Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Trustee was appointed in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The estate included 44 lots, subdivided and zoned for mobile homes. Lot 45 contained an assisted living facility. The lots shared infrastructure and were subject to restrictions, including one prohibiting transfer of lots for construction of residences and requiring that title remain in the developer. GCL purchased Lot 45. The township solicitor agreed and the Bankruptcy Court declared the sale free of the restriction. The Trustee discovered that some residents had affixed mobile homes to the land. To resolve the matter, the Trustee agreed to sell lots to the residents. The trustee and the township entered agreement, abrogating the restriction as to the lots. CGL, not a party to that agreement, alleged that the sales damaged its property interests in Lot 45 and that the agreement deprived CGL of its property rights without notice and without due process of law. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the claims were not frivolous and could be filed in state court. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. The Barton doctrine, which requires a party seeking to sue a court-appointed receiver, to obtain leave of the appointing court, continues to apply to bankruptcy trustees.View "In Re: VistaCare Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The company and its affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to resolve asbestos-related liability through the creation of a personal-injury trust under 11 U.S.C. 524(g). As part of its reorganization plan, it sought to transfer rights under insurance liability policies to the trust. The Insurers had provided liability policies to the debtors prior to bankruptcy and objected that the transfer violated the policies' anti-assignment provisions. The bankruptcy and district courts held that 11 U.S.C. 1123(a)(5)(B) preempts those provisions. The Third Circuit affirmed. Section 524 trusts are the only national statutory scheme available to resolve asbestos litigation through a quasi-administrative process. The plain language of 11 U.S.C. 1123(a) evinces clear intent for a preemptive scope that includes transfer of property to a 524 trust; that preemption reaches private contracts enforced by state common law. View "In Re: Fed-Mogul Global, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Based on prior Pennsylvania convictions for simple assault and third-degree murder, the presentence report recommended that he be sentenced as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1. The district court agreed and imposed a sentence of 96 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s attempt to drag his wife up the stairs with his hands around her neck qualified as a crime of violence, as did his kicking a man to death after an attempt to buy drugs. View "United States v. Marrero" on Justia Law

Defendants owned an engineering and surveying company. Between 2002 and 2008, it failed to pay the IRS more than $500,000 in taxes withheld from employee paychecks. They were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and 21 counts of failure to account and pay over employment taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7202. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, but remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in imposing a two-level increase to the offense levels for abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.3.View "United States v. DeMuro" on Justia Law

A psychologist challenged the government's claim that he had over-billed Medicare and owed the government more than $600,000 in overpayments. At a hearing on the claim, the doctor presented extensive evidence, but the government neither appeared nor presented argument or advocacy, either written or in person. The ALJ concluded that the overpayment was actually $5,434.48. The doctor moved, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1), to recoup tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in fighting the claim. His request was denied by an administrative appeals council and the district court based on their conclusion that the hearing before the ALJ was not an adversary adjudication, as is required for a fee award under the EAJA. The Third Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the government did not engage in purposeful advocacy.View "Handron v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

An ATF agent noticed that his barber carried guns and that the shop was used for illegal activities. Learning that his barber had felony convictions, the agent purchased weapons from the barber, obtained warrants, searched the shop and arrested the barber, which led to indictment of Turner. Turner was convicted of conspiring to make false statements to a firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 371, 924(a)(1)(A), knowingly aiding and abetting in making false statements to a firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A), (2), and knowingly possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), and sentenced to 190 months. On appeal, Turner‘s newly-appointed counsel filed a "quasi- Anders brief," raising a combination of colorable and frivolous arguments. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, clarifying that, except in cases governed by Anders, parties represented by counsel may not file pro se briefs. When such briefs are filed the clerk will refer them to putative pro se litigant's counsel. Counsel may include a client's pro se arguments in their own briefs or, in an appropriate and unusual case, seek leave to file a separate, supplemental brief drafted by counsel that advances arguments raised by the client that counsel believes are meritorious. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

After police conducted a controlled buy, through a confidential informant, defendant was convicted of cocaine distribution and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the district court violated defendant's constitutional rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 by questioning prospective jurors on the record, at sidebar outside his presence. The court properly denied his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant and properly imposed an upward variance. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Participants in an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan brought suit under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1, claiming excessive fees on annuity insurance contracts offered to plan participants. The district court dismissed the ICA claims because only those maintaining an ownership interest in the funds could sue under the derivative suit provision and the participants are no longer investors in the funds in question. As to the ERISA claims, the court dismissed because participants failed to make a pre-suit demand upon the plan trustees to take appropriate action and failed to join the trustees as parties. The Third Circuit affirmed with regards to the ICA claims, but vacated on the ERISA counts, holding that the statute does not require pre-suit demand or joinder of trustees. View "Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, involved in the adult media industry, challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 2257 and 2257A, criminal laws imposing record-keeping, labeling, and inspection requirements on producers of sexually explicit depictions. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated in part. With respect to an as-applied challenge, the district court properly held that the statutes are content-neutral and that intermediate scrutiny applies, but plaintiffs should have an opportunity to conduct discovery and develop the record regarding whether they are narrowly tailored. With respect to a facial challenge, the court stated that certain statutory definitions are not readily susceptible to limiting constructions. View "Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Singh, born in Jamaica, has been a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. since 1975, married a U.S. citizen and raised three children. In operating a construction firm that bid on public works projects as a Minority Business Enterprise, Singh accepted kickbacks for falsely certifying that his business was serving as a subcontractor on government projects when, in fact, another did the work. When the company filed for bankruptcy in 2005, the scheme came to light. Singh was charged with failing to disclose all of the company’s accounts receivable on the bankruptcy petition, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Singh pled guilty and agreed to restitution in the amount of $54,418.08. He was sentenced to 10 months. DHS initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Immigration Judge entered an order of removal, which the BIA affirmed, finding that conviction under 152(3) categorically involves fraud and that the restitution order established that the offense caused loss to the trustee exceeding $10,000. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the statute requires actual, not merely intended, loss. The court rejected an argument that 152(3) is a perjury offense that must meet the requirements for perjury-based aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(43)(S).View "Singh v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law