Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by a group of students and Children’s Health Defense, Inc. against Rutgers University. The plaintiffs challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required in-person students to be vaccinated or else enroll in online programs or seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons. The court found that the university's policy did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights.The court held that there is no fundamental right to refuse vaccination. It applied the rational basis review and concluded that Rutgers University had a rational basis for its policy given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the policy was ultra vires under New Jersey law, determining that Rutgers was authorized to require COVID-19 vaccinations under state law. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, concluding that Rutgers had a rational basis for its differential treatment of students and staff, as well as vaccinated and unvaccinated students. View "Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), which allows certain qualified retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms, and its relation to New Jersey’s more restrictive retired police officer permitting law. The retired law enforcement officers from various agencies claimed that LEOSA provided them with a federal right to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey, superseding the state law. The State of New Jersey argued that LEOSA did not provide an enforceable right and, if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies—not to officers who retired from New Jersey law enforcement agencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers who meet all the statutory requirements with an enforceable right, and that right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court held that the federal statute also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers, allowing them to carry concealed firearms. View "Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a group of former union members alleged that their First Amendment rights were violated when their respective unions continued to deduct membership dues from their paychecks after they had resigned from the unions. The appellants had previously signed union membership applications authorizing the deduction of dues from their paychecks, with the authorizations being irrevocable for a year, regardless of membership status, unless the member provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. The appellants resigned from their respective unions after their annual revocation windows had passed, and the unions continued to deduct dues until the next annual revocation window. The appellants argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment, should extend to their situation. The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that Janus was focused on preventing forced speech by nonmembers who never consented to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court further rejected the appellants' due process claims, finding that they had not been deprived of any constitutional rights. The court also dismissed the appellants' contract defenses, finding that they had not alleged that the terms of their original membership agreements entitled them to membership in perpetuity. The court affirmed the District Court's orders dismissing the appellants' claims. View "Fultz v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

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Appellant Gilroy St. Patrick Stewart was pulled over by Trooper George Tessitore for driving a vehicle with heavily tinted windows and a partially obstructed license plate, both violations of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had to determine whether the officer unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop, thereby violating Stewart's Fourth Amendment rights.Upon pulling over Stewart, Tessitore asked for his driver's license and the vehicle’s registration. Stewart produced an Ohio driver's license and a vehicle that was registered to a Hazel Sparkes of Baldwin, New York. Stewart claimed the vehicle belonged to his aunt. Tessitore then questioned Stewart about his travel plans. During the stop, Tessitore discovered that Stewart had a history of arrests, including a money laundering arrest made by the Drug Enforcement Agency. Tessitore also noted that Stewart was driving on I-80, a well-known drug trafficking corridor, and that there was an air freshener hanging from Stewart's rear-view mirror, often used to mask the smell of narcotics.Stewart was subsequently charged with possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, after 20 kilograms of cocaine were found in a hidden compartment in his vehicle. Stewart moved to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an unlawful search, a motion that was denied by the District Court.Upon review, the Court of Appeals held that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he extended the length of the stop, due to a combination of factors including Stewart's evasive and inconsistent answers, the darkly tinted car windows, the car's registration to a third party, Stewart's prior arrests, his travel along a known drug corridor, and the air freshener in his vehicle. As such, the officer did not unconstitutionally prolong the traffic stop, and Stewart's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the District Court’s order denying Stewart's motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop. View "USA v. Stewart" on Justia Law

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In a case involving the Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds in Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that these individuals are included in "the people" whose right to bear arms is protected under the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs, including three individuals who were aged 18 to 20 when the case was filed, along with two gun rights organizations, challenged Pennsylvania's statutory scheme that effectively bans 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms outside their homes during a state of emergency. The Court found that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment presumptively encompasses all adult Americans, including 18-to-20-year-olds, and there was no founding-era law that supported disarming this age group. The Court reversed the District Court's decision dismissing the case and denying the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to enter an injunction forbidding the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police from arresting law-abiding 18-to-20-year-olds who openly carry firearms during a state of emergency declared by the Commonwealth. View "Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police" on Justia Law

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This case involves Bradley Barlow, Frances Biddiscombe, and others who were members of either the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 668 or the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 13. They all signed union membership agreements authorizing the deduction of membership dues from their paychecks. The authorizations were irrevocable, regardless of union membership status, unless they provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. After resigning from their respective unions, their membership dues continued to be deducted until the next annual revocation window. They sued, claiming that the continued collection of dues after their resignations constitutes compelled speech, violating their First Amendment rights. They relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of their complaints, holding that Janus was focused on nonmembers who never elected to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court also rejected their due process claims for failure to provide procedures for notice and the ability to object to how their dues were spent, as these procedures were based on avoiding subjecting nonconsenting individuals from subsidizing a political agenda, which was not the case for these appellants. The court also rejected the appellants' contract defenses. View "Barlow v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

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A traffic stop conducted by Pennsylvania State Trooper Galen Clemons resulted in the arrest of Jamar Hunter after a loaded Glock-45 semi-automatic handgun was discovered in Hunter's waistband. This discovery followed a routine license and warrant check and an additional computerized criminal history check on Hunter and his passenger, Deshaun Davis. Hunter was later indicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Hunter moved to suppress the firearm evidence claiming that the computerized criminal history check extended the traffic stop beyond its constitutional authority.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Hunter's motion to suppress. The court reasoned that the computerized criminal history check was unrelated to the traffic stop's mission and, without reasonable suspicion, prolonged the stop, therefore violating the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, finding that the lower court had applied a subjective standard of review, thereby erring as a matter of law. The appellate court held that the criminal history check, which lasted approximately two minutes, was an objectively reasonable safety precaution related to the mission of the traffic stop under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) and the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals found the check to be a negligibly burdensome officer safety precaution that fell within the stop's mission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "USA v. Hunter" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Lutter began working for Essex County, in a bargaining unit represented by JNESO. Under Supreme Court precedent (Abood), a public-sector union could charge fees from non-union members whom the union represented. New Jersey law permitted public-sector unions to deduct an "agency fee." Lutter joined JNESO and authorized payroll deductions of her union dues.In 2018, New Jersey enacted the Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act (WDEA): a union member could revoke authorization for payroll deductions only during the 10 days following the anniversary of his employment start date. Previously, union members could give notice of revocation at any time. A month later, the Supreme Court (Janus) held that the First Amendment prohibits public-sector unions from collecting agency fees from nonmembers without their clear and affirmative consent. Under WDEA Janus would have to wait nearly a year to revoke her payroll deduction authorization. In July 2018, she nonetheless requested that deductions of her union dues cease and resigned from JNESO. Essex County deducted Lutter's union dues for 10 months.Lutter filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. JNESO sent her a check in the amount of the contested union dues plus interest. She did not cash or deposit that check. The district court dismissed the case. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The check did not moot her damages claims against JNESO but Lutter, as a non-union member no longer subject to payroll deductions, lacks standing for her claims against the other parties and for her additional requests for relief against JNESO. View "Lutter v. Jneso" on Justia Law

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Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference. View "Durham v. Kelley" on Justia Law

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Philadelphia Police obtained a search warrant for the house where Dennis resided, suspecting that it was being used for drug activity. Dennis was not home. Six officers performing surveillance were in plain clothes “to maintain an advantage.” They spotted Dennis driving near his house and decided to stop his car. The ensuing events were captured by a nearby surveillance camera. The plainclothes officers in unmarked police cars surrounded Dennis’s vehicle at an intersection. For 48 seconds, Dennis attempted to free his car, bumping into the police vehicles. When Dennis’s car appeared to have stopped, Officer Nicoletti shot Dennis, who was unarmed, three times through the driver’s window. Dennis died at the scene.In the ensuing lawsuit (42 U.S.C. 1983), the court found open questions of fact concerning excessive force claims against Philadelphia and Nicoletti, regarding whether Dennis posed a threat to the officers or public safety. The court denied Nicoletti qualified immunity, reasoning that his conduct: “sho[oting] at an unarmed driver attempting to escape at slow speed who had hit a car,” and/or “using deadly force against an individual driving a car” when “the driver did not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or others,” violated clearly established law. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to consider Nicoletti’s factual arguments and rejecting any arguments that could be construed as a legal challenge to the holding that his conduct violated clearly established law. View "Rush v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law