Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a controlled-buy involving a confidential informant, Haziz was charged with distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a public housing facility, 21 U.S.C. 860(a). He waived conflict for representation by a firm representing a co-defendant. When he withdrew consent, a new attorney was appointed. At trial, the judge denied a motion for a mistrial that was based on witness statements that Haziz was in jail, but used a cautionary instruction. After the jury was dismissed, an alternate juror told a deputy that jurors had stated that they went along with the verdict although they did not necessarily agree with it. The court informed counsel, but denied a motion to interview the alternate juror. Haziz was sentenced to 120 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting arguments based on disqualification of first defense counsel; denial of a mistrial; denial of the request to interview the alternate juror; refusal to adopt a “mitigating role” adjustment in sentencing; and the total weight of the drugs involved. The court vacated the sentence; the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applies and Haziz is not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. View "United States v. Self" on Justia Law

ABC is a dissolved corporation. Doe 1 was the company’s President and sole shareholder. Doe 2 is his son. LaCheen represents ABC and Doe 1; Blank represents Doe 2. The law firms have a joint-defense agreement covering the three. Investigating tax implications of ABC’s acquisition and sale of closely held companies, the government issued a grand jury subpoena to ABC’s former vice president as custodian of records. The documents are in custody of Blank. ABC refused to accept service of the subpoena issued to its former employee. The government issued subpoenas to LaCheen and Blank. The firms withheld documents listed on a privilege log. The government sought to compel ABC, Blank, and LaCheen to produce documents identified on the privilege logs, citing cited the crime-fraud doctrine, which provides that evidentiary privileges may not be used to shield communications made for purposes of getting advice for commission of a fraud or crime. The district court entered the order. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. To obtain immediate appellate review, a privilege holder must disobey the order, be held in contempt, then appeal the contempt order. That route is available to ABC, which can obtain custody of the documents from its agent. View "In Re: Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Barnabas rented a van from Budget and gave Dewindt permission to use it without listing her as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. Dewindt was driving down a steep hill when the brakes failed. Dewindt attempted to stop by driving onto an uphill driveway. The van crashed into a tree, injuring the passengers. Barnabas was not in the van. The district court entered summary judgment for Budget. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded on claims of strict liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium. The district court erroneously relied on cases decided under the Second Restatement of Torts which does not recognize strict liability claims against lessorss. Strict liability under the Third Restatement would reach Budget as lessor/distributor of the allegedly defective van. The Third Circuit had certified the question and the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands responded that Virgin Islands local courts should apply sections 1 and 20 of the Third Restatement and allow lessors to be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from a defective product. The district court should also determine whether plaintiffs may rely on warranties in the rental agreement with Budget. View "Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs installed shingles manufactured by Owens Corning (debtor). They discovered leaks in 2009; shingles had cracked. Each sent warranty claims, which were rejected. They filed a class action alleging fraud, negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. In 2000, the debtors had filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions; the Bankruptcy Court set a claims bar date in 2002 and approved a notice that appeared in multiple publications. Notices of the confirmation hearing for the Plan, in 2006, included generic notice to unknown claimants. At the time they filed the class action plaintiffs did not hold “claims” under 11 U.S.C. 1101. The Third Circuit subsequently established a rule that a claim arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which underlies a right to payment under the Bankruptcy Code. Based on that holding, the district court held that plaintiffs’ claims were discharged. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and remanded, agreeing that plaintiffs had “claims.” Both were “exposed” to the product before confirmation of the plan. Plaintiffs were not afforded due process by published notice, however, because they could not have known they had claims at the time of confirmation. View "Wright v. Owens Corning" on Justia Law

Rolan was convicted in 1984 of murder and possession of an instrument of crime for a 1983 shooting death involving a drug sale. He obtained habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a retrial, the jury convicted Rolan of murder again. After exhausting appeals, he again sought habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was based on closing argument statements about the reliability of an alibi witness. The court properly allowed reading of a transcript of testimony by a witness, who died before retrial. View "Rolan v. Coleman" on Justia Law

E.R., now 10 years old, attended kindergarten and first grade at a public school. E.R. has been identified as having numerous learning disabilities, and health-related problems, including severe food and contact allergies. During the summer after first grade, her parents determined that programs offered by the district were inadequate to address E.R.'s unique needs, and decided to enroll her at a private school that specializes in instructing students with learning disabilities. They filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking compensatory education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and tuition reimbursement, including transportation expenses. A hearing officer awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year, reimbursement of tuition for the 2008-2009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation. The district court reversed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The district took reasonable steps to accommodate E.R.'s disabilities and include her in all class activities; it was not required to grant the specific accommodations requested by her parents or otherwise make substantial modifications to the programs that were used for all other students. View "Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R." on Justia Law

While working as a dentist, Fleisher obtained long-term disability insurance coverage under separate policies. He obtained the North American policy by membership in a professional organization. The Standard policy is an employee benefit, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) and provides for monthly benefits to a maximum of "$10,000 before reduction by Deductible Income," defined to include "[a]ny amount you receive or are eligible to receive because of your disability under another group insurance coverage," but to exclude benefits paid under "any individual disability insurance policy." In 2008, Fleisher became disabled and claimed benefits under both policies. Shortly after Fleisher began collecting under both policies, Standard reduced his monthly benefits from $10,000 to $8,500 based on its determination that the North American policy was another group insurance coverage, and that the $1,500 in benefits he receives under it is deductible income. The district court dismissed his ERISA suit. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence and not unreasonable. View "Fleisher v. Std. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative nationwide class of third-party payors and a putative nationwide class of individual patient-consumers who paid for prescriptions, sued pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging that they paid for oncology and hepatitis drugs that were ineffective or unsafe for the off-label uses for which they were prescribed and that defendants pursued illegal marketing campaigns to persuade physicians to prescribe the drugs for those uses. While physicians are not prohibited from prescribing drugs for off-label uses, manufacturers are generally prohibited by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301, from manufacturing, marketing, or selling for off-label use. Defendant had pled guilty to a criminal charge brought by the FDA and agreed to pay fine of $180 million and to pay $255 million to resolve civil claims that it defrauded Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA. The district court dismissed, for lack of standing, claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S. 2C:41-1, and other state statutory and common law causes of action. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged misconduct and the alleged harm. View "In Re: Schering Plough Corp." on Justia Law

Debtors began development of a subdivision and entered into a construction loan agreement with Bank Lenders, who retained a lien on substantially all of Debtors' assets. Debtors subsequently borrowed from Cornerstone, which similarly received liens and later agreed to subordinate the claims to that of Bank Lenders. After selling approximately a quarter of the planned units, Debtors filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11. The final plan of reorganization, confirmed by the court, specified that claims of Cornerstone would be secured to the extent determined by the court and included a budget that anticipated full payment of both Bank Lenders and Cornerstone; unsecured claimants would receive about 45 percent. The court valued Cornerstone's claims, using fair market value of the project on the plan confirmation date, rather than potential use and disposition value. Because the amount due Bank Lenders exceeded that value plus the value of other assets, no collateral remained to secure Cornerstone's claims; Cornerstone was treated as unsecured. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. The Bankruptcy Court properly accepted the valuation because it overcame the presumed validity and amount of the Cornerstone’s secured claims. Cornerstone did not prove that secured claims were worth more than the valuation indicated. View "In re: Heritage Highgate Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993 Simon and others burglarized a house; the occupant arrived during the burglary and was shot dead. Simon was tried for felony murder, first degree robbery, and third degree burglary. Simon repeatedly moved to dismiss his appointed defender, Ayala. Ayala moved to withdraw claiming that Simon was hostile and was planning to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined. Ayala did not give an opening statement, call witnesses, or object to closure of the courtroom during closing arguments and jury instructions. Simon was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His direct appeals were unsuccessful. Another participant, who testified against Simon, had his sentence reduced for his assistance. Virgin Islands court rejected a petition for habeas corpus and, on appeal, Simon's attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The motion was granted and the petition was ultimately denied. The Third Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The Appellate Division did not err in applying Anders procedures to assess motions filed by court-appointed counsel to withdraw on post-conviction appeal, but erred in finding the Anders brief sufficient on its face. There were nonfrivolous issues that should be reviewed on the merits. View "Simon v. Gov't of the VI" on Justia Law