Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In consolidated cases, the Third Circuit addressed the FRCP 17 obligation to appoint counsel in cases involving parties who appear to be incompetent. The court held that the court abused its discretion in not appointing a representative for a prisoner for his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting deliberate indifference to medical needs. After multiple extensions, the inmate explained that he was in a psychiatric facility for four months. The judge denied further extensions and requests to appoint counsel. Meanwhile, he pled guilty to threats against the President and mailing threatening communications. A psychiatrist concluded that the inmate suffered delusional disorder, that some of his conduct is beyond his control, and that he has limited cognitive abilities. The court granted a motion to withdraw the plea, finding the inmate mentally incompetent. In the civil case, the judge, aware of the criminal proceedings, noted his concerns about mental competence, but again denied a motion to appoint counsel, stating that "it is unlikely that counsel could be found." The district court dismissed his case. In the other case, the court remanded for a determination of Rule 17 obligations. View "Powell v. Dr. Symons" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a maintenance director, had a stroke and began leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 612(a)(1) in January 2008. He received disability benefits from Unum. The doctor cleared him to return to work starting on May 1, with conditions that he not work more than four hours per day or lift loads in excess of 20 pounds. The administrator notified plaintiff that part-time work was not available. The doctor cleared him to work full-time, but did not change the lifting restriction. On April 20, the employer terminated plaintiff's employment and notified him that he would not be rehired with lifting restrictions. Until July 2008, when the restrictions were lifted, he received benefits from Unum. The district court rejected claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and the FMLA. The Third Circuit affirmed. The FMLA does not require an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to facilitate return to an equivalent position following leave. Entitlement to restoration requires that the employee be able to perform essential job functions without accommodation. Having represented to Unum that he was disabled, plaintiff was estopped from claiming that he was able to perform all essential functions. View "Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC" on Justia Law

Assistant managers at Rite Aid stores in Maryland and Ohio joined a nationwide opt-in action in a Pennsylvania federal court, seeking back pay for misclassification of assistant managers as overtime-exempt (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b)). One of them (Fisher) then initiated an F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) class action lawsuit in the District of Maryland, seeking damages for alleged misclassification under Maryland laws. Following dismissal without prejudice under the "first-filed" rule, Fisher refiled in Pennsylvania, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Another plaintiff initiated a class action in the District of Northern Ohio seeking damages for alleged misclassification under the Ohio Act, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The case was transferred to Pennsylvania based on the forum selection clause in the employment contract. The Pennsylvania district court dismissed, holding that state law is not preempted, but that Rule 23 opt-out class actions based on state laws paralleling the FLSA are incompatible with the opt-in procedure under the FLSA, which was designed to prevent litigation through representative action. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to preemption, but reversed with respect to inherent incompatibility. View "Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Secretary of Labor filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that defendants had established a health benefit plan that was a multi-employer welfare arrangement governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Defendants had retained, as compensation, a substantial portion of payments made by businesses to enroll their employees. The complaint alleged improper diversion of funds and that defendants were required by ERISA to use the assets only for the defraying reasonable plan expenses for the benefit of plan participants. The district court ruled in favor of defendants. The Third Circuit vacated, characterizing the scheme appearing to be "an aggressively marketed, but inadequately funded health benefit plan masquerading as an ERISA-exempt plan in order to evade the solvency controls imposed by state insurance regulation."View "Sec'y of Labor v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two crimes involving sexual exploitation of minors. After the plea agreement was signed, the probation office recommended a five-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.5(b), which applies to defendants who "engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct." The agreement referred to other USSG provisions, but not to criminal history enhancements. Defendant conceded the applicability of the enhancement in the district court, which imposed a sentence of 216 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting an argument that the government breached the plea agreement by requesting the enhancement and a request for resentencing to a range of 108 to 135 months' imprisonment.View "United States v. Dahmen" on Justia Law

Serving a life sentence for murder, petitioner exhausted state appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. The petition was not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Allegedly "new," exculpatory evidence of witness tampering and the identity of the "actual shooter" was known to petitioner in 1994. Petitioner did not establish his diligence or extraordinarily burdensome circumstances and the evidence did not establish actual innocence. View "Sistrunk v. Rozum" on Justia Law

When William and Adele divorced in 2008, she waived her right to proceeds from his 401(k) plan, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. He did not replace her as named beneficiary before he died intestate, nine months later. Because of a 2009 Supreme Court case, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator, 555 U.S. 285, the plan was obligated to pay the proceeds to Adele in accordance with plan documents regardless of the waiver. The district court held that estate could not attempt to recover the funds by bringing suit directly against Adele to enforce her waiver. The Third circuit reversed in part. Permitting suits against beneficiaries after benefits have been paid does not implicate any concern of expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of ERISA. View "Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayers (married couples) had an interest in real estate that was condemned by Pennsylvania for construction of a highway. The state agreed to pay $40.9 million, with interest, in five yearly installments. During the first three years of the agreement, the taxpayers excluded the interest from their federal income taxes as exempt under 26 U.S.C. 103, which permits exclusion of interest payments that are obligations of the state. The IRS issued to each couple a deficiency notice for $2.3 million, which was affirmed by the Tax Court. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Negotiations between the parties transformed the state's interest obligation from mandatory to voluntary. The purpose underlying Section 103 was "well served" in this case; the state was able to obtain credit from the taxpayers at a lower rate of interest than it otherwise might have had to if the condemnation proceeding had been completed. View "DeNaples v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Panama and a citizen of Spain, entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant visitor in 1998. In 2000 he married a U.S. citizen. His status was adjusted to conditional lawful permanent resident. In 2004, petitioner and his wife appeared together at an interview in support of his I-751 petition to remove conditions on residence; petitioner affirmed, under oath, that he did not have children. After the two divorced, petitioner amended the birth certificates of children born to another woman during his marriage, to reflect that he was their father. In 2006, petitioner filed an N-400 Application for Naturalization listing the two as his children. USCIS determined that petitioner had provided false testimony during the 2004 interview and denied his petition on grounds that he lacked the requisite good moral character. In 2009 USCIS initiated removal. The district court ruled in favor of the government, noting uncontradicted evidence that petitioner, under penalty of perjury, gave false evidence in order to receive a benefit in an immigration proceeding. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding there was no material issue of fact. View "Gonzalez v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

In 1998, petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., was convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute more than 50 grams of "crack" cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and sentenced to 168 months imprisonment, After his release from prison, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement issued a warrant and took petitioner into custody. He has been incarcerated by ICE since March, 2008 without a bond hearing. The district court denied habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed. Under the pre-removal statute, 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), ICE can detain any alien pending a decision in removal proceedings and can release on bond any alien not otherwise ineligible for such release. Section 1226 provides for mandatory detention of aliens who are removable on account of commission of enumerated offenses, including aggravated felonies such as petitioner's. Once there is an order of removal, detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), under which ICE must remove the alien within 90 days. Evaluating the situation under section 1226, the court determined that petitioner had been detained for longer than "reasonable." View "Leslie v. Att'y Gen. of United States" on Justia Law