamaican prison system because of the nature of their mental illness” and that Roye will be homeless in Jamaica due to a lack of family ties. The BIA ordered immediate removal. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA must review the conclusion that the evidence demonstrates that Roye’s persecutors will physically and sexually abuse him in a manner that rises to the level of torture under the CAT, and decide whether Jamaican public officials will consent to or acquiesce in such abuse. View "Roye v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 1980 Pacific purchased a certificate of reinsurance from a predecessor of Global. The Certificate included a sentence that reads, “As a condition precedent, the Company [i.e., Pacific] shall promptly provide the Reinsurer [i.e., Global] with a definitive statement of loss on any claim or occurrence reported to the Company and brought under this Certificate which involves a death, serious injury or lawsuit.” In the early 1990s, claimants began inundating Buffalo Forge with asbestos-related lawsuits. It notified Pacific, its excess carrier, of these claims in April 2001. By 2004, its primary policy was exhausted. In 2005, Pacific instructed its broker to keep its reinsurers informed about developments in the Buffalo Forge matter. The district court applied Pennsylvania law. Under New York law, when a reinsurance contract expressly requires a reinsured to provide its reinsurer with prompt notice of a claim or occurrence as a condition precedent to coverage and the reinsured fails to do so, that failure excuses the reinsurer from its duty to perform, regardless whether the reinsurer suffered prejudice as a result of the late notice. The Third Circuit reversed and applied New York law and concluded that the agreement is fairly susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. View "Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am." on Justia Law