Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1984, Petitioner, a citizen of Colombia, was admitted to the U.S. at age 20 as a lawful permanent resident. He married a U.S. citizen and has a son, also a citizen. Until 2009, Petitioner lived without incident. In 2009, he was stopped at a checkpoint near North Hudson, New York, with two passengers in his car. Petitioner admitted that he was aware they were illegal aliens, that he had picked them on the U.S. side of the border, that he was to be paid $1,000 to drive them to Queens, and that he had performed such work twice before. Petitioner was charged with Bringing In and Harboring Aliens, 8 U.S.C.1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and Transporting Illegal Aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i). Charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on conviction for an aggravated felony, Petitioner applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). The government conceded that an aggravated felony conviction does not, alone, render an alien ineligible for adjustment of status, but urged that conviction under 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 182(a)(6)(E)(i), as “an alien who … knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law.” The IJ denied adjustment of status. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed. Petitioner’s conduct did not constitute encouraging, inducing, assisting, abetting, or aiding another alien to enter the U.S. View "Parra-Rojas v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

The Winkelman brothers, have a “long and protracted litigation history” involving challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought while in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit denied certificates of appealability. The current motion, to reinstate their direct appeals, argued that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, Alleyne v. U.S. that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit denied the motion, which it characterized as “successive.” A successive section 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The Supreme Court may have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne, but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” View "United States v. Winkelman" on Justia Law

Roldan, a pretrial releasee under supervision of the Virgin Islands Probation Office, was found murdered. Probation officer Semper was fired, as “extremely negligent in the supervision” of Roldan. Semper claimed that he was not the officer assigned to Roldan. He sought reinstatement and back pay, alleging violation of his due process rights and 18 U.S.C. 3602, which provides that a district court shall appoint probation officers and “may, for cause, remove a probation officer appointed to serve with compensation.” ‖The district court dismissed. Rejecting the government’s argument Roldan was not among those excepted service employees eligible for review of adverse agency actions under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Semper failed to set forth a money-mandating statute or regulation giving him the right to contest his termination in a Tucker Act proceeding. Following denial of certiorari, Semper filed another suit, citing federal question jurisdiction, and asserting a Bivens claim against the chief judge in his individual capacity; a claim against that judge in his official capacity; a claim against the United States pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act; and a claim under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, against the judge. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of three claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded with instructions to dismiss his individual capacity claim against the judge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Semper v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Bason was an Assistant Attorney General with the Virgin Islands Department of Justice, subject to a collective bargaining agreement. The Governor of the Virgin Islands approved Bason’s immediate termination. The Union submitted a grievance challenging the decision. An arbitrator found that the Governor lacked just cause to remove Bason and awarded immediate reinstatement. The Virgin Islands Superior Court vacated the award “only to the extent that it grants relief prior to July 23, 2010.” The Government filed a notice of appeal. The Union moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because neither the court nor the arbitrator ever established the amount of back pay owed to Bason, rendering the judgment non-final. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court held that an order mandating immediate reinstatement constitutes an appealable injunction and reversed the reinstatement. The Union sought certiorari, but on December 28, 2012, the President signed H.R. 6116, to eliminate Third Circuit certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Third Circuit concluded that it retained certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in Virgin Islands courts before the enactment of H.R. 6116, but dismissed the petition as moot because Bason had died.View "United Indus., Serv., Transp., Prof'l, & Gov't Workers v. Gov't of the V.I." on Justia Law

New Jersey and Pennsylvania municipalities sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) (collectively, the Enterprises). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally-chartered but privately owned corporations that issue publicly traded securities, created by Congress to establish and stabilize secondary markets for residential mortgages, 12 U.S.C. 1716; 12 U.S.C. 1451. Fannie and Freddie purchase mortgages from third-party lenders, pooling them together and selling securities backed by those mortgages. In the wake of the housing market collapse of 2008, Fannie and Freddie owned many defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages. They went bankrupt, and Congress created the FHFA to act as conservator for Fannie and Freddie. Congress exempted the Enterprises from all state and local taxation, with an exception for taxes on real property. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments that the Enterprises were not exempt from paying state and local real estate transfer taxes. The district courts dismissed. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. View "Delaware Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

Before Paul filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Paul and Candace were in divorce proceedings in New Jersey. No final judgment existed nor was there a division of marital assets. Based on an estimate of her expected share of marital assets, Candace filed a timely proof of claim for $577,935 against Paul’s bankruptcy estate, apparently premised on her stake in a partnership that was legally titled in Paul’s name and, therefore, passed to his bankruptcy estate. It would likely be distributed as shared marital property in a divorce decree. The trustee sought to expunge the claim, arguing that Candace’s interest in equitably dividing marital property in Paul’s bankruptcy estate was not a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. 101(5), because the state court had not entered a final divorce decree before Paul’s filing. The bankruptcy judge found that the claim for equitable distribution arose prepetition and must be allowed. On direct appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Although Candace did not have an equitable distribution decree in hand at the time Paul filed for bankruptcy, the focus should not be on when the claim accrues, but whether a claim exists. Given the Bankruptcy Code’s expansive definition of “claim,” a non-debtor spouse has an allowable pre-petition claim against the bankruptcy estate for equitable distribution of marital property when the parties are in divorce proceedings before the bankruptcy petition is filed. View "In re: Paul Ruitenberg, III" on Justia Law

Woronowicz was convicted of four counts of willful failure to file tax returns and was sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment with 1 year of supervised release. He failed to comply with the terms of supervised release, resulting in an additional three months’ imprisonment. Woronowicz failed to surrender. After being arrested, Woronowicz consented a search of his residence. Agents discovered counterfeit currency with a face value in excess of $207,000. About 90 percent of the bills were completed on only one side and $20,000 worth were completed on both sides. Agents also discovered materials used to manufacture counterfeit currency. Woronowicz pleaded guilty to the one count of counterfeiting. The district court applied a 12-level enhancement to the Guidelines range, under section 2B5.1(b)(1)(B) based on its calculation of the face value of the counterfeit currency as exceeding $200,000. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Woronowicz" on Justia Law

Vega pled guilty to multiple counts of crack cocaine possession and distribution, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. In 2004, the district court sentenced him to 108 months imprisonment on the drug charges and a mandatory 60 months, to be served consecutively, on the firearm count. The Sentencing Guidelines called for 97-121 months on the drug charges; the gun offense carried a mandatory consecutive sentence of 60 months, 18 U.S.C. 24(c)(1)(A)(I). At the time, the drug charges also carried a mandatory minimum penalty of 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). This ought to have led to a range of 120-121 months, but the mandatory minimum was not requested by the government. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act lowered mandatory minimum penalties for distributing crack cocaine. Under the new guideline (made retroactive, effective November, 2011), the offense level for Vega’s drug offenses would be 30. With relevant adjustments already established, this would lead to a Guideline range of 78-97 months rather than 97-121 months. The district court found that sentence reduction was blocked by operation of the 120 month mandatory minimum sentence that should have been, but was not, applied to his case. The Third Circuit reversed, acknowledging that the case presented an interaction of complex statutes, policy statements, and confused prior proceedings, creating a difficult, perhaps unique, pattern. View "United States v. Ortiz-Vega" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Zhu, from Fujian Province, China, entered the U.S. in 1999 without proper documentation. In an INS interview, she stated that she feared persecution under China’s population control policies. She was paroled into the U.S. for a hearing. In 2000, Zhu applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Zhu testified that birth control officials tried to force her to wear an IUD. The IJ found Zhu’s testimony lacked credibility and ordered her removed. The BIA affirmed. In 2002, Zhu moved to reopen, alleging that she had married and given birth to a son and would be forcibly sterilized if she returned to China. The BIA denied the motion, noting that Zhu was not in violation of Chinese population control policies and had not shown that a Chinese national becomes automatically subject to punitive birth control measures if she returns with a child born outside China. In 2008, Zhu again moved to reopen, alleging that she had given birth to two more children and that the Chinese government now counted children born overseas when considering violations of population control policies. She submitted a notice indicating that Zhu must submit to sterilization upon her return to China, and a letter from her mother, noting that the officials had learned about her children. The BIA denied the motion. In 2013, Zhu filed a third motion, with voluminous documentation. The BIA denied Zhu’s motion to reopen. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that the BIA’s opinion did not reflect meaningful consideration of much of the evidence. View "Zhu v. Att'y Gen. of United States" on Justia Law