Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a class action against their former employer, Siemens, and its retirement plans, claiming violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in refusing to provide permanent job separation (PJS) pension benefits when Siemens terminated their employment. The Third Circuit reversed in part and directed entry of judgment in favor of Siemens on all issues. By their plain terms, the Siemens plans do not provide for PJS benefits. Siemens did not establish an ERISA section 204 "transition" plan by virtue of 13-day arrangement in 1998 that was part of Siemens' purchase of a business unit from Westinghouse, nor was Siemens obligated to provide PJS benefits under section 208, based on the purchase from Westinghouse. View "Shaver v. Siemens Corp." on Justia Law

The tenant moved into an apartment in 2004. The building later came under management by defendants. In 2008 tenant filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962, alleging that defendants conspired to harbor illegal aliens and to encourage or induce illegal aliens to reside in the U.S. in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). He claimed that the apartment complex fell into disrepair and that criminal activity went unreported, causing injury to his leasehold property. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The "harboring" claim was properly dismissed; the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the conduct tended to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in the U.S. illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting the unlawful presence. With respect to the "inducing" claim, the court stated that it could not imagine that Congress contemplated that landlords and hotel and motel operators would be responsible for making complex legal determinations about who is permitted to live in this country, much less that they would be criminalized for an error in so doing.View "Delrio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc." on Justia Law

After receiving a tip from a reliable source that individuals in a white Toyota Camry were carrying firearms, police officers initiated a traffic stop. A firearm was discovered on the driver, who unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence. The requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was not established by the presence of illegal tints on the vehicle's windows or by the tip that firearms were in the possession of the individuals in the vehicle. The informant gave brief information, not including whether the firearm was legal or illegal. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Petitioner has lived in the U.S. since entering on a visitor’s visa in 1980, when he was 20 years old. His wife became a U.S. citizen by naturalization in 1997 and they have a child, born in New Jersey in 1990. In 2006, petitioner filed an application to adjust his status to permanent residence based on his marriage. He disclosed a 2004 arrest for propositioning an undercover officer for prostitution, which resulted in a plea of guilty to disorderly conduct. DHS concluded, based on the arrest report, that he had falsely claimed to be from Puerto Rico rather than Costa Rica at the time of arrest, triggering a bar to admissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii). In 2007, DHS initiated removal proceedings. An immigration judge found him inadmissible and the BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The statute applies to false citizenship claims made in conjunction with applications for private employment or for public services and benefits.View "Castro v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, an inmate filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, alleging personal injuries caused by defendants' exposing him to second-hand smoke. The district court dismissed, but news of the dismissal did not reach him for almost a year because of a prison transfer. The district court denied untimely motions to reopen the time for appeal and for reconsideration. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not relax the timing requirements for filing a motion to reopen the time for appeal under FRAP 4(a)(6), even for prison delay, because those requirements are governed by statute and are jurisdictional. The situation is not one in which time lost due to prison delays can be excluded. While prison delay may make an untimely motion for reconsideration timely, that motion was delayed by clerks' office errors, not by prison delay. View "Baker v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Long filed an suit against city and state police and forensic chemists, claiming conspiracy to obtain a murder conviction against him by presenting false evidence and preventing him from obtaining DNA testing that would prove his innocence (42 U.S.C. 1983). After screening (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2); 1915A), the district court found that the claims were barred unless he could demonstrate that his conviction was invalid. Dismissal was entered on the docket August 21, 2006, so that he had until September 4 to file a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. On September 25, he filed the motion with a letter explaining that he had not received the filings until September 22, because of a transfer from one prison to another. The district court treated the motion as timely, but rejected it on the merits. The order was entered on the docket October 6. On October 31, Long signed a notice of appeal that was timely from the denial of reconsideration, but untimely from the dismissal order. The Third Circuit affirmed without deciding the delay issue, finding that it had jurisdiction based on the denial of reconsideration. View "Long v. Atl. City Police Dep't" on Justia Law

An inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections brought a civil rights action in 2000 claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group, a subgroup of Sunni Muslims. Several claims were dismissed, and, following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of individual defendants on a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that policies and practices violated the inmate's right to practice his religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The Third Circuit affirmed. RLUIPA does not permit individual-capacity suits and defendants had qualified immunity with respect to the 1983 claims. Plaintiff did not have a clearly established right to separate religious services in accordance with the Habashi sect when Sunni Islamic services were already available. View "Sharp v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff led a demonstration at the entrance to the Liberty Bell Center at Independence National Park, sharing the sidewalk with tourists, carriage operators, and Komen Foundation walk participants. A ranger told plaintiff to vacate the sidewalk because it was not a designated First Amendment area; he issued an oral permit to continue on the opposite side. Plaintiff refused. Two hours later, the ranger escorted him off the sidewalk. Plaintiff was convicted of violating a permit, 36 C.F.R. 1.6(g)(2), and interfering with agency functions, 36 C.F.R. 2.32. The Third Circuit found insufficient evidence of violating a permit, and vacated conviction for interfering with agency functions as invalid under the First Amendment. Plaintiff sued the Park Service, the Department of the Interior, and the rangers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding the rangers entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not clearly established at the time, and he could not show that the rangers acted without probable cause when arresting him. Plaintiff was not similarly situated to other groups that were allowed to stay. Claims for declaratory relief were moot; the Park Service has revised regulations to designate the sidewalk as a First Amendment area, and now exempts small groups from permit requirements. The Third Circuit affirmed View "Marcavage v. Nat'l Park Serv." on Justia Law

In 1988, plaintiff began working for Lawrence County; her supervisor was Mancino. Plaintiff has health problems and missed work frequently. According to plaintiff, Mancino expressed dissatisfaction with her absences and, in 2004, put her on a six-month probationary period. Mancino claims that he did not have authority to terminate plaintiff, but that his supervisor authorized him to do so after the probationary period. The district court dismissed some claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Const. Stat. 951, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The county settled the Rehabilitation Act claim and plaintiff conceded the PHRA claim against Mancino. On the FMLA claim against Mancino, the district court held that, while the FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies, an individual supervisor is an "employer" for FMLA purposes only if he has sufficient control over conditions and terms of employment. Because Mancino lacked final authority to fire plaintiff, he did not have sufficient control. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that a rational jury could find that Mancino had sufficient control to qualify as an employer under the FMLA. View "Haybarger v. Mancino" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1990 of murder and arson after his 20-year-old mentally ill daughter died in a fire at a religious retreat. His attorney argued that the deceased set the fire as a suicidal act. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. On remand for an evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court received substantial evidence about developments in the field of fire science that provided reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation. The court nonetheless affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied an appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit remanded for discovery. Petitioner was diligent in state court to develop his claims that newly developed scientific evidence establishes that the expert testimony at his trial was fundamentally unreliable, in violation of due process, and that he is actually innocent. He has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that discovery is essential to the development of his federal claims. View "Lee v. Tennis" on Justia Law