Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In June 2019, a confrontation occurred between a Philadelphia Police Department officer and a civilian near a parade route. The officer told the civilian, who was walking her bike, she could not proceed in a certain direction. An altercation followed, during which the officer used a choke hold and both parties sustained minor injuries. The civilian requested medical assistance and the officer’s identification, after which the officer escalated the charges against her. Based on the officer’s account, a detective recommended multiple criminal charges, including aggravated assault. The civilian was detained overnight, but charges were later dismissed.At trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff brought federal and state claims against the involved officers. The jury found for the plaintiff on all counts, awarding $6,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages—split evenly between the two defendants. The District Court reduced the punitive damages to $250,000 for each defendant, otherwise denying post-trial motions, and awarded attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial of the detective’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. The Third Circuit held that the detective had probable cause to recommend charges based on the information he had at the time, entitling him to judgment as a matter of law on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims. Regarding punitive damages, the court found the $250,000 award against the officer constitutionally excessive under Supreme Court due-process standards and reduced it to $12,000. The court reversed the judgment against the detective, vacated the judgment against the officer as to punitive damages, and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, including reconsideration of attorneys’ fees. View "Wexler v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two biopharmaceutical companies over the distribution of a biosimilar drug following the expiration of a key patent. After Janssen’s patent for the composition of its biologic drug expired, Samsung sought to introduce its biosimilar product. Janssen and Samsung had previously settled related patent litigation through an agreement that granted Samsung a limited license to enter the market at a set date and restricted Samsung’s ability to sublicense, except to certain commercialization partners. Samsung subsequently entered into agreements with both Sandoz and Quallent, a subsidiary of the Cigna Group, allowing Quallent to distribute the biosimilar under its own label. Janssen argued that the sublicense to Quallent violated the settlement agreement and would cause it irreparable harm by altering market dynamics, reducing its market share and negotiation leverage, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Samsung from supplying Quallent during the litigation.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Janssen’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that while Janssen was likely to succeed on the merits of its breach-of-contract claim, it had not demonstrated irreparable harm because any injury could be measured and compensated by monetary damages. The court credited Samsung’s expert's view that harm to Janssen would be quantifiable, did not find persuasive evidence of brand loyalty or reputational harm, and concluded that Janssen’s asserted loss of negotiation leverage was too speculative.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Court held that loss of market share in a complex market does not categorically constitute irreparable harm in contract cases, and that mere difficulty in calculating damages does not meet the threshold for irreparable harm. The Court concluded that Janssen had not shown the requisite irreparable harm to justify preliminary injunctive relief. View "Johnson & Johnson v. Samsung Bioepis Co Ltd" on Justia Law

A non-profit organization that develops and sells technical standards for use in industry brought suit against a for-profit company that operates an online library of building codes. The for-profit company published on its website the full text of several copyrighted standards developed by the non-profit, which had been incorporated by reference into the International Building Code. This building code, in turn, was adopted as law by the City of Philadelphia and other jurisdictions. The for-profit company made these incorporated standards freely available, though it also sold premium subscriptions for enhanced features. The non-profit derived significant revenue from licensing and selling its standards, including those incorporated into law, and did not authorize the copying.The case was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After limited discovery and a hearing, the District Court denied the non-profit’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the for-profit company was likely to succeed on its fair use defense. The District Court found that the company’s publication of the standards for the purpose of public access to the law was transformative, even though the use was commercial in part, and that the standards, as incorporated into law, were primarily factual in nature. The District Court also found that copying the entire standards was reasonable because the law incorporated those standards in full, and that the effect on the market for the standards was at best equivocal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit held that the for-profit company is likely to succeed on the merits of its fair use defense, as three of the four statutory fair use factors favored fair use and the fourth was equivocal. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "American Society for Testing & Materials v. UPCODES Inc" on Justia Law

KalshiEX LLC operates a federally licensed designated contract market (DCM) that allows users to trade event contracts, including those based on sports outcomes. In late 2024, after Kalshi began offering sports-related event contracts similar to those offered by a competitor, New Jersey issued a cease-and-desist letter. The state asserted that Kalshi’s activities violated the New Jersey Constitution and state gambling laws, particularly regarding betting on collegiate sports, and threatened legal action with significant penalties if Kalshi continued its operations within New Jersey.In response, Kalshi initiated proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of New Jersey’s gambling laws against its federally regulated contracts. The District Court granted the injunction, finding that Kalshi had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the public interest favored enjoining enforcement of potentially preempted state law. New Jersey appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, and the decision to grant the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The appellate court held that the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) grants the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) exclusive jurisdiction over swaps, including sports-related event contracts traded on CFTC-licensed DCMs. Both field and conflict preemption principles bar New Jersey from enforcing its gambling laws against these contracts. The court concluded that Kalshi demonstrated a likelihood of success on the preemption claim, irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and that the equities and public interest favored injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction. View "Kalshiex LLC v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

Between April 2020 and September 2021, the defendant orchestrated a scheme to defraud federal relief programs, including the Paycheck Protection Program, Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, leading to losses exceeding $2 million. He submitted multiple fraudulent loan applications using his own identity, corporate entities, his wife’s and neighbor’s information, and the personal information of at least thirteen other family members and associates. These individuals provided their details to facilitate the fraud and, upon receiving illicit funds, paid kickbacks to the defendant. The defendant’s wife was found to have gone beyond simply providing her information, including contacting a lender and fleeing with the defendant to avoid law enforcement. His neighbor also played a more active role and later pleaded guilty to wire fraud.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and unlawful monetary transactions. At sentencing, the District Court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), finding that the scheme was “otherwise extensive,” and included at least three “participants” (the defendant, his wife, and his neighbor), plus thirteen non-participants. The court overruled the defendant’s objections, adopted the Presentence Investigation Report, and imposed a 149-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly applied the four-level enhancement, specifically whether the wife and neighbor qualified as “participants.” The appellate court held that the phrase “otherwise extensive” in the guideline is ambiguous, and that the District Court’s reliance on the commentary and prior precedent was ultimately appropriate. The Third Circuit found any legal error by the District Court was harmless and affirmed the sentence, holding that the enhancement was properly applied under the correct legal standard. View "USA v. Miller" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania state prisoner with a history of opioid addiction participated in a prison Medication Assisted Treatment program, receiving Suboxone to help control his cravings. After prison officials twice accused him of possessing contraband and diverting his medication to other prisoners, he was removed from the treatment program. Instead of abruptly ending his medication, a prison doctor tapered his doses over a week to reduce withdrawal symptoms. The prisoner later suffered withdrawal effects and mental health challenges but was not reinstated in the program despite his requests. He claimed the diversion finding was unfair but did not allege personal animus or pretext by the officials involved.He filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against various prison officials and a doctor, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a state-law negligence claim. The District Court dismissed all claims, finding the federal claims inadequately pleaded and the state-law claim procedurally improper for lack of a certificate of merit under Pennsylvania law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the complaint failed to allege deliberate indifference to medical needs as required by precedent; the officials’ actions were judged to be good-faith medical decisions, not constitutionally blameworthy conduct. The court also affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim, finding no plausible allegation that the prisoner was excluded from treatment “by reason of” his disability, but rather for diversion of medication. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the state-law negligence claim, as recent Supreme Court precedent abrogated the procedural requirement relied upon by the District Court, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "DiFraia v. Ransom" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Dominican Republic entered the United States without authorization as a child and lived with his mother, brother, and stepfather. The stepfather, who was not an authorized resident at the time, severely abused both the petitioner and his mother. After enduring years of abuse, the petitioner left home as a teenager but continued to support his mother, who later developed significant mental health issues linked to her trauma. The stepfather eventually gained lawful permanent resident (LPR) status and later threatened the petitioner again.The petitioner was charged with removability for lacking valid entry documents. He conceded removability but sought relief through two forms of cancellation: one, a special rule for individuals abused by a parent who is or was an LPR or citizen; the other, cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents based on hardship to a qualifying relative. The Immigration Judge denied both applications, finding the petitioner ineligible for special rule cancellation because the stepfather was not an LPR at the time of the abuse, and finding insufficient evidence of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the mother to grant cancellation of removal.On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge, agreeing that the abuser had to be an LPR at the time of the abuse and that the hardship to the mother did not meet the statutory threshold. The petitioner then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit held that the special rule for cancellation does not require the abuser to have been an LPR at the time of the abuse; it is sufficient if the abuser is or was an LPR at any time before relief is adjudicated. The court thus granted the petition on this claim and remanded for further proceedings. However, it denied the petition regarding cancellation of removal, finding substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion on hardship. View "Cardenas v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

An attorney representing a party before a federal appellate court submitted two briefs containing summaries of prior administrative agency decisions. These summaries were provided by a non-attorney, who had used artificial intelligence (AI) to generate them. The attorney made minor edits but did not verify the existence or accuracy of the cited authorities before filing the briefs. Seven of the eight cited authorities were inaccurately described, and one did not exist. The government identified these issues in its response, but even after reading the government’s brief and suspecting that AI had been used, the attorney did not check the citations or correct the record. He characterized the errors as immaterial in a reply brief, again without verification. Only after the court ordered him to provide copies of the cited decisions did the attorney confirm the inaccuracies and the nonexistence of one adjudication.Following the discovery of these misrepresentations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered the attorney to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. In response, the attorney admitted to his failures, demonstrated contrition, and described corrective actions taken. He requested and received a hearing regarding potential sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, which requires competent representation, by failing to thoroughly verify citations and relying on unverified, AI-generated summaries. The court found that while the attorney’s conduct did not rise to a knowing violation of the duty of candor under Rule 3.3, his overall lack of diligence warranted discipline. The court imposed a public reprimand, with notice to other courts and disciplinary authorities, but did not impose monetary sanctions, citing mitigating factors including the novelty of AI issues and the attorney’s post-hearing candor. View "McCarthy v. DEA" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a residence where a firearm was discovered in a bag containing the defendant’s identification and two loaded magazines. The defendant was present in the bedroom with the bag and was on parole for a prior state offense. DNA swabs taken from the firearm, along with a sample from the defendant, were analyzed by the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Laboratory, which identified multiple DNA contributors but could not conclusively match the DNA to the defendant. The DNA evidence was then submitted to a private company using TrueAllele probabilistic genotyping software, which calculated an extremely high likelihood ratio indicating the DNA was much more likely to include the defendant as a contributor.The defendant moved to exclude the TrueAllele evidence in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, arguing it was unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. After a two-day Daubert hearing featuring expert testimony from both sides, the District Court found that the government met its burden to demonstrate the reliability of TrueAllele and denied the motion to exclude. The District Court also rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal these rulings, and was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment, consecutive to an anticipated state sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s Daubert ruling for abuse of discretion and its Second Amendment analysis de novo. The Third Circuit held that TrueAllele’s methodology was sufficiently reliable for admissibility, finding that it satisfied factors such as testability, low error rates, presence of governing standards, peer review, and general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. The Court also affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the defendant’s constitutional and sentencing challenges, and the judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation operated a power plant in Pennsylvania, where its employees were represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 29. After a 2021 dispute over health care benefit contributions, an arbitrator found that Energy Harbor had underpaid and ordered it to make additional contributions for 2021. Later, the parties entered into a new collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) on October 1, 2021, which included a broad arbitration clause and a merger clause voiding prior agreements not incorporated into the new CBA. When the union later alleged that Energy Harbor similarly underpaid contributions for 2022, it filed a grievance, contending that Energy Harbor failed to adjust 2022 contributions as required by the prior arbitration award.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the matter after the union sought to compel arbitration. The District Court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, held that the broad arbitration clause in the new CBA covered the dispute regarding the 2022 contributions. The court reasoned that because the grievance referenced the contribution-increase provision of the CBA, the dispute was subject to arbitration, and found no evidence that the parties intended to exclude such claims from arbitration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Third Circuit held that, although the arbitration clause was broad, the union’s grievance regarding 2022 contributions did not arise under the new CBA but instead relied on the prior arbitration award, which was not incorporated into the new agreement. The court concluded that the dispute had “nothing to do with” the rights under the CBA because there was no evidence of a required increase in Energy Harbor’s health care plan costs from 2021 to 2022. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for Energy Harbor. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 29 v. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp" on Justia Law