Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Copenhefer was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats. As to the murder conviction, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, making a death sentence mandatory. The court imposed the death sentence and consecutive sentences totaling 20 to 40 years on remaining counts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A trial court denied a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act; the Supreme Court again affirmed. In 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted habeas relief from the death sentence on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was required to find that Copenhefer’s lack of a prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the original sentence. The court rejected additional claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory that the victim lingered before dying and that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove female jurors. View "Copenhefer v. Horn" on Justia Law

Bistrian, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, filed 108-page complaint with 114 pages of exhibits, alleging that, while he was awaiting sentencing on wire-fraud charges, prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they flubbed the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, Bistrian contends he repeatedly requested help, but no preventive measures were taken. Later, one of the inmates against whom Bistrian had cooperated, along with others, beat him while they were together in a locked recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon attacked Bistrian in the recreation pen. Bistrian also claimed that certain of the 447 days he spent in segregation violated his substantive due process, procedural due process, and free speech rights. After the district court ruled on motions, six counts survived against 28 defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. Counts that survived include: deliberate indifference to medical needs; substantive due process violations by failure to protect and by punitive detention; procedural due process; and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. View "Bistrian v. Levi" on Justia Law

Garrus was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 2001. At sentencing, the judge increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9714, the “three strikes” law. To do so, the judge made a finding that Garrus had previously been convicted of burglarizing an occupied building, when, in fact, he had only pled guilty to, and been convicted of, second degree burglary (which, under Pennsylvania law, necessarily requires that the burglarized building was unoccupied). In a habeas petition, Garrus argued that this judicial fact-finding violated the Supreme Court's 2000 holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, requiring that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court denied the petition on the basis that the highest state court determination upholding the sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Third Circuit reversed. The state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was objectively unreasonable. View "Garrus v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Ware and Stratton, convicted of offenses involving crack cocaine, moved for reductions in their sentences following a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to crack cocaine offenses. Ware’s conviction included counts of conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of crack with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. Ware was found to be responsible for 1.17 grams of crack. Stratton was convicted on counts including distribution of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. He was found responsible for 5.9 grams of crack. Stratton was granted a downward departure based on over-representation of criminal history. Ware’s sentence was reduced from 128 months to 84 months, but a different judge denied Stratton’s motion to reduce his sentence from 188 months. The Third Circuit reversed as to Ware and affirmed as to Stratton. The Sentencing Guidelines amendments at issue do not apply to defendants who, like Ware and Stratton, were originally sentenced on the basis of variances (Ware) or departures (Stratton) from a guideline range not affected by the amendments. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law

While conducting an undercover online investigation of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, officer Erdely was able to connect to a computer sharing child pornography files. Erdely obtained a court order to identify the IP address that had shared the files. The address was registered to Cunningham’s deceased mother. During a search, the only working computer was found in Cunningham’s bedroom. Cunningham admitted to searching for and downloading child pornography. At trial, the district court allowed the government, over Cunningham’s objection, to show the jury videos containing seven different video clips totaling approximately two minutes as a sample of the child pornography that gave rise to the charges. Cunningham was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment and 20 years’ supervised release following his conviction for receipt and distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. The district court abused its discretion, not only by failing to review the videos prior to admitting them but also by allowing all of those videos to be shown to the jury, because the highly inflammatory nature of two of them clearly and substantially outweighed their probative value pertaining to the crimes charged. The errors were not harmless. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Atlantic, a New Jersey pipe foundry, and four of its managers were convicted of conspiring to commit environmental pollution and worker safety violations, attempting to cover up or impede federal investigation of those violations, and violations of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251) and the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7413(c)). Defendants illegally pumped contaminated water into storm drains that drained into the Delaware River; unlawfully burned 50-gallon drums of paint waste in a cupola and emitted the fumes into the air; and attempted to cover up work-related accidents at its facility, one of which resulted in the death of an employee who was run-over by a forklift. The district court imposed sentences of 70, 41, 30 and six months’ imprisonment on the managers and applied the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. 3571(c)(1), rather than the CWA and CAA, and fined Atlantic the maximum penalty of $500,000 per violation on conspiracy, four counts of obstruction, eight CWA counts, and one CAA count for a total fine of $8 million. It also sentenced Atlantic to 4 years’ probation, with a court-ordered monitor to ensure regulatory compliance. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the sentences. View "United States v. Maury" on Justia Law

Following his convictions for wire fraud and failure to appear at trial, the district court ordered Craig to pay $12,411 in restitution and a $300 special assessment. The government sought to satisfy the order from $16,342 it had seized previously from Craig. Craig filed a motion (FRCP 41(g)) for return of the remaining $3,631. The government argued that the balance should be applied to an unsatisfied restitution order entered by another court. The court denied the motion. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the court lacked authority to order the transfer of funds to another district. The district court returned the money, but denied Craig’s request for interest. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 2465: does not entitle a convicted criminal to interest on an award of excess funds returned to him after he satisfies a restitution order. View "Unted States v. Craig" on Justia Law

Hanif, a citizen of Guyana, entered the U.S. on a fraudulent visa during the 1980s. After his marriage to a naturalized citizen, Hanif applied for a waiver of his ground of inadmissibility. In 2006 an IJ and adjusted Hanif to Lawful Permanent Resident status. In 2008, Khadoo, a friend, was arrested for possession of a forged instrument. In exchange for reduced charges against Khadoo, Hanif turned over $5,100 in counterfeit bills and offered to cooperate in the counterfeiting investigation. He subsequently fled the country. When Hanif returned, he was arrested and paroled into the U.S. He pled guilty to dealing in counterfeit currency, 18 USC 473. DHS began removal proceedings; he applied for waiver, claiming that removal would cause extreme hardship to his wife and children. An IJ found him ineligible for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), noting a BIA holding that an alien who entered the U.S. without inspection and later obtained LPR status through adjustment has previously been admitted as an LPR, and must satisfy the seven year continuous residence requirement. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the statutory language is unambiguous and requires that the prior admission has been made while the alien was in LPR status. View "Hanif v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Until 2003, Hagans worked as a security guard and as a sanitation worker. At 44 years old, Hagans required open-heart surgery. Hagans claims additional medical problems relating to his cerebrovascular and respiratory systems, hypertension and dysphagia, insomnia, and back pain. He has been diagnosed with depression. Hagans began receiving disability benefits as of January 30, 2003. In September, 2004, pursuant to an updated Residual Function Capacity assessment showing his condition had improved, SSA determined that Hagans was no longer eligible for benefits. The ALJ considered several evaluations of Hagans’s condition, most of which were completed in mid-2004, and found that he was capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity, although he could not perform his past relevant work. The Appeals Council denied review; the district court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed, after determining that “relatively high” deference should be afforded to SSA’s Acquiescence Ruling interpreting the cessation provision of 42 U.S.C. 423(f) as referring to the time of the SSA’s initial disability determination. SSA correctly evaluated Hagans’s condition as of the date on which the agency first found that Hagans’s eligibility for disability benefits ceased. Substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Hagans was not fully disabled as of that date. View "Hagans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Sandy, hearing and speech impaired, applied to work as a grocery store cashier and stocker. As part of the application, Sandy took a Customer Service Assessment created by Kronos and received a score of 40%. Kroger relied, in part, on the Assessment in deciding not to hire Sandy, who filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a third-party administrative subpoena to Kronos, denied a petition to revoke the subpoena, and, after Kronos failed to provide requested information, filed a motion to enforce the subpoena in district court, which limited the scope of the subpoena. The Third Circuit reversed geographic and temporal restrictions, and restrictions related to job description, and affirmed refusal to allow discovery into racial discrimination. On remand, the district court expanded the scope of its original order, but again limited disclosure of information related to the Kronos tests and foundt entered a modified version of the confidentiality order. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of how specific limitations are tied to Kronos’s justifiable fears regarding disclosure of proprietary information and for individualized determination of whether costs of production under the expanded subpoena are outside the scope of what Kronos can reasonably expect as the cost of doing business. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kronos, Inc" on Justia Law