Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a Sherman Act case, the district court held that more than $365,000 in charges imposed by the electronic discovery vendors, covering hard drive imaging, data processing, keyword searching, and file format conversion, were taxable under FRCP 54(d), without differentiating between those charges that constitute "fees for exemplification," and charges that constitute "costs of making copies," 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). The Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, noting conflicting decisions by other courts. None of activities at issue can be regarded as exemplification of materials; only scanning and file format conversion can be considered to be making copies, an activity that amounts to approximately $30,000 of electronic discovery charges taxed in the case.View "Race Tires Am., Inc.l v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant accepted $1,000 and Mets tickets for helping a consulting company obtain a contract with the county for temporary employment of individuals for clean-up after a 2006 flood. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The presentence report recommended a sentence of 15 to 21 months' imprisonment. USSG 2C1.2(a)(1) set the base offense level at 11; the report added two levels under 2C1.2(b)(1) because the offense involved more than one gratuity and four levels under 2C1.2(b)(3) because the offense involved a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position. It subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility (3E1.1). The district court imposed a sentence of 15 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant could not hire or fire; could not bind the county; could not act officially on the county's behalf; had administrative, not policymaking, duties; and reported to superiors, who reported to County Commissioners. The high-level government official enhancement was not applied to his superior, also implicated in the bribery scheme. Defendant was, however, responsible for the human resource department. View "United States v. Richards" on Justia Law

In 2007, the HHS Office of Inspector General conducted a nationwide audit to determine whether states were complying with the requirements to reimburse the federal share of recovered AFDC overpayments made before October 1, 1996. The audit found that the Pennsylvania DPW had recovered $10,598,095 in AFDC overpayments from October 1, 1996 through June 30, 2006, but had not reimbursed ACF for the federal share of $5,609,572. DPW appealed a reimbursement request, challenging HHS authority to conduct the audit, but not the audit findings. The appeals board and district court upheld the HHS determination, rejecting an argument that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. 601, designates a procedure established by the Single Audit Act, 31 U.S.C. 7501-7507 as the exclusive audit procedure. Under the SAA, "[e]ach non-Federal entity" that expends at least $300,000 of federal awards in a fiscal year "shall have either a single audit or a program-specific audit made for such fiscal year in accordance with the requirements of this chapter." The Third Circuit affirmed, also rejecting claims under FOIA and that DPW was entitled to retain the federal share of the AFDC overpayment recoveries under substantive law. View "Commonwealth of PA v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

When plaintiff, a nurse, was hired in 2006 and rehired in 2009, she signed the hospital's forms, including an agreement to submit all disputes to binding arbitration. She acknowledged receipt of a brochure that outlines an internal grievance process culminating in arbitration, as well as the parameters of the arbitration agreement itself, but does not state that claims regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement itself must be arbitrated. In 2009 plaintiff filed a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and state law. The district court denied a motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit reversed, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that might render the arbitration agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. View "Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Philadelphia, Inc." on Justia Law

During the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the Democratic National Committee and others sued the Republican National Committee, and others, alleging that defendants targeted minority voters for intimidation, in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. RNC allegedly mailed sample ballots to individuals in precincts with a high percentage of minority registered voters and included individuals whose postcards were returned as undeliverable on a list of voters to challenge at the polls and enlisted off-duty officers to intimidate voters by standing at minority precinct polling places, wearing “National Ballot Security Task Force” armbands. Some allegedly wore visible firearms. In 1982, RNC and DNC entered into a consent decree, national in scope, limiting RNC's participation in voter fraud prevention without advance court approval. The decree was modified in 1987 and was the subject of enforcement actions in 2000, 2004, and 2008. The district court denied, in part, a motion to modify or vacate the decree, but made modifications. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that if RNC does not hope to engage in conduct that would violate the decree, it is puzzling that it would pursue vacatur so vigorously. despite significant modifications. View "Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm." on Justia Law

Synapse provides customers with promotional rate or free magazine subscriptions, obtains their credit card information, and, when the promotion expires, provides notice, then bills a subscription to the credit card, if the customer does not cancel. Former customers claimed that the automatic renewal notices amounted to a deceptive business practice. The district court denied certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class. The Third Circuit affirmed. None of the plaintiffs are current Synapse customers, so they lack standing to seek the remedy they are pursuing on behalf of the class. View "McNair v. Synapse Grp., Inc" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder after a third trial concerning a 1996 shooting death. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act, then sought federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted prior testimony from an unavailable government witness, even though petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness with newly-discovered impeachment evidence. Petitioner had a full opportunity for cross-examination at his second trial. The court also rejected claims based on the judge questioning a juror in camera, without petitioner present. View "Ross v. Dist. Attorney of the Cnty of Allegheny" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B). Using the 2006 USSG, the probation office determined a base offense level of 32, which was combined with 11 criminal history points and career offender status, due to prior felony convictions for aggravated assault and distribution of a controlled substance. After a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the total offense level was 31, resulting in an advisory range of 188-235 months. The court granted downward departure under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines, arrived at a range of 140-175 months, and sentenced him to 150 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant filed a motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined that the advisory range was dictated by the Career Offender Guidelines, not his post-departure range, which corresponded to the range in the Crack Cocaine Guidelines. View "United States v. Barney" on Justia Law

In 2000, petitioner, a 12-year-old citizen of Argentina, entered the U.S. under the visa waiver program, 8 U.S.C. 1189(a). In 2011, ICE agents, executing an arrest warrant for her brother, took petitioner into custody and scheduled removal without an appearance before an immigration judge, based on petitioner remaining for more than the 90 days permitted by the vwp. She argued that the removal order was invalid because she was a minor when she entered this country and could not waive any procedural rights and that she did not receive procedural protections to which she would have been entitled absent such a waiver. The Third Circuit denied her appeal, finding no prejudice resulting from enforcement of the allegedly-defective waiver. Petitioner would not have been allowed to enter without signing the waiver; if she had been of majority age and had knowingly and voluntarily had executed the waiver, she would not have been entitled to the procedural protections normally afforded to an alien prior to removal. View "Vera v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Following a violent, racially-motivated fight among teenagers in a park, one person died. The mother of a participant was dating a police officer and the district attorney took over the investigation, believing there was a cover-up. The FBI became involved and officers were convicted of knowingly falsifying police reports with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation into a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and knowingly making a false material statement in a matter within FBI jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the convictions and rejecting a challenge to section 1519 as unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Nestor" on Justia Law