Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two U.S. Army Reserve officers, deployed to Iraq in 2003 to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority, were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.371, for participating in a bid-rigging scheme that involved directing millions of dollars in contracts to companies owned by an American businessman. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish participation in the conspiracy; to denial of a motion to suppress; and to denial of immunity for a co-conspirator. View "United States v. Whiteford" on Justia Law

Married couples formed Virgin Islands corporations that were limited partners in a VI limited liability limited partnership, Four Points, and derived all of their income from Four Points. The couples assert that they were not bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands in 2006, but that a portion of their income was derived from sources there, I.R.C. 932(a)(1)(A)(ii). Both couples filed 2006 tax returns with the U.S. and with the Virgin Islands, but, rather than paying the Virgin Islands, they paid all taxes to the U.S., claiming that they believed that the IRS would pay the Virgin Islands or that the VIBIR would obtain the amounts from the IRS. The couples filed suit to compel the VIBIR to declare whether the income was derived from sources within the Virgin Islands and, against the U.S., requested refunds. The district court dismissed with respect to the Virgin Islands and transferred the claim against the U.S. to Florida. The Third Circuit affirmed. Taxpayers stated no cause of action against the Virgin Islands and any claims are not ripe, as there has been no administrative action against them. The District Court of the Virgin Islands may transfer VI tax cases to other district courts. View "In re:Birdman" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of a series of carjackings, an attempted robbery, and the murder of a security guard. One was sentenced to life imprisonment and consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive prison term of 15 years on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to the federal sentences. Three others were sentenced to life imprisonment on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive 15-year prison term on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to federal sentences. Each was fined $50,000. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, faulty jury instructions, insufficiency of the evidence, and double jeopardy. After examining 18 U.S.C. 924 (c) and (j) the court stated that Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative punishment when a killing occurs in connection with a predicate offense, including crimes of violence and drug trafficking. A "Title III" recorded conversation (18 U.S.C. 2510) admitted at trial was not testimonial, and not subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, 12 years old, was bitten by a barracuda while playing in shallow water near Buck Island Reef National Monument. Buck Island is accessible only by watercraft and is open to the public for recreational activities. When boat owners apply for a permit to visit, they receive a brochure detailing hazards. There are also signs posted on the Island, warning of the same hazards. The warnings indicate that barracuda should be treated with caution, but are not usually aggressive toward humans. The government was aware of only one incident in 22 years involving a barracuda bite near Buck Island. Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, alleging negligent failure to warn. The district court dismissed, citing the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Third Circuit affirmed. No statute, regulation, or policy mandated any particular method for warning about marine hazards. The National Park Service has discretion regarding whether to provide warnings and the extent of any such warnings, in light of the information available. View "S.R.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

Ford provides a warranty, entitling buyers of new vehicles to have Ford repair or replace defective components at any Ford dealer, regardless of where they purchased the vehicle. Ford reimburses dealers, providing a mark-up of 40% over cost for most parts. However, under the New Jersey Franchise Protection Act, Ford must reimburse dealers for parts at the "prevailing retail rate," charged customers for non-warranty work. Ford implemented a Dealer Parity Surcharge to recoup the increased cost. Ford calculated, for each New Jersey dealer, the cost of increased warranty reimbursements and divided by the number of vehicles purchased by that same dealer. That amount constituted the surcharge added to the wholesale price of every vehicle. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment that DPS violated the NJFPA. Ford devised a new system, NJCS, under which Ford calculated its total cost of complying with the NJFPA and divided by the number of wholesale vehicles sold in the state. A dealer’s total NJCS increased in proportion to the number of vehicles it purchased, regardless of how many warranty repairs it submitted. The district court found that NJCS violated NJFPA. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the scheme does not violate the statute. View "Liberty Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 1977 defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. He was released in 1992, and, still on parole, was accused of inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter. He was convicted; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections recommended that his sentence include participation in a sex offender treatment program. He has been repeatedly denied parole based on refusal to participate. He claims that the program requirement that he admit committing the sex crime for which he was convicted would amount to self-incrimination and would have compromised his then-pending appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to address whether petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Even assuming that refusal to participate was the sole reason for denying parole, the actions of the Board did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of the program is not simply to gather information and an inmate has no right to parole. Penalties that merely alter the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amend View "Roman v. DiGuglielmo" on Justia Law

By their 1998 Primary Care Physician Agreement, the parties agreed that Dr. Sutter would provide primary care health services to members of Oxford's managed care network in exchange for predetermined reimbursement. They agreed to arbitrate any disputes. A dispute arose when Sutter accused Oxford of improperly denying, underpaying, and delaying reimbursement of physicians' claims. Sutter filed a complaint on behalf of himself and a class of health care providers, alleging breach of contract and other violations of New Jersey law. The state court granted Oxford’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the agreement allowed for class arbitration. The arbitrator entered a Partial Final Class Determination Award. Oxford sought to vacate, arguing that the arbitrator disregarded the law by ordering class arbitration. The district court denied Oxford's motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Arbitration proceeded on a classwide basis. Oxford later moved to vacated, based on the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. The arbitrator endeavored to interpret the parties' agreement within the bounds of the law and his interpretation was not irrational. Nothing more is required under the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. She began supervised release in 2007, but violated conditions. After first modifying the conditions, the district court revoked supervised release. She served about three months, was again released, and again violated conditions. The court modified the conditions to include four months of home detention with electronic monitoring. Violations continued; the court again revoked supervised release and sentenced her to 19 months' imprisonment and supervised release, with six months to be served in a halfway house, and six to be served under home detention. She violated again conditions. The district court concluded that the maximum term was not reduced by the aggregate length of previously-served revocation imprisonment and imposed what it viewed as the statutory maximum: 24 months' imprisonment, without supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term under 18 U.S.C. 3583. Defendant argued that home detention counts as imprisonment, because 3583(e)(4) states that home detention "may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration." View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In lieu of providing employees with a paycheck, attorney Maynard paid cash, requiring that employees endorse an unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment. After receiving a cash remuneration in 1996, one employee refused to endorse the paycheck. Maynard firex her for noncompliance. At a hearing before the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, the employee testified that she needed a signed paycheck to apply for government financial assistance. She had never shared this information with Maynard before the hearing. The district court held that Maynard's order was unreasonable and that the resulting termination was in violation of the VI Wrongful Discharge Act, which permits termination of an employee who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions of the employer, and awarded back pay. The Third Circuit reversed. The lower court erred by considering the employee's individual needs in determining reasonableness of the order. View "Maynard v. Rivera" on Justia Law

After an error resulted in omission of a will's residual clause, litigation between the decedent's son and a charitable trust settled with the son receiving $5,600,000 and property and the trust receiving $11,721,141. The Estate filed a claim for federal estate tax charitable deduction. The IRS disallowed the deduction, finding that the contribution was made by the son via the settlement. The district court granted the Estate summary judgment, but found the government's position substantially justified and did not award fees or costs. The Third Circuit affirmed. The award for prevailing parties under 26 U.S.C. 7430 incorporates the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), under which recovery of fees is barred if a party’s net worth exceeds the statutory amount. Parties seeking to recover under either the prevailing party provision or the qualified offer provision must satisfy the net worth requirements. Although the trust satisfied the net worth requirements as a tax-exempt charitable organization with fewer than 500 employees, the court rejected an argument that it was the real party in interest. View "Estate of Palumbo v. United States" on Justia Law